Faculty Research Working Papers Series

The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy

John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt

March 2006

RWP06-011

The views expressed in the KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the John F. Kennedy School of Government or Harvard University. Copyright belongs to the author(s). Papers may be downloaded for personal use only.

  

THE  ISRAEL  LOBBY  AND  U.S.  FOREIGN  POLICY  

John  J.  Mearsheimer  

Department  of  Political  Science  

University  of  Chicago  

Stephen  M.  Walt  

John  F.  Kennedy  School  of  Government  

Harvard  University  

March  2006  

The  two  authors  of  this  Working  Paper  are  solely  responsible  for  the  views  expressed  in  it.   As  academic  institutions,  Harvard  University  and  the  University  of  Chicago  do  not  take  positions  on  the  scholarship  of  individual  faculty,  and  this  article  should  not  be  interpreted  or  portrayed  as  reflecting  the  official  position  of  either  institution.  

An  edited  and  reworked  version  of  this  paper  was  published  in  the  London  Review  of  Books  Vol.  28,  No.  6  (March  23,  2006),  and  is  available  online  at  www.lrb.co.uk  

THE  ISRAEL  LOBBY  AND  U.S.  FOREIGN  POLICY  

  U.S.  foreign  policy  shapes  events  in  every  corner  of  the  globe.   Nowhere  is  this  truer  than  in  the  Middle  East,  a  region  of  recurring  instability  and  enormous  strategic  importance.   Most  recently,  the  Bush  Administration’s  attempt  to  transform  the  region  into  a  community  of  democracies  has  helped  produce  a  resilient  insurency  in  Iraq,  a  sharp  rise  in  world  oil  prices,  and  terrorist  bombings  in  Madrid,  London,  and  Amman.    With  so  much  at  stake  for  so  many,  all  countries  need  to  understand  the  forces  that  drive  U.S.  Middle  East  policy.  

 The  U.S.  national  interest  should  be  the  primary  object  of  American  foreign  policy.    For  the  past  several  decades,  however,  and  especially  since  the  Six  Day  War  in  1967,  the  centerpiece  of  U.S.  Middle  East  policy  has  been  its  relationship  with  Israel.   The  combination  of  unwavering  U.S.  support  for  Israel  and  the  related  effort  to  spread  democracy  throughout  the  region  has  inflamed  Arab  and  Islamic  opinion  and  eopardized  U.S.  security.   

 This  situation  has  no  equal  in  American  political  history.   Why  has  the  United  States  been  willing  to  set  aside  its  own  security  in  order  to  advance  the  interests  of  another  state?   One  might  assume  that  the  bond  between  the  two  countries  is  based  on  shared  strategic  interests  or  compelling  moral  imperativs.   As  we  show  below,  however,  neither  of  those  explanations  can  account  for  the  remarkable  level  of  material  and  diplomatic  support  that  the  United  States  povides  to  Israel.    

 Instead,  the  overall  thrust  of  U.S.  policy  in  the  region  is  due  almost  entirely  to  U.S.  domestic  politics,  and  especially  to  the  activities  of  the  “Israel  Lobby.”  Other  special  interest  groups  have  managed  to  skew  U.S.  foreign  policy  in  directions  they  favored,  but  no  lobby  has  managed  to  divert  U.S.  foreign  policy  as  far  from  what  the  American  national  interest  would  otherwise  suggest,  while  simultaneously  convincing  Americans  that  U.S.  and  Israeli  interests  are  essentially  identical.1    

 In  the  pages  that  follow,  we  describe  how  the  Lobby  has  accomplished  this  feat,  and  how  its  activities  have  shaped  America’s  actions  in  this  critical  region.   Given  the  strategic  importance  of  the  Middle  East  and  its  potential  impact  on  others,  both  Americans  and  non‐Americans  need  to  understand  and  address  the  Lobby’s  influence  on  U.S.  policy.   

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 Some  readers  will  find  this  analysis  disturbing,  but  the  facts  recounted  here  are  not  in  serious  dispute  among  scholars.   Indeed,  our  account  relies  heavily  on  the  work  of  Israeli  scholars  and  journalists,  who  deserve  great  credit  for  shedding  light  on  these  issues.   We  also  rely  on  evidence  provided  by  respected  Israeli  and  international  human  rights  organizations.   Similarly,  our  claims  about  the  Lobby’s  impact  rely  on  testimony  from  the  Lobby’s  own  members,  as  well  as  testimony  from  politicians  who  have  worked  with  them.   Readers  may  reject  our  conclusions,  of  course,  but  the  evidence  on  which  they  rest  is  not  controversial.  

 THE  GREAT  BENEFACTOR  

 Since  the  October  War  in  1973,  Washington  has  provided  Israel  with  a  level  of  support  dwarfing  the  amounts  provided  to  any  other  state.   It  has  been  the  largest  annual  recipient  of  direct  U.S.  economic  and  military  assistance  since  1976  and  the  largest  total  recipient  since  World  War  II.   Total  direct  U.S.  aid  to  Israel  amounts  to  well  over  $140  billion  in  2003  dollars.2   Israel  receives  about  $3  billion  in  direct  foreign  assistance  each  year,  which  is  roughly  one‐fifth  of  America’s  foreign  aid  budget.   In  per  capita  terms,  the  United  States  gives  each  Israeli  a  direct  subsidy  worth  about  $500  per  year.3   This  largesse  is  especially  striking  when  one  realizes  that  Israel  is  now  a  wealthy  industrial  state  with  a  per  capita  incom  roughly  equal  to  South  Korea  or  Spain.4

 Israel  also  gets  other  special  deals  from  Washington.5   Other  aid  recipients  get  their  money  in  quarterly  installments,  but  Israel  receives  its  entire  appropriation  at  the  beginning  of  each  fiscal  year  and  thus  earns  extra  interest.   Most  recipients  of  American  military  assistance  are  required  to  spend  all  of  it  in  the  United  States,  but  Israel  can  use  roughly  twenty‐five  percent  of  its  aid  allotment  to  subsidize  its  own  defense  industry.   Israel  is  the  only  recipient  that  does  not  have  to  account  for  how  the  aid  is  spent,  an  exemption  that  makes  it  virtually  impossible  to  prevent  the  money  from  being  used  for  purposes  the  United  States  opposes,  like  building  settlements  in  the  West  Bank.  

 Moreover,  the  United  States  has  provided  Israel  with  nearly  $3  billion  to  develop  weapons  systems  like  the  Lavi  aircraft  that  the  Pentagon  did  not  want  or  need,  while  giving  Israel  access  to  top‐drawer  U.S.  weaponry  like  Blackhawk  helicopters  and  F‐16  jets.   Finally,  the  United  States  gives  Israel  access  to  intelligence  that  it  denies  its  NATO  allies  and  has  turned  a  blind  eye  towards  Israels  acquisition  of  nuclear  weapons.6   

 2

In  addition,  Washington  provides  Israel  with  consistent  diplomatic  support.   Since  1982,  the  United  States  has  vetoed  32  United  Nations  Security  Council  resolutions  that  were  critical  of  Israel,  a  number  greater  than  the  combined  total  of  vetoes  cast  by  all  the  other  Security  Council  members.7   It  also  blocks  Arab  states’  efforts  to  put  Israel’s  nuclear  arsenal  on  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency’s  agenda.8

 The  United  States  also  comes  to  Israel’s  rescue  in  wartime  and  takes  its  side  when  negotiating  peace.   The  Nixon  Administration  re‐supplied  Israel  during  the  October  War  and  protected  Israel  from  the  threat  of  Soviet  intervention.   Washington  was  deeply  involved  in  the  negotiations  that  ended  that  war  as  well  as  the  lengthy  “step‐by‐step”  process  that  followed,  just  as  it  played  a  key  role  in  the  negotiations  that  preceded  and  followed  the  1993  Oslo  Accords.9   There  were  occasional  frictions  between  U.S.  and  Israeli  officials  in  both  cases,  but  the  United  States  coordinated  its  positions  closely  with  Israel  and  consistently  backed  the  Israeli  approach  to  the  negotitions.   Indeed,  one  American  participant  at  Camp  David  (2000)  later  said,  “far  too  often,  we  functioned  .  .  .  as  Israel’s  lawyer.”10    

 As  discussed  below,  Washington  has  given  Israel  wide  latitude  in  dealing  with  the  occupied  territories  (the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip),  even  when  its  actions  were  at  odds  with  stated  U.S.  policy.   Moreover,  the  Bush  Administration’s  ambitious  strategy  to  transform  the  Middle  East—beginning  with  the  invasion  of  Iraq—is  at  least  partly  intended  to  improve  Israel’s  strategic  situation.   Apart  from  wartime  alliances,  it  is  hard  to  think  of  another  instance  where  one  country  has  provided  another  with  a  similar  level  of  material  and  diplomaticsupport  for  such  an  extended  period.   America’s  support  for  Israel  is,  in  short,  unique.  

 This  extraordinary  generosity  might  be  understandable  if  Israel  were  a  vital  strategic  asset  or  if  there  were  a  compelling  mora  case  for  sustained  U.S.  backing.   But  neither  rationale  is  convincing.  

 A  STRATEGIC  LIABILITY  

 According  to  the  American‐Israel  Public  Affairs  Committee’s  (AIPAC)  website,  “the  United  States  and  Israel  have  formed  a  unique  partnership  to  meet  the  growing  strategic  threats  in  the  Middle  East  .  .  .  .  This  cooperative  effort  provides  significant  benefits  for  both  the  United  States  and  Israel.”11   This  claim  is  an  article  of  faith  among  Israel’s  supporters  and  is  routinely  invoked  by  Israeli  politicians  and  pro‐Israel  Americans.   

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Israel  may  have  been  a  strategic  asset  during  the  Cold  War.12   By  serving  as  America’s  proxy  after  the  Six  Day  War  (1967),  Israel  helped  contain  Soviet  expansion  in  the  region  and  inflicted  humiliating  defeats  on  Soviet  clients  like  Egypt  and  Syria.   Israel  occasionally  helped  protect  other  U.S.  allies  (like  Jordan’s  King  Hussein)  and  its  military  prowess  forced  Moscow  to  spend  more  backing  its  losing  clients.   Israel  also  gave  the  United  States  useful  intelligence  about  Soviet  capabilities.  

 Israel’s  strategic  value  during  this  period  should  not  be  overstated,  however.13   Backing  Israel  was  not  cheap,  and  it  complicated  America’s  relations  with  the  Arab  world.   For  example,  the  U.S.  decision  to  give  Israel  $2.2  billion  in  emergency  military  aid  during  the  October  War  triggered  an  OPEC  oil  embargo  that  inflicted  considerable  damage  o  Western  economies.   Moreover,  Israel’s  military  could  not  protect  U.S.  interests  in  the  region.   For  example,  the  United  States  could  not  rely  on  Israel  when  the  Iranian  Revolution  in  1979  raised  concerns  about  the  security  of  Persian  Glf  oil  supplies,  and  had  to  create  its  own  “Rapid  Deployment  Force”  instead.   

Even  if  Israel  was  a  strategic  asset  during  the  Cold  War,  the  first  Gulf  War  (1990‐91)  revealed  that  Israel  was  becoming  a  strategic  burden.   The  United  States  could  not  use  Israeli  bases  during  the  war  without  rupturing  the  anti‐Iraq  coalition,  and  it  had  to  divert  resources  (e.g.,  Patriot  missile  batteries)  to  keep  Tel  Aviv  from  doing  anything  that  might  fracture  the  alliance  against  Saddam.   History  repeated  itself  in  2003:  although  Israel  was  eager  for  the  United  States  to  attack  Saddam,  President  Bush  could  not  ask  it  to  help  without  triggering  Arab  opposition.   So  Israel  stayed  on  the  sidelines  again.14

Beginning  in  the  1990s,  and  especially  after  9/11,  U.S.  support  for  Israel  has  been  justified  by  the  claim  that  both  states  are  threatened  by  terrorist  groups  originating  in  the  Arabor  Muslim  world,  and  by  a  set  of  “rogue  states”  that  back  these  groups  and  seek  WMD.   This  rationale  implies  that  Washington  should  give  Israel  a  free  hand  in  dealing  with  the  Palestinians  and  not  press  Israel  t  make  concessions  until  all  Palestinian  terrorists  are  imprisoned  or  dead.   It  also  implies  that  the  United  States  should  go  after  countries  like  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Iran,  Saddam  Hussein’s  Iraq,  and  Bashar  al‐Assad’s  Syria.   Israel  is  thus  seen  as  a  crucial  ally  in  the  war  on  terror,  because  its  enemies  are  America’s  enemies.   

This  new  rationale  seems  persuasive,  but  Israel  is  in  fact  a  liability  in  the  war  on  terror  and  the  broader  effort  to  deal  with  rogue  states.   

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To  begin  with,  “terrorism”  is  a  tactic  employed  by  a  wide  array  of  political  groups;  it  is  not  a  single  unified  adversary.   The  terrorist  organizations  that  threaten  Israel  (e.g.,  Hamas  or  Hezbollah)  do  not  threaten  the  United  States,  except  when  it  intervenes  against  them  (as  in  Lebanon  in  1982).   Moreover,  Palestinian  terrorism  is  not  random  violence  directed  against  Israel  or  “the  West”;  it  is  largely  a  response  to  Israel’s  prolonged  campaign  to  colonize  the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip.   

  More  importantly,  saying  that  Israel  and  the  United  States  are  united  by  a  shared  terrorist  threat  has  the  causal  relationship  backwards:  rather,  the  United  States  has  a  terrorism  problem  in  good  part  because  it  is  so  closely  allied  with  Israel,  not  the  other  way  around.   U.S.  support  for  Israel  is  not  the  only  source  of  anti‐American  terrorism,  but  it  is  an  important  one,  and  it  makes  winning  the  war  on  terror  more  difficult.15   There  is  no  question,  for  example,  that  many  al  Qaeda  leaders,  including  bin  Laden,  are  motivated  by  Israel’s  presence  in  Jerusalem  and  the  plight  of  the  Palestinians.   According  to  the  U.S.  9/11  Commission,  bin  Laden  explicitly  sought  to  punish  the  United  States  for  its  policies  in  the  Middle  East,  including  its  support  for  Israel,  and  he  even  tried  to  time  the  attacks  to  highlight  this  issue.16   

  Equally  important,  unconditional  U.S.  support  for  Israel  makes  it  easier  for  extremists  like  bin  Laden  to  rally  popular  support  and  to  attract  recruits.   Public  opinion  polls  confirm  that  Arab  populations  are  deeply  hostile  to  American  support  for  Israel,  and  the  U.S.  State  Department’s  Advisory  Group  on  Public  Diplomacy  for  the  Arab  and  Muslim  world  found  that  “citizens  in  these  countries  are  genuinely  distressed  at  the  plight  of  the  Palestinians  and  at  the  role  they  perceive  the  UnitedStates  to  be  playing.”17

  As  for  so‐called  rogue  states  in  the  Middle  East,  they  are  not  a  dire  threat  to  vital  U.S.  interests,  apart  from  the  U.S.  commitment  to  Israel  itself.   Although  the  United  States  does  have  a  number  of  disagreements  with  these  regimes,  Washington  would  not  be  nearly  as  worried  about  Iran,  Ba’thist  Iraq,  or  Syria  were  it  not  so  closely  tied  to  Israel.   Even  if  these  states  acquire  nuclear  weapons—which  is  obviously  not  desirable—it  would  not  be  a  strategic  disaster  for  the  United  States.   Neither  America  nor  Israel  could  be  blackmailed  by  a  nucleararmed  rogue,  because  the  blackmailer  could  not  carry  out  the  threat  without  receiving  overwhelming  retaliation.   The  danger  of  a  “nuclear  handoff”  to  terrorists  is  equally  remote,  because  a  rogue  state  could  not  be  sure  the  transfer  would  be  undetected  or  that  it  would  not  be  blamed  and  punished  afterward.   

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  Furthermore,  the  U.S.  relationship  with  Israel  actually  makes  it  harder  to  deal  with  these  states.   Israel’s  nuclear  arsenal  is  one  reason  why  some  of  its  neighbors  want  nuclear  weapons,  and  threatening  these  states  with  regime  change  merely  increases  that  desire.   Yet  Israel  is  not  much  of  an  asset  when  the  United  States  contemplates  using  force  against  these  regimes,  because  it  cannot  participate  in  the  fight.   

  In  short,  treating  Israel  as  America’s  most  important  ally  in  the  campaign  against  terrorism  and  assorted  Middle  East  dictatorships  bothexaggerates  Israel’s  ability  to  help  on  these  issues  and  ignores  the  ways  that  Israel’s  policies  make  U.S.  efforts  more  difficult.   

  Unquestioned  support  for  Israel  also  weakens  the  U.S.  position  outside  the  Middle  East.   Foreign  elites  consistently  view  the  United  States  as  too  supportive  of  Israel,  and  think  its  tolerance  of  Israeli  repression  in  the  occupied  territories  is  morally  obtuse  and  a  handicap  in  the  war  on  terroism.18   In  April  2004,  for  example,  52  former  British  diplomats  sent  Prime  Minister  Tony  Blair  a  letter  saying  that  the  Israel‐Palestine  conflict  had  “poisoned  relations  between  the  West  and  the  Arab  and  Islamic  worlds,”  and  warning  that  the  policies  of  Bush  and  Prime  Minister  Ariel  Sharon  were  “one‐sided  and  illegal.”19

  A  final  reason  to  question  Israel’s  strategic  value  is  that  it  does  not  act  like  a  loyal  ally.   Israeli  officials  frequently  ignore  U.S.  requests  and  renege  on  promises  made  to  top  U.S.  leaders  (including  past  pledges  to  halt  settlement  construction  and  to  refrain  from  “targeted  assassinations”  of  Palestinian  leaders).20   Moreover,  Israel  has  provided  sensitive  U.S.  military  technology  to  potential  U.S.  rivals  like  China,  in  what  the  U.S.  State  Department  Inspector‐General  called  “a  systematic  and  growing  pattern  of  unauthorized  transfers.”21   According  to  the  U.S.  General  Accounting  Office,  Israel  also  “conducts  the  most  aggressive  espionage  operations  against  the  U.S.  of  any  ally.”22   In  addition  to  the  case  of  Jonathan  Pollard,  who  gave  Israel  large  quantities  of  classified  material  in  the  early  1980s  (which  Israel  reportedly  passed  onto  the  Soviet  Union  to  gain  more  exit  visas  for  Soviet  Jews),  a  new  controversy  erupted  in  2004  when  it  was  revealed  that  a  key  Pentagon  official  (Larry  Franklin)  had  passed  classified  information  to  an  Israeli  diplomat,  allegedly  aided  by  two  AIPAC  officials.23   Israel  is  hardly  the  only  country  that  spies  on  the  United  States,  but  its  willingness  to  spy  on  its  principal  patron  casts  further  doubt  on  its  strategic  value.   

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A  DWINDLING  MORAL  CASE  

Apart  from  its  alleged  strategic  value,  Israel’s  backers  also  argue  that  it  deserves  unqualified  U.S.  support  because  1)  it  is  weak  and  surrounded  by  enemies,  2)  it  is  a  democracy,  which  is  a  morally  preferable  form  of  government;  3)  the  Jewish  people  have  suffered  from  past  crimes  and  therefore  deserve  special  treatment,  and  4)  Israel’s  conduct  has  been  morally  superior  to  its  adversaries’  behavior.

On  close  inspection,  however,  each  of  these  arguments  is  unpersuasive.   There  is  a  strong  moral  case  for  supporting  Israel’s  existence,  but  that  is  not  in  jeopardy.   Viewed  objectively,  Israel’s  past  and  present  conduct  offers  no  moral  basis  for  privileging  it  over  the  Palestinians.    

Backing  the  Underdog?  

 Israel  is  often  portrayed  as  weak  and  besieged,  a  Jewish  David  surrounded  by  a  hostile  Arab  Goliath.   This  image  has  been  carefully  nurtured  by  Israeli  leaders  and  sympathetic  writers,  but  the  opposite  image  is  closer  to  the  truth.   Contrary  to  popular  belief,  the  Zionists  had  larger,  better‐equipped,  and  better‐led  forces  during  the  1947‐49  War  of  Independence  and  the  Israel  Defense  Forces  (IDF)  won  quick  and  easy  victories  against  Egypt  in  1956  and  against  Egypt,  Jordan,  and  Syria  in  1967—before  large‐scale  U.S.  aid  began  flowing  to  Israel.24   These  victories  offer  eloquent  evidence  of  Israeli  patriotism,  organizational  ability,  and  military  prowess,  but  they  also  reveal  that  Israel  was  far  from  helpless  even  in  its  earliest  years.    

 Today,  Israel  is  the  strongest  military  power  in  the  Middle  East.   Its  conventional  forces  are  far  superior  to  its  neighbors  and  it  is  the  only  state  in  the  region  with  nuclear  weapons.   Egypt  and  Jordan  signed  peace  treaties  with  Israel  and  Saudi  Arabia  has  offered  to  do  so  as  well.   Syria  has  lost  its  Soviet  patron,  Iraq  has  been  decimated  by  three  disastrous  wars,  and  Iran  is  hundreds  of  miles  away.  The  Palestinians  barely  have  effective  police,  let  alone  a  military  that  could  threaten  Israel.   According  to  a  2005  assessment  by  Tel  Aviv  University’s  prestigious  Jaffee  Center  for  Strategic  Studies,  “the  strategic  balance  decidedly  favors  Israel,  which  has  continued  to  widen  the  qualitative  gap  between  its  own  military  capability  and  deterrence  powers  and  those  of  its  neghbors.”25    If  backing  the  underdog  were  a  compelling  rationale,  the  United  States  would  be  supporting  Israel’s  opponents.   

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Aiding  a  Fellow  Democracy?  

 American  backing  is  often  justified  by  the  claim  that  Israel  is  a  fellow‐democracy  surrounded  by  hostile  dictatorships.   This  rationale  sounds  convincing,  but  it  cannot  account  for  the  current  level  of  U.S.  support.   After  all,  there  are  many  democracies  around  the  world,  but  none  receives  the  lavish  support  that  Israel  does.   The  United  States  has  overthrown  democratic  governments  in  the  past  and  supported  dictators  when  this  was  thought  to  advance  .S.  interests,  and  it  has  good  relations  with  a  number  of  dictatorships  today.   Thus,  being  democratic  neither  justifies  nor  explains  America’s  support  for  Israel.   

 The  “shared  democracy”  rationale  is  also  weakened  by  aspects  of  Israeli  democracy  that  are  at  odds  with  core  American  values.   The  United  States  is  a  liberal  democracy  where  people  of  any  race,  religion,  or  ethnicity  are  supposed  to  enjoy  equal  rights.   By  contrast,  Israel  was  explicitly  founded  as  a  Jewish  state  and  citizenship  is  based  on  the  principle  of  blood  kinship.26   Given  this  conception  of  citizenship,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Israel’s  1.3  million  Arabs  are  treated  as  second‐class  citizens,  or  that  a  recent  Israeli  government  commission  found  that  Israel  behaves  in  a  “neglectful  and  discriminatory”  manner  towards  them.27    

 Similarly,  Israel  does  not  permit  Palestinians  who  marry  Israeli  citizens  to  become  citizens  themselves,  and  does  not  give  these  spouses  the  right  to  live  in  Israel.   The  Israeli  human  rights  organization  B’tselem  called  this  restriction  “a  racist  law  that  determines  who  can  live  here  according  to  racist  criteria.”28   Such  laws  may  be  understandable  given  Israel’s  founding  principles,  but  they  are  not  consistent  with  America’s  image  of  democracy.  

 Israel’s  democratic  status  is  also  undermined  by  its  refusal  to  grant  the  Palestinians  a  viable  state  of  their  own.   Israel  controls  the  lives  of  about  3.8  million  Palestinians  in  Gaza  and  the  West  Bank,  while  colonizing  lands  on  which  the  Palestinians  have  long  dwelt.   Israel  is  formally  democratic,  but  the  millions  of  Palestinians  that  it  controls  are  denied  full  political  rights  and  the  “shared  democracy”  rationale  is  correspondingly  weakened.  

 Compensation  for  Past  Crimes  

A  third  moral  justification  is  the  history  of  Jewish  suffering  in  the  Christian  West,  especially  the  tragic  episode  of  the  Holocaust.   Because  Jews  were  persecuted  for  

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centuries  and  can  only  be  safe  in  a  Jewish  homeland,  many  believe  that  Israel  deserves  special  treatment  from  the  United  States.    

There  is  no  question  that  Jews  suffered  greatly  from  the  despicable  legacy  of  anti‐Semitism,  and  that  Israel’s  creation  was  an  appropriate  response  to  a  long  record  of  crimes.   This  history,  as  noted,  provides  a  strong  moral  case  for  supporting  Israel’s  existence.   But  the  creation  of  Israel  involved  additional  crimes  against  a  largely  innocent  third  party:  the  Palestinians.  

The  history  of  these  events  is  well‐understood.   When  political  Zionism  began  in  earnest  in  the  late  19th  century,  there  were  only  about  15,000  Jews  in  Palestine.29   In  1893,  for  example,  the  Arabs  comprised  roughly  95  percent  of  the  population,  and  though  under  Ottoman  control,  they  had  been  in  continuous  possession  of  this  territory  for  1300  years.30  Even  when  Israel  was  founded,  Jews  were  only  about  35  percent  of  Palestine’s  population  and  owned  7  percent  of  the  land.31

The  mainstream  Zionist  leadership  was  not  interested  in  establishing  a  bi‐national  state  or  accepting  a  permanent  partition  of  Palestine.   The  Zionist  leadership  was  sometimes  willing  to  accept  partition  as  a  first  step,  but  this  was  a  tactical  maneuver  and  not  their  real  objective.   As  David  Ben‐Gurion  put  it  in  the  late  1930s,  “After  the  formation  of  a  large  army  in  the  wake  of  the  establishment  of  the  state,  we  shall  abolish  partition  and  expand  to  the  whole  of  Palestine.”32    

To  achieve  this  goal,  the  Zionists  had  to  expel  large  numbers  of  Arabs  from  the  territory  that  would  eventually  become  Israel.   There  was  simply  no  other  way  to  accomplish  their  objective.   Ben‐Gurion  saw  the  problem  clearly,  writing  in  1941  that  “it  is  impossible  to  imagine  general  evacuation  [of  the  Arab  population]  without  compulsion,  and  brutal  compulsion.”33   Or  as  Israeli  historian  Benny  Morris  puts  it,  “the  idea  of  transfer  is  as  old  as  modern  Zionism  and  has  accompanied  its  evolution  and  praxis  during  the  past  century.”34     

This  opportunity  came  in  1947‐48,  when  Jewish  forces  drove  up  to  700,000  Palestinians  into  exile.35   Israeli  officials  have  long  claimed  that  the  Arabs  fled  because  their  leaders  told  them  to,  but  careful  scholarship  (much  of  it  by  Israeli  historians  like  Morris)  have  demolished  this  myth.   In  fact,  most  Arab  leaders  urged  the  Palestinian  population  to  stay  home,  but  fear  of  violent  death  at  the  hands  of  Zionist  forces  led  most  of  them  to  flee.36   After  the  war,  Israel  barred  the  return  of  the  Palestinian  exiles.   

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The  fact  that  the  creation  of  Israel  entailed  a  moral  crime  against  the  Palestinian  people  was  well  understood  by  Israel’s  leadrs.   As  Ben‐Gurion  told  Nahum  Goldmann,  president  of  the  World  Jewish  Congress,  “If  I  were  an  Arab  leader  I  would  never  make  terms  with  Israel.  That  is  natural:  we  have  taken  their  country.  .  .  .  We  come  from  Israel,  but  two  thousand  years  ago,  and  what  is  that  to  them?   There  has  been  anti‐Semitism,  the  Nazis,  Hitler,  Auschwitz,  but  was  that  their  fault?   They  only  see  one  thing:  we  have  come  here  and  stolen  their  country.   Why  should  they  accept  that?”37

Since  then,  Israeli  leaders  have  repeatedly  sought  to  deny  the  Palestinians’  national  ambitions.38   Prime  Minister  Golda  Meir  famously  remarked  that  “there  was  no  such  thing  as  a  Palestinian,”  and  even  Prime  Minister  Yitzhak  Rabin,  who  signed  the  1993  Oslo  Accords,  nonetheless  opposed  creating  a  full‐fledged  Palestinian  state.39   Pressure  from  extremist  violence  and  the  growing  Palestinian  population  has  forced  subsequent  Israeli  leaders  to  disengage  rom  some  of  the  occupied  territories  and  to  explore  territorial  compromise,  but  no  Israeli  government  has  been  willing  to  offer  the  Palestinians  a  viable  state  of  their  own.   Even  Prime  Minister  Ehud  Barak’s  purportedly  generous  offer  at  Camp  David  in  July  2000  would  only  have  given  the  Palestiniansa  disarmed  and  dismembered  set  of  “Bantustans”  under  de  facto  Israeli  control.40   

Europe’s  crimes  against  the  Jews  provide  a  clear  moral  justification  for  Israel’s  right  to  exist.   But  Israel’s  survival  is  not  in  doubt—even  if  some  Islamic  extremists  make  outrageous  and  unrealistic  references  to  “wiping  it  off  the  map”—and  the  tragic  history  of  the  Jewish  people  does  not  obligate  the  United  States  to  help  Israel  no  matter  what  it  does  today.      

“Virtuous  Israelis”  versus  “Evil  Arabs”  

 The  final  moral  argument  portrays  Israel  as  a  country  that  has  sought  peace  at  every  turn  and  showed  great  restraint  even  when  rovoked.   The  Arabs,  by  contrast,  are  said  to  have  acted  with  great  wickedness.   This  narrative—which  is  endlessly  repeated  by  Israeli  leaders  and  American  apologists  such  as  Alan  Dershowitz—is  yet  another  myth.41   In  terms  of  actual  behavior,  Israel’s  conduct  is  not  morally  distinguishable  from  the  actions  of  its  opponents.  

 Israeli  scholarship  shows  that  the  early  Zionists  were  far  from  benevolent  towards  the  Palestinian  Arabs.42   The  Arab  inhabitants  did  resist  the  Zionists’  encroachments,  which  is  hardly  surprising  given  that  the  Zionists  were  trying  to  create  their  own  state  on  Arab  lands.   The  Zionists  responded  vigorously,  and  

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neither  side  owns  the  moral  high  ground  during  this  period.   This  same  scholarship  also  reveals  that  the  creation  of  Israel  in  1947‐48  involved  explicit  acts  of  ethnic  cleansing,  including  executions,  massacres,  and  rapes  by  Jews.43    

 Furthermore,  Israel’s  subsequent  conduct  towards  its  Arab  adversaries  and  its  Palestinian  subjects  has  often  been  brutal,  belying  any  claim  to  morally  superior  conduct.   Between  1949  and  1956,  for  example,  Israeli  security  forces  killed  between  2,700  and  5000  Arab  infiltrators,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  them  unarmed.44   The  IDF  conducted  numerous  cross‐border  raids  against  its  neighbors  in  the  early  1950s,  and  though  these  actions  were  portrayed  as  defensive  responses,  they  were  actually  part  of  a  broader  effort  to  expand  Israel’s  borders.   Israel’s  expansionist  ambitions  also  led  it  to  join  Britain  and  France  in  attacking  Egypt  in  1956,  and  Israel  withdrew  from  the  lands  it  had  conquered  only  in  the  face  of  intense  U.S.  pressure.  45    

 The  IDF  also  murdered  hundreds  of  Egyptian  prisoners‐of‐war  in  both  the  1956  and  1967  wars.46   In  1967,  it  expelled  between  100,000  and  260,000  Palestinians  from  the  newly‐conquered  West  Bank,  and  drove  80,000  Syrians  from  the  Golan  Heights.47   It  was  also  complicit  in  the  massacre  of  700  innocent  Palestinians  at  the  Sabra  and  Shatila  refugee  camps  following  its  invsion  of  Lebanon  in  1982,  and  an  Israeli  investigatory  commission  found  then‐Defence  Minister  Sharon  “personally  responsible”  for  these  atrocities.48   

 Israeli  personnel  have  tortured  numerous  Palestinian  prisoners,  systematically  humiliated  and  inconvenienced  Palestinian  civilians,  and  used  force  indiscriminately  against  them  on  numerous  occasions.   During  the  First  Intifida  (1987‐1991),  for  example,  the  IDF  distributed  truncheons  to  its  troops  and  encouraged  them  to  break  the  bones  of  Palestinian  protestors.   The  Swedish  “Save  the  Children”  organization  estimated  that  “23,600  to  29,900  children  required  medical  treatment  for  their  beating  injuries  in  the  first  two  years  of  the  intifida,”  with  nearly  one‐third  sustaining  broken  bones.   Nearly  one‐third  of  the  beaten  children  were  aged  ten  and  under.”49    

 Israel’s  response  to  the  Second  Intifida  (2000‐2005)  has  been  even  more  violent,  leading  Ha’aretz  to  declare  that  “the  IDF  …  is  turning  into  a  killing  machine  whose  efficiency  is  awe‐inspiring,  yet  shocking.”50   The  IDF  fired  one  million  bullets  in  the  first  days  of  the  uprising,  which  is  far  from  a  measured  response.51   Since  then,  Israel  has  killed  3.4  Palestinians  for  every  Israeli  lost,  the  majority  of  whom  have  been  innocent  bystanders;  the  ratio  of  Palestinian  to  Israeli  children  killed  is  even  higher  (5.7  to  1).52   Israeli  forces  have  also  killed  several  foreign  

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 peace  activists,  including  a  23  year‐old  American  woman  crushed  by  an  Israeli  bulldozer  in  March  2003.53    

 These  facts  about  Israel’s  conduct  have  been  amply  documented  by  numerous  human  rights  organizations—including  prominent  Israeli  groups—and  are  not  disputed  by  fair‐minded  observers.   And  that  is  why  four  former  officials  of  Shin  Bet  (the  Israeli  domestic  security  organization)  condemned  Israel’s  conduct  during  the  Second  Intifada  in  November  2003.   One  of  them  declared  “we  are  behaving  disgracefully,”  and  another  termed  Israel’s  conduct  “patently  immoral.”54    

 But  isn’t  Israel  entitled  to  do  whatever  it  takes  to  protect  its  citizens?   Doesn’t  the  unique  evil  of  terrorism  justify  continued  U.S.  support,  even  if  Israel  often  responds  harshly?  

 In  fact,  this  argument  is  not  a  compelling  moral  justification  either.   Palestinians  have  used  terrorism  against  their  Israeli  occupiers,  and  their  willingness  to  attack  innocent  civilians  is  wrong.   This  behavior  is  not  surprising,  however,  because  the  Palestinians  believe  they  have  no  other  way  to  force  Israeli  concessions.   As  former  Prime  Minister  Barak  once  admitted,  had  he  been  born  a  Palestinian,  he  “would  have  joined  a  terrorist  organization.”55    

 Finally,  we  should  not  forget  that  the  Zionists  used  terrorism  when  they  were  in  a  similarly  weak  position  and  trying  to  obtain  their  on  state.   Between  1944  and  1947,  several  Zionist  organizations  used  terrorist  bombings  to  drive  the  British  from  Palestine,  and  took  the  lives  of  many  innocent  civilians  along  the  way.56   Israeli  terrorists  also  murdered  U.N.  mediator  Count  Folke  Bernadotte  in  1948,  because  they  opposed  his  proposal  to  internationalize  Jerusalem.57   Nor  were  the  perpetrators  of  these  acts  isolated  extremists:  the  leaders  of  the  murder  plot  were  eventually  granted  amnesty  by  the  Israeli  government  and  one  of  them  was  elected  to  the  Knsset.   Another  terrorist  leader,  who  approved  the  murder  but  was  not  tried,  was  future  Prime  Minister  Yitzhak  Shamir.   Indeed,  Shamir  openly  argued  that  “neither  Jewish  ethics  nor  Jewish  tradition  can  disqualify  terrorism  as  a  means  of  combat.”   Rather,  terrorism  had  “a  great  part  to  play  …  in  our  war  against  the  occupier  [Britain].”58    If  the  Palestinians’  use  of  terrorism  is  morally  reprehensible  today,  so  was  Israel’s  reliance  upon  it  in  the  past,  and  thus  one  cannot  justify  U.S.  support  for  Israel  on  the  grounds  that  its  past  conduct  was  morally  superior.59

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Israel  may  not  have  acted  worse  than  many  other  countries,  but  it  clearly  has  not  acted  any  better.   And  if  neither  strategic  nor  moral  arguments  can  account  for  America’s  support  for  Israel,  how  are  we  to  explain  it?  

 THE  ISRAEL  LOBBY  

 The  explanation  lies  in  the  unmatched  power  of  the  Israel  Lobby.   Were  it  not  for  the  Lobby’s  ability  to  manipulate  the  American  political  system,  the  relationship  between  Israel  and  the  United  States  would  be  far  less  intimate  than  it  is  today.    

 What  Is  The  Lobby?  

 We  use  “the  Lobbyʺ as  a  convenient  short‐hand  term  for  the  loose  coalition  of  individuals  and  organizations  who  actively  work  to  shape  U.S.  foreign  policy  in  a  pro‐Israel  direction.   Our  use  of  this  term  is  not  meant  to  suggest  that  ʺthe  Lobbyʺ is  a  unified  movement  with  a  central  leadership,  or  that  individuals  within  it  do  not  disagree  on  certain  issues  

  The  core  of  the  Lobby  is  comprised  of  American  Jews  who  make  a  significant  effort  in  their  daily  lives  to  bend  U.S.  foreign  policy  so  that  it  advances  Israel’s  interests.   Their  activities  go  beyond  merely  voting  for  candidates  who  are  pro‐Israel  to  include  letter‐writing,  financial  contributions,  and  supporting  pro‐Israel  organizations.    But  not  all  Jewish‐Americans  are  part  of  the  Lobby,  because  Israel  is  not  a  salient  issue  for  many  of  them.   In  a  2004  survey,  for  example,  roughly  36  percent  of  Jewish‐Americans  said  they  were  either  “not  very”  or  “not  at  all”  emotionally  attached  to  Israel.60   

  Jewish‐Americans  also  differ  on  specific  Israeli  policies.   Many  of  the  key  organizations  in  the  Lobby,  like  AIPAC  and  the  Conference  of  Presidents  of  Major  Jewish  Organizations  (CPMJO),  are  run  by  hardliners  who  generally  supported  the  expansionist  policies  of  Israel’s  Likud  Party,  including  its  hostility  to  the  Oslo  Peace  Process.  The  bulk  of  U.S.  Jewry,  on  the  other  hand,  is  more  favorably  disposed  to  making  concessions  to  the  Palestinians,  and  a  few  groups—such  as  Jewish  Voice  for  Peace—strongly  advocate  such  steps.61   Despite  these  differences,  moderates  and  hardliners  both  support  steadfast  U.S.  support  for  Israel.  

  Not  surprisingly,  American  Jewish  leaders  often  consult  with  Israeli  officials,  so  that  the  former  can  maximize  their  influence  in  the  United  States.   As  one  activist  with  a  major  Jewish  organization  wrote,  “it  is  routine  for  us  to  say:  ‘This  is  our  

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policy  on  a  certain  issue,  but  we  must  check  what  the  Israelis  think.’   We  as  a  community  do  it  all  the  time.”62   There  is  also  a  strong  norm  against  criticizing  Israeli  policy,  and  Jewish‐American  leaders  rarely  support  putting  pressure  on  Israel.   Thus,  Edgar  Bronfman  Sr.,  the  president  of  the  World  Jewish  Congress,  was  accused  of  “perfidy”  when  he  wrote  a  letter  to  President  Bush  in  mid‐2003  urging  Bush  to  pressure  Israel  to  curb  construction  of  its  controversial  “security  fence.”63   Critics  declared  that,  “It  would  be  obscene  at  any  time  for  the  president  of  the  World  Jewish  Congress  to  lobby  the  president  of  the  United  States  to  rsist  policies  being  promoted  by  the  government  of  Israel.”    

Similarly,  when  Israel  Policy  Forum  president  Seymour  Reich  advised  Secretary  of  State  Condoleezza  Rice  to  pressure  Israel  to  reopen  a  crtical  border  crossing  in  the  Gaza  Strip  in  November  2005,  critics  denounced  his  action  as  “irresponsible  behavior,”  and  declared  that,  “There  is  absolutely  no  room  in  the  Jewish  mainstream  for  actively  canvassing  against  the  security‐related  policies  .  .  .  of  Israel.”64   Recoiling  from  these  attacks,  Reich  proclaimed  that  “the  word  pressure  is  not  in  my  vocabulary  when  it  comes  to  Israel.”  

Jewish‐Americans  have  formed  an  impressive  array  of  organizations  to  influence  American  foreign  policy,  of  which  AIPAC  is  the  most  powerful  and  well‐known.   In  1997,  Fortune  magazine  asked  members  of  Congress  and  their  staffs  to  list  the  most  powerful  lobbies  in  Washington.65   AIPAC  was  ranked  second  behind  the  American  Association  of  Retired  People  (AARP),  but  ahead  of  heavyweight  lobbies  like  the  AFL‐CIO  and  the  National  Rifle  Association.   A  National  Journal  study  in  March  2005  reached  a  similar  conclusion,  placing  AIPAC  in  second  place  (tied  with  AARP)  in  the  Washington’s  “muscle  rankings.”66

The  Lobby  also  includes  prominent  Christian  evangelicals  like  Gary  Bauer,  Jerry  Falwell,  Ralph  Reed,  and  Pat  Robertson,  as  well  as  Dick  Armey  and  Tom  DeLay,  former  majority  leaders  in  the  House  of  Representatives.   They  believe  Israel’s  rebirth  is  part  of  Biblical  prophecy,  support  its  expansionist  agenda,  and  think  pressuring  Israel  is  contrary  to  God’s  will.67   In  addition,  the  Lobby’s  membership  includes  neoconservative  gentiles  such  as  John  Bolton,  the  late  Wall  Street  Journal  editor  Robert  Bartley,  former  Secretary  of  Education  William  Bennett,  former  U.N.  Ambassador  Jeanne  Kirkpatrick,  and  columnist  George  Will.     

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Sources  of  Power  

 The  United  States  has  a  divided  government  that  offers  many  ways  to  influence  the  policy  process.   As  a  result,  interest  groups  can  shape  policy  in  many  different  ways—by  lobbying  elected  representatives  and  members  of  the  executive  branch,  making  campaign  contributions,  voting  in  elections,  molding  public  opinion,  etc.     

 Furthermore,  special  interest  groups  enjoy  disproportionate  power  when  they  are  committed  to  a  particular  issue  and  the  bulk  of  the  populaton  is  indifferent.   Policymakers  will  tend  to  accommodate  those  who  care  about  the  issue  in  question,  even  if  their  numbers  are  small,  confident  that  the  rest  of  the  population  will  not  penalize  them.  

 The  Israel  Lobby’s  power  flows  from  its  unmatched  ability  to  play  this  game  of  interest  group  politics.   In  its  basic  operations,  it  is  no  different  from  interest  groups  like  the  Farm  Lobby,  steel  and  textile  workers,  and  other  ethnic  lobbies.   What  sets  the  Israel  Lobby  apart  is  its  extraordinary  effectiveness.   But  there  is  nothing  improper  about  American  Jews  and  their  Christian  allies  attempting  to  sway  U.S.  policy  towards  Israel.   The  Lobby’s  activities  are  not  the  sort  of  conspiracy  depicted  in  anti‐Semitic  tracts  like  the  Protocols  of  the  Elders  of  Zion.   For  the  most  part,  the  individuals  and  groups  that  comprise  the  Lobby  are  doing  what  other  special  interest  groups  do,  just  much  better.   Moreover,  pro‐Arab  interest  groups  are  weak  to  non‐existent,  which  makes  the  Lobby’s  task  even  easier.68

 Strategies  for  Success  

 The  Lobby  pursues  two  broad  strategies  to  promote  U.S.  support  for  Israel.   First,  it  wields  significant  influence  in  Washington,  pressuring  both  Congress  and  the  Executive  branch  to  support  Israel  down  the  line.   Whatever  an  individual  lawmaker  or  policymaker’s  own  views,  the  Lobby  tries  to  make  supporting  Israel  the  “smart”  political  choice.  

 Second,  the  Lobby  strives  to  ensure  that  public  discourse  about  Israel  portrays  it  in  a  positive  light,  by  repeating  myths  about  Israel  and  its  founding  and  by  publicizing  Israel’s  side  in  the  policy  debates  of  the  day.   The  goal  is  to  prevent  critical  commentary  about  Israel  from  getting  a  fair  hearing  in  the  political  arena.   Controlling  the  debate  is  essential  to  guaranteeing  U.S.  support,  because  a  

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candid  discussion  of  U.S.‐Israeli  relations  might  lead  Americans  to  favor  a  different  policy.   

 Influencing  Congress  

 A  key  pillar  of  the  Lobby’s  effectiveness  is  its  influence  in  the  U.S.  Congress,  where  Israel  is  virtually  immune  from  criticism.   This  is  in  itself  a  remarkable  situation,  because  Congress  almost  never  shies  away  from  contentious  issues.   Whether  the  issue  is  abortion,  affirmative  action,  health  care,  or  welfare,  there  is  certain  to  be  a  lively  debate  on  Capitol  Hill.   Where  Israel  is  concerned,  however,  potential  critics  fall  silent  and  there  is  hardly  any  debate  at  all.  

 One  reason  for  the  Lobby’s  success  with  Congress  is  that  some  key  members  are  Christian  Zionists  like  Dick  Armey,  who  said  in  September  2002  that  “My  No.  1  priority  in  foreign  policy  is  to  protect  Israel.”69   One  would  think  that  the  number  1  priority  for  any  congressman  would  be  to  “protect  America,”  but  that  is  not  what  Armey  said.   There  are  also  Jewish  senators  and  congressmen  who  work  to  make  U.S.  foreign  policy  support  Israel’s  interests.  

 Pro‐Israel  congressional  staffers  are  another  source  of  the  Lobby’s  power.   As  Morris  Amitay,  a  former  head  of  AIPAC,  once  admitted,  “There  are  a  lot  of  guys  at  the  working  level  up  here  [on  Capitol  Hill]  …  who  happen  to  be  Jewish,  who  are  willing  …  to  look  at  certain  issues  in  terms  of  their  Jewishness  ….  These  are  all  guys  who  are  in  a  position  to  make  the  decision  in  these  areas  for  those  senators  ….  You  can  get  an  awful  lot  done  just  at  the  staff  level.”70

 It  is  AIPAC  itself,  however,  that  forms  the  core  of  the  Lobby’s  influence  in  Congress.   AIPAC’s  success  is  due  to  its  ability  to  reward  legislators  and  congressional  candidates  who  support  its  agenda,  and  to  punish  those  who  challenge  it.   Money  is  critical  to  U.S.  elections  (as  the  recent  scandal  over  lobbyist  Jack  Abramoff’s  various  shady  dealings  reminds  us),  and  AIPAC  makes  sure  that  its  friends  get  strong  financial  support  from  the  myriad  pro‐Israel  political  action  committees.   Those  seen  as  hostile  to  Israel,  on  the  other  hand,  can  be  sure  that  AIPAC  will  direct  campaign  contributions  to  their  political  opponents.   AIPAC  also  organizes  letter‐writing  campaigns  and  encourages  newspaper  editors  to  endorse  pro‐Israel  candidates.  

 There  is  no  doubt  about  the  potency  of  these  tactics.   To  take  but  one  example,  in  1984  AIPAC  helped  defeat  Senator  Charles  Percy  from  Illinois,  who,  according  to  one  prominent  Lobby  figure,  had  “displayed  insensitivity  and  even  hostility  to  

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our  concerns.”   Thomas  Dine,  the  head  of  AIPAC  at  the  time,  explained  what  happened:  “All  the  Jews  in  America,  from  coast  to  coast,  gathered  to  oust  Percy.   And  the  American  politicians  ‐‐ those  who  hold  public  positions  now,  and  those  who  aspire  ‐‐ got  the  message.”71   AIPAC  prizes  its  reputation  as  a  formidable  adversary,  of  course,  because  it  discourages  anyone  from  questioning  its  agenda.    

 AIPAC’s  influence  on  Capitol  Hill  goes  even  further,  however.   According  to  Douglas  Bloomfield,  a  former  AIPAC  staff  member,  “It  is  common  for  members  of  Congress  and  their  staffs  to  turn  to  AIPAC  first  when  they  need  information,  before  calling  the  Library  of  Congress,  the  Congressional  Research  Service,  committee  staff  or  administration  experts.”72   More  importantly,  he  notes  that  AIPAC  is  “often  called  upon  to  draft  speeches,  work  on  legislation,  advise  on  tactics,  perform  research,  collect  co‐sponsors  and  marshal  votes.”    

 The  bottom  line  is  that  AIPAC,  which  is  a  de  facto  agent  for  a  foreign  government,  has  a  stranglehold  on  the  U.S.  Congress.73   Open  debate  about  U.S.  policy  towards  Israel  does  not  occur  there,  even  though  that  policy  has  important  consequences  for  the  entire  world.   Thus,  one  of  the  three  main  branches  of  the  U.S.  government  is  firmly  committed  to  supporting  Israel.   As  former  Senator  Ernest  Hollings  (D‐SC)  noted  as  he  was  leaving  office,  “You  can’t  have  an  Israeli  policy  other  than  what  AIPAC  gives  you  around  here.”74   Small  wonder  that  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Ariel  Sharon  once  told  an  American  audience.  “When  people  ask  me  how  they  can  help  Israel,  I  tell  them—Help  AIPAC.”75

 Influencing  the  Executive  

 The  Lobby  also  has  significant  leverage  over  the  Executive  branch.   That  power  derives  in  part  from  the  influence  Jewish  voters  have  on  presidential  elections.   Despite  their  small  numbers  in  the  population  (less  than  3  percent),  they  make  large  campaign  donations  to  candidates  from  both  parties.   The  Washington  Post  once  estimated  that  Democratic  presidential  candidates  “depend  on  Jewish  supporters  to  supply  as  much  as  60  percent  of  the  money.”76   Furthermore,  Jewish  voters  have  high  turn‐out  rates  and  are  concentrated  in  key  states  like  California,  Florida,  Illinois,  New  York,  and  Pennsylvania.   Because  they  matter  in  close  elections,  Presidential  candidates  go  to  great  lengths  not  to  antagonize  Jewish  voters.    

 Key  organizations  in  the  Lobby  also  directly  target  the  administration  in  power.   For  example,  pro‐Israel  forces  make  sure  that  critics  of  the  Jewish  state  do  not  get  important  foreign‐policy  appointments.   Jimmy  Carter  wanted  to  make  George  

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Ball  his  first  secretary  of  state,  but  he  knew  that  Ball  was  perceived  as  critical  of  Israel  and  that  the  Lobby  would  oppose  the  appointment.77   This  litmus  test  forces  any  aspiring  policymaker  to  become  an  overt  supporter  of  Israel,  which  is  why  public  critics  of  Israeli  policy  have  become  an  endangered  species  in  the  U.S.  foreign  policy  establishment.  

 These  constraints  still  operate  today.   When  2004  presidential  candidate  Howard  Dean  called  for  the  United  States  to  take  a  more  “even‐handed  role”  in  the  Arab‐Israeli  conflict,  Senator  Joseph  Lieberman  accused  him  of  selling  Israel  down  the  river  and  said  his  statement  was  “irresponsible.”78   Virtually  all  of  the  top  Democrats  in  the  House  signed  a  hard‐hitting  letter  to  Dean  criticizing  his  comments,  and  the  Chicago  Jewish  Star  reported  that  “anonymous  attackers  …  are  clogging  the  e‐mail  inboxes  of  Jewish  leaders  around  the  country,  warning  ‐‐ without  much  evidence  ‐‐ that  Dean  would  somehow  be  bad  for  Israel.”79

 This  worry  was  absurd,  however,  because  Dean  is  in  fact  quite  hawkish  on  Israel.80   His  campaign  co‐chair  was  a  former  AIPAC  president,  and  Dean  said  his  own  views  on  the  Middle  East  more  closely  reflected  those  of  AIPAC  than  the  more  moderate  Americans  for  Peac  Now.   Dean  had  merely  suggested  that  to  “bring  the  sides  together,”  Washington  should  act  as  an  honest  broker.  This  is  hardly  a  radical  idea,  but  it  is  anathema  to  the  Lobby,  which  does  not  tolerate  the  idea  of  even‐handedness  when  it  comes  to  the  Arab‐Israeli  conflict.    

 The  Lobby’s  goals  are  also  served  when  pro‐Israel  individuals  occupy  important  positions  in  the  executive  branch.   During  the  Clinton  Administration,  for  example,  Middle  East  policy  was  largely  shaped  by  officials  with  close  ties  to  Israel  or  to  prominent  pro‐Israel  organizations—including  Martin  Indyk,  the  former  deputy  director  of  research  at  AIPAC  and  co‐founder  of  the  pro‐Israel  Washington  Institute  for  Near  East  Policy  (WINEP);  Dennis  Ross,  who  joined  WINEP  after  leaving  government  in  2001;  and  Aaron  Miller,  who  has  lived  in  Israel  and  often  visits  there.81    

 These  men  were  among  President  Clinton’s  closest  advisors  at  the  Camp  David  summit  in  July  2000.   Although  all  three  supported  the  Oslo  peace  process  and  favored  creation  of  a  Palestinian  state,  they  did  so  only  within  the  limits  of  what  would  be  acceptable  to  Israel.82   In  particular,  the  American  delegation  took  its  cues  from  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Ehud  Barak,  coordinated  negotiating  positions  in  advance,  and  did  not  offer  its  own  independent  proposals  for  settling  the  conflict.   Not  surprisingly,  Palestinian  negotiators  complained  that  they  were  

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“negotiating  with  two  Israeli  teams  ‐‐ one  displaying  an  Israeli  flag,  and  one  an  American  flag.”83     

 The  situation  is  even  more  pronounced  in  the  Bush  Administration,  whose  ranks  include  fervently  pro‐Israel  individuals  like  Elliot  Abrams,  John  Bolton,  Douglas  Feith,  I.  Lewis  (“Scooter”)  Libby,  Richard  Perle,  Paul  Wolfowitz,  and  David  Wurmser.   As  we  shall  see,  these  officials  consistently  pushed  for  policies  favored  by  Israel  and  backed  by  organizations  in  the  Lobby.  

 Manipulating  the  Media  

 In  addition  to  influencing  government  policy  directly,  the  Lobby  strives  to  shape  public  perceptions  about  Israel  and  the  Middle  East.   It  does  not  want  an  open  debate  on  issues  involving  Israel,  because  an  open  debate  might  cause  Americans  to  question  the  level  of  support  that  they  currently  provide.   Accordingly,  pro‐Israel  organizations  work  hard  to  influence  the  media,  think  tanks,  and  academia,  because  these  institutions  are  critical  in  shaping  popular  opinion.  

 The  Lobby’s  perspective  on  Israel  is  widely  reflected  in  the  mainstream  media  in  good  part  because  most  American  commentators  ae  pro‐Israel.   The  debate  among  Middle  East  pundits,  journalist  Eric  Alterman  writes,  is  “dominated  by  people  who  cannot  imagine  criticizing  Israel.”84   He  lists  61  “columnists  and  commentators  who  can  be  counted  upon  to  support  Israel  reflexively  and  without  qualification.”   Conversely,  Alterman  found  just  five  pundits  who  consistently  criticize  Israeli  behavior  or  endorse  pro‐Arab  positions.   Newspapers  occasionally  publish  guest  op‐eds  challenging  Israeli  policy,  but  the  balance  of  opinion  clearly  favors  the  other  side.   

 This  pro‐Israel  bias  is  reflected  in  the  editorials  of  major  newspapers.   Robert  Bartley,  the  late  editor  of  the  Wall  Street  Journal,  once  remarked  that,  “Shamir,  Sharon,  Bibi  –  whatever  those  guys  want  is  pretty  much  fine  by  me.”85   Not  surprisingly,  the  Journal,  along  with  other  prominent  newspapers  like  The  Chicago  Sun‐Times  and  The  Washington  Times  regularly  run  editorials  that  are  strongly  pro‐Israel.   Magazines  like  Commentary,  the  New  Republic,  and  the  Weekly  Standard  also  zealously  defend  Israel  at  every  turn.  

  

Editorial  bias  is  also  found  in  papers  like  the  New  York  Times.   The  Times  occasionally  criticizes  Israeli  policies  and  sometimes  concedes  that  the  Palestinians  have  legitimate  grievances,  but  it  is  not  even‐handed.   In  his  memoirs,  for  example,  former  Times  executive  editor  Max  Frankel  acknowledged  

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the  impact  his  own  pro‐Israel  attitude  had  on  his  editorial  choices.   In  his  words:  “I  was  much  more  deeply  devoted  to  Israel  than  I  dared  to  assert.”   He  goes  on:  “Fortified  by  my  knowledge  of  Israel  and  my  friendships  there,  I  myself  wrote  most  of  our  Middle  East  commentaries.   As  more  Arab  than  Jewish  readers  recognized,  I  wrote  them  from  a  pro‐Israel  perspective.”  86   

 The  media’s  reporting  of  news  events  involving  Israel  is  somewhat  more  even‐handed  than  editorial  commentary  is,  in  part  because  reporters  strive  to  be  objective,  but  also  because  it  is  difficult  to  cover  events  in  the  occupied  territories  without  acknowledging  Israel’s  actual  behavior.   To  discourage  unfavorable  reporting  on  Israel,  the  Lobby  organizes  letter  writing  campaigns,  demonstrations,  and  boycotts  against  news  outlets  whose  content  it  considers  anti‐Israel.   One  CNN  executive  has  said  that  he  sometimes  gets  6,000  e‐mail  messages  in  a  single  day  complaining  that  a  story  is  anti‐Israel.87   Similarly,  the  pro‐Israel  Committee  for  Accurate  Middle  East  Reporting  in  America  (CAMERA)  organized  demonstrations  outside  National  Public  Radio  stations  in  33  cities  in  May  2003,  and  it  also  tried  to  convince  contributors  to  withhold  support  from  NPR  until  its  Middle  East  coverage  became  more  sympatheticto  Israel.88   Boston’s  NPR  station,  WBUR,  reportedly  lost  more  than  $1  million  in  contributions  as  a  result  of  these  efforts.  Pressure  on  NPR  has  also  come  from  Israel’s  friends  in  Congress,  who  have  asked  NPR  for  an  internal  audit  as  well  as  more  oversight  of  its  Middle  East  coverage.    

 These  factors  help  explain  why  the  American  media  contains  few  criticisms  of  Israeli  policy,  rarely  questions  Washington’s  relationship  with  Israel,  and  only  occasionally  discusses  the  Lobby’s  profound  influence  on  U.S.  policy.   

 Think  Tanks  That  Think  One  Way  

 Pro‐Israel  forces  predominate  in  U.S.  think  tanks,  which  play  an  important  role  in  shaping  public  debate  as  well  as  actual  policy.   The  Lobby  created  its  own  think  tank  in  1985,  when  Martin  Indyk  helped  found  WINEP.89   Although  WINEP  plays  down  its  links  to  Israel  and  claims  instead  that  it  provides  a  “balanced  and  realistic”  perspective  on  Middle  East  issues,  this  is  not  the  case.90   In  fact,  WINEP  is  funded  and  run  by  individuals  who  are  deeply  committed  to  advancing  Israel’s  agenda.    

  The  Lobby’s  influence  in  the  think  tank  world  extends  well  beyond  WINEP.   Over  the  past  25  years,  pro‐Israel  forces  have  established  a  commanding  presence  at  the  American  Enterprise  Institute,  the  Brookings  Institution,  the  

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Center  for  Security  Policy,  the  Foreign  Policy  Research  Institute,  the  Heritage  Foundation,  the  Hudson  Institute,  the  Institute  for  Foreign  Policy  Analysis,  and  the  Jewish  Institute  for  National  Security  Affairs  (JINSA).   These  think  tanks  are  decidedly  pro‐Israel,  and  include  few,  if  any,  critics  of  U.S.  support  for  the  Jewish  state.  

  A  good  indicator  of  the  Lobby’s  influence  in  the  think  tank  world  is  the  evolution  of  the  Brookings  Institution.   For  many  years,  its  senior  expert  on  Middle  East  issues  was  William  B.  Quandt,  a  distinguished  academic  and  former  NSC  official  with  a  well‐deserved  reputation  for  evenhandedness  regarding  the  Arab‐Israeli  conflict.   Today,  however,  Brookings’s  work  on  these  issues  is  conducted  through  its  Saban  Center  for  Middle  East  Studies,  which  is  financed  by  Haim  Saban,  a  wealthy  Israeli‐American  businessman  and  ardent  Zionist.91  The  director  of  the  Saban  Center  is  the  ubiquitous  Martin  Indyk.   Thus,  what  was  once  a  non‐partisan  policy  institute  on  Middle  East  matters  is  now  part  of  the  chorus  of  largely  pro‐Israel  think  tanks.  

  Policing  Academia  

  The  Lobby  has  had  the  most  difficulty  stifling  debate  about  Israel  on  college  campuses,  because  academic  freedom  is  a  core  value  and  because  tenured  professors  are  hard  to  threaten  or  silence.   Even  so,  there  was  only  mild  criticism  of  Israel  in  the  1990s,  when  the  Oslo  peace  process  was  underway.   Criticism  rose  after  that  process  collapsed  and  Ariel  Sharon  came  to  power  in  early  2001,  and  it  became  especially  intense  when  the  IDF  re‐occupied  the  West  Bank  in  spring  2002  and  employed  massive  force  against  the  Second  Intifada.  

 The  Lobby  moved  aggressively  to  “take  back  the  campuses.”   New  groups  sprang  up,  like  the  Caravan  for  Democracy,  which  brought  Israeli  speakers  to  U.S.  colleges.92   Established  groups  like  the  Jewish  Council  for  Public  Affairs  and  Hillel  jumped  into  the  fray,  and  a  new  group—the  Israel  on  Campus  Coalition—was  formed  to  coordinate  the  many  groups  that  now  sought  to  make  Israel’s  case  on  campus.    Finally,  AIPAC  more  than  tripled  its  spending  for  programs  to  monitor  university  activities  and  to  train  young  advocates  for  Israel,  in  order  to  “vastly  expand  the  number  of  students  involved  on  campus  .  .  .  in  the  national  pro‐Israel  effort.”93    

 The  Lobby  also  monitors  what  professors  write  and  teach.   In  September  2002,  for  example,  Martin  Kramer  and  Daniel  Pipes,  two  passionately  pro‐Israel  neoconservatives,  established  a  website  (Campus  Watch)  that  posted  dossiers  on  

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suspect  academics  and  encouraged  students  to  report  comments  or  behavior  that  might  be  considered  hostile  to  Israel.94   This  transparent  attempt  to  blacklist  and  intimidate  scholars  prompted  a  harsh  reaction  and  Pipes  and  Kramer  later  removed  he  dossiers,  but  the  website  still  invites  students  to  report  alleged  anti‐Israel  behavior  at  U.S.  colleges.  

 Groups  in  the  Lobby  also  direct  their  fire  at  particular  professors  and  the  universities  that  hire  them.   Columbia  University,  which  had  the  late  Palestinian  scholar  Edward  Said  on  its  faculty,  has  been  a  frequent  target  of  pro‐Israel  forces.   Jonathan  Cole,  the  former  Columbia  provost,  reported  that,  “One  can  be  sure  that  any  public  statement  in  support  of  the  Palestinian  people  by  the  preeminent  literary  critic  Edward  Said  wil  elicit  hundreds  of  e‐mails,  letters,  and  journalistic  accounts  that  call  on  us  to  denounce  Said  and  to  either  sanction  or  fire  him.”95   When  Columbia  recruited  historian  Rashid  Khalidi  from  the  University  of  Chicago,  Cole  says  that  “the  complaints  started  flowing  in  from  people  who  disagreed  with  the  content  of  his  political  views.”   Princeton  faced  the  same  problem  a  few  years  later  when  it  considered  wooing  Khalidi  away  from  Columbia.96

 A  classic  illustration  of  the  effort  to  police  academia  occurred  in  late  2004,  when  the  “David  Project”  produced  a  propaganda  film  alleging  that  faculty  in  Columbia  University’s  Middle  East  studies  program  were  anti‐Semitic  and  were  intimidating  Jewish  students  who  defended  Israel.97   Columbia  was  raked  over  the  coals  in  pro‐Israel  circles,  but  a  faculty  committee  assigned  to  investigate  the  charges  found  no  evidence  of  anti‐Semitism  and  the  only  incident  worth  noting  was  the  possibility  that  one  professor  had  “responded  heatedly”  to  a  student’s  question.98    The  committee  also  discovered  that  the  accused  professors  had  been  the  target  of  an  overt  intimidation  campaign.    

 Perhaps  the  most  disturbing  aspect  of  this  campaign  to  eliminate  criticism  of  Israel  from  college  campuses  is  the  effort  by  Jewsh  groups  to  push  Congress  to  establish  mechanisms  that  monitor  what  professors  say  about  Israel.99   Schools  judged  to  have  an  anti‐Israel  bias  would  be  denied  Federal  funding.   This  effort  to  get  the  U.S.  government  to  police  campuses  have  not  yet  succeeded,  but  the  attempt  illustrates  the  importance  pro‐Israel  groups  place  on  controlling  debate  on  these  issues.   

 Finally,  a  number  of  Jewish  philanthropists  have  established  Israel  studies  programs  (in  addition  to  the  roughly  130  Jewish  Studies  programs  that  already  exist)  so  as  to  increase  the  number  of  Israel‐friendly  scholars  on  campus.100   NYU  

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announced  the  establishment  of  the  Taub  Center  for  Israel  Studies  on  May  1,  2003,  and  similar  programs  have  been  established  at  other  schools  like  Berkeley,  Brandeis,  and  Emory.   Academic  administrators  emphasize  the  pedagogical  value  of  these  programs,  but  the  truth  is  that  they  are  intended  in  good  part  to  promote  Israel’s  image  on  campus.   Fred  Laffer,  the  head  of  the  Taub  Foundation,  makes  clear  that  his  foundation  funded  the  NYU  center  to  help  counter  the  “Arabic  [sic]  point  of  view”  that  he  thinks  is  prevalent  in  NYU’s  Middle  East  programs.101

 In  sum,  the  Lobby  has  gone  to  considerable  lengths  to  insulate  Israel  from  criticism  on  college  campuses.  It  has  not  been  as  successful  in  academia  as  it  has  been  on  Capitol  Hill,  but  it  has  worked  hard  to  stifle  criticism  of  Israel  by  professors  and  students  and  there  is  much  less  of  it  on  campuses  today102

  The  Great  Silencer  

  No  discussion  of  how  the  Lobby  operates  would  be  complete  without  examining  one  of  its  most  powerful  weapons:  the  charge  of  anti‐Semitism.   Anyone  who  criticizes  Israeli  actions  or  says  that  pro‐Israel  groups  have  significant  influence  over  U.S.  Middle  East  policy—an  influence  that  AIPAC  celebrates—stands  a  good  chance  of  getting  labeled  an  anti‐Semite.   In  fact,  anyone  who  says  that  there  is  an  Israel  Lobby  runs  the  risk  of  being  charged  with  anti‐Semitism,  even  though  the  Israeli  media  themselves  refer  to  America’s  “Jewish  Lobby.”   In  effect,  the  Lobby  boasts  of  its  own  power  and  then  attacks  anyone  who  calls  attention  to  it.   This  tactic  is  very  effective,  because  anti‐Semitism  is  loathsome  and  no  responsible  person  wants  to  be  accused  of  it.  

 Europeans  have  been  more  willing  than  Americans  to  criticize  Israeli  policy  in  recent  years,  which  some  attribute  to  a  resurgence  of  anti‐Semitism  in  Europe.   We  are  “getting  to  a  point,”  the  U.S.  Ambassador  to  the  European  Union  said  in  early  2004,  “where  it  is  as  bad  as  it  was  in  the  1930s.”103   Measuring  anti‐Semitism  is  a  complicated  matter,  but  the  weight  of  evidence  points  in  the  opposite  direction.  For  example,  in  the  spring  of  2004,  when  accusations  of  European  anti‐Semitism  filled  the  air  in  America,  separate  surveys  of  European  public  opinion  conducted  by  the  Anti‐Defamation  League  and  the  Pew  Research  Center  for  the  People  and  the  Press  showed  that  it  was  actually  declining.104    

 Consider  France,  which  pro‐Israel  forces  often  portray  as  the  most  anti‐Semitic  state  in  Europe.   A  poll  of  French  citizens  in  2002  found  that:  89  percent  could  envisage  living  with  a  Jew;  97  percent  believe  making  anti‐Semitic  graffiti  is  a  

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serious  crime;  87  percent  think  attacks  on  French  synagogues  are  scandalous;  and  85  percent  of  practicing  French  Catholics  reject  the  charge  that  Jews  have  too  much  influence  in  business  and  finance.105   It  is  unsurprising  that  the  head  of  the  French  Jewish  community  declared  in  the  summer  of  2003  that  “France  is  not  more  anti‐Semitic  than  America.”106   According  to  a  recent  article  in  Haʹaretz,  the  French  police  report  that  anti‐Semitic  incidents  in  France  declined  by  almost  50  per  cent  in  2005;  and  this  despite  the  fact  that  France  has  the  largest  Muslim  population  of  any  country  in  Europe.107    

 Finally,  when  a  French  Jew  was  brutally  murdered  last  month  by  a  Muslim  gang,  tens  of  thousands  of  French  demonstrators  poured  into  the  streets  to  condemn  anti‐Semitism.   Moreover,  President  Jacques  Chirac  and  Prime  Minister  Dominique  de  Villepin  both  attended  the  victim’s  memorial  service  in  a  public  showof  solidarity  with  French  Jewry.108   It  is  also  worth  noting  that  in  2002  more  Jews  immigrated  to  Germany  than  Israel,  making  it  “the  fastest  growing  Jewish  community  in  the  world,”  according  to  an  article  in  the  Jewish  newspaper  Forward.109   If  Europe  were  really  heading  back  to  the  1930s,  it  is  hard  to  imagine  that  Jews  would  be  moving  there  in  large  numbers.   

 We  recognize,  however,  that  Europe  is  not  free  of  the  scourge  of  anti‐Semitism.   No  one  would  deny  that  there  are  still  some  virulent  autochthonous  anti‐Semites  in  Europe  (as  there  are  in  the  United  States)  but  their  numbers  are  small  and  their  extreme  views  are  rejected  by  the  vast  majority  of  Europeans.   Nor  would  one  deny  that  there  is  anti‐Semitism  among  European  Muslims,  some  of  it  provoked  by  Israel’s  behavior  towards  the  Palestinians  and  some  of  it  straightforwardly  racist.  110   This  problem  is  worrisome,  but  it  is  hardly  out  of  control.   Muslims  constitute  less  than  five  percent  of  Europe’s  total  population,  and  European  governments  are  working  hard  to  combat  the  problem.   Why?   Because  most  Europeans  reject  such  hateful  views.111    In  short,  when  it  comes  to  anti‐Semitism,  Europe  today  bears  hardly  any  resemblance  to  Europe  in  the  1930s.    

 This  is  why  pro‐Israel  forces,  when  pressed  to  go  beyond  assertion,  claim  that  there  is  a  ‘new  anti‐Semitism’,  which  they  equate  with  criticism  of  Israel.112   In  other  words  criticize  Israeli  policy  and  you  are  by  definition  an  anti‐Semite.   When  the  synod  of  the  Church  of  England  recently  voted  to  divest  from  Caterpillar  Inc  on  the  grounds  that  Caterpillar  manufacures  the  bulldozers  used  to  demolish  Palestinian  homes,  the  Chief  Rabbi  complained  that  it  would  ʹhave  the  most  adverse  repercussions  on  ...  Jewish‐Christian  relations  in  Britainʹ,  while  Rabbi  Tony  Bayfield,  the  head  of  the  Reform  movement,  said:  “ʹThere  is  a  clear  problem  of  anti‐Zionist  ‐ verging  on  anti‐Semitic  ‐ attitudes  emerging  in  the  grass  

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roots,  and  even  in  the  middle  ranks  of  the  Church.”113  However,  the  Church  was  neither  guilty  of  anti‐Zionism  nor  anti‐Semitism;  it  was  merely  protesting  Israeli  policy.114

 Critics  are  also  accused  of  holding  Israel  to  an  unfair  standard  or  questioning  its  right  to  exist.  But  these  are  bogus  charges  too.  Western  critics  of  Israel  hardly  ever  question  its  right  to  exist.  Instead,  they  question  its  behavior  towards  the  Palestinians,  which  is  a  legitimate  criticism:  Israelis  question  it  themselves.  Nor  is  Israel  being  judged  unfairly.  Rather,  Israeli  treatment  of  the  Palestinians  elicits  criticism  because  it  is  contrary  to  widely‐accepted  human  rights  norms  and  international  law,  as  well  as  the  principle  of  national  self‐determination.  And  it  is  hardly  the  only  state  that  has  faced  sharp  criticism  on  these  grounds.  

 In  sum,  other  ethnic  lobbies  can  only  dream  of  having  the  political  muscle  that  pro‐Israel  organizations  possess.  The  question,  therefore,  is  what  effect  does  the  Lobby  have  on  U.S.  foreign  policy?  

 THE  TAIL  WAGGING  THE  DOG  

 If  the  Lobby’s  impact  were  confined  to  U.S.  economic  aid  to  Israel,  its  influence  might  not  be  that  worrisome.   Foreign  aid  is  valuable,  but  not  as  useful  as  having  the  world’s  only  superpower  bring  its  vast  capabilities  to  bear  on  Israel’s  behalf.    Accordingly,  the  Lobby  has  also  sought  to  shape  the  core  elements  of  U.S.  Middle  East  policy.   In  particular,  it  has  worked  successfully  to  convince  American  leaders  to  back  Israel’s  continued  repression  of  the  Palestinians  and  to  take  im  at  Israel’s  primary  regional  adversaries:  Iran,  Iraq,  and  Syria.    

  Demonizing  the  Palestinians  

 It  is  now  largely  forgotten,  but  in  the  fall  of  2001,  and  especially  in  the  spring  of  2002,  the  Bush  Administration  tried  to  reduce  anti‐American  sentiment  in  the  Arab  world  and  undermine  support  for  terrorist  groups  like  al  Qaeda,  by  halting  Israel’s  expansionist  policies  in  the  occupied  territories  and  advocating  the  creation  of  a  Palestinian  state.  

 Bush  had  enormous  potential  leverage  at  his  disposal.   He  could  have  threatened  to  reduce  U.S.  economic  and  diplomatic  support  for  Israel,  and  the  American  people  would  almost  certainly  have  supported  him.   A  May  2003  poll  reported  that  over  60  percent  of  Americans  were  willing  to  withhold  aid  to  Israel  if  it  resisted  U.S.  pressure  to  settle  the  conflict,  and  that  number  rose  to  70  percent  

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among  “politically  active”  Americans.115   Indeed,  73  percent  said  that  United  States  should  not  favor  either  side.  

 Yet  the  Bush  Administration  failed  to  change  Israel’s  policies,  and  Washington  ended  up  backing  Israel’s  hard‐line  approach  instead.   Over  time,  the  Administration  also  adopted  Israel’s  justifications  for  this  approach,  so  that  U.S.  and  Israeli  rhetoric  became  similar.   By  February  2003,  a  Washington  Post  headline  summarized  the  situation:  “Bush  and  Sharon  Nearly  Identical  on  Mideast  Policy.”116   The  main  reason  for  this  switch  is  the  Lobby.  

 The  story  begins  in  late  September  2001  when  President  Bush  began  pressuring  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Sharon  to  show  restraint  inthe  occupied  territories.   He  also  pressed  Sharon  to  allow  Israeli  foreign  minister  Shimon  Peres  to  meet  with  Palestinian  leader  Yasser  Arafat,  even  though  Bush  was  highly  critical  of  Arafat’s  leadership.117   Bush  also  said  publicly  that  he  supported  a  Palestinian  state.118   Alarmed  by  these  developments,  Sharon  accused  Bush  of  trying  “to  appease  the  Arabs  at  our  expense,”  warning  that  Israel  “will  not  be  Czechoslovakia.”119    

 Bush  was  reportedly  furious  at  Sharon’s  likening  him  to  Neville  Chamberlain,  and  White  House  press  secretary  Ari  Fleischer  called  Sharon’s  remarks  “unacceptable.”120   The  Israeli  prime  minister  offered  a  pro  forma  apology,  but  he  quickly  joined  forces  with  the  Lobby  to  convince  the  Bush  administration  and  the  American  people  that  the  United  Statesand  Israel  faced  a  common  threat  from  terrorism.121   Israeli  officials  and  Lobby  representatives  repeatedly  emphasized  that  there  was  no  real  difference  between  Arafat  and  Osaa  bin  Laden,  and  insisted  that  the  United  States  and  Israel  should  isolate  the  Palestinians’  elected  leader  and  have  nothing  to  do  with  him122

The  Lobby  also  went  to  work  in  Congress.   On  November  16,  89  senators  sent  Bush  a  letter  praising  him  for  refusing  to  meet  with  Arafat,  but  also  demanding  that  the  United  States  not  restrain  Israel  from  retaliating  against  the  Palestinians  and  insisting  that  theadministration  state  publicly  that  it  stood  steadfastly  behind  Israel.   According  to  the  New  York  Times,  the  letter  “stemmed  from  a  meeting  two  weeks  ago  between  leaders  of  the  American  Jewish  community  and  key  senators,”  adding  that  AIPAC  was  “particularly  active  in  providing  advice  on  the  letter.”123   

By  late  November,  relations  between  Tel  Aviv  and  Washington  had  improved  considerably.   This  was  due  in  part  to  the  Lobby’s  efforts  to  bend  U.S.  policy  in  Israel’s  direction,  but  also  to  America’s  initial  victory  in  Afghanistan,  which  

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reduced  the  perceived  need  for  Arab  support  in  dealing  with  al  Qaeda.   Sharon  visited  the  White  House  in  early  December  and  had  a  friendly  meeting  with  Bush.124

But  trouble  erupted  again  in  April  2002,  after  the  IDF  launched  Operation  Defensive  Shield  and  resumed  control  of  virtually  all  of  the  major  Palestinian  areas  on  the  Wst  Bank.125   Bush  knew  that  Israel’s  action  would  damage  America’s  image  in  the  Arab  and  Islamic  world  and  undermine  the  war  on  terrorim,  so  he  demanded  on  April  4  that  Sharon  “halt  the  incursions  and  begin  withdrawal.”   He  underscored  this  message  two  days  later,  saying  this  meant  “withdrawal  without  delay.”   On  April  7,  Bush’s  national  security  advisor,  Condoleezza  Rice,  told  reporters  that,  “‘without  delay’  means  without  delay.  It  means  now.”   That  same  day  Secretary  of  State  Colin  Powell  set  out  for  the  Middle  East  to  pressure  all  sides  to  stop  fighting  and  start  neotiating.126

Israel  and  the  Lobby  swung  into  action.   A  key  target  was  Powell,  who  began  feeling  intense  heat  from  pro‐Israel  officials  in  Vice  President  Cheney’s  office  and  the  Pentagon,  as  well  as  from  neoconservative  pundits  like  Robert  Kagan  and  William  Kristol,  who  accused  him  of  having  “virtually  obliterated  the  distinction  between  terrorists  and  those  fighting  terrorists.”127   A  second  target  was  Bush  himself,  who  was  being  pressed  by  Jewish  leaders  and  Christian  evangelicals,  the  latter  a  key  component  of  his  political  base.   Tom  DeLay  and  Dick  Armey  were  especially  outspoken  about  the  need  to  support  Israel,  and  DeLay  and  Senate  Minority  Leader  Trent  Lott  visited  the  White  House  and  personally  warned  Bush  to  back  off.128   

The  first  sign  that  Bush  was  caving  came  on  April  11—only  one  week  after  he  told  Sharon  to  withdraw  his  forces—when  Ari  Fleischer  said  the  President  believes  Sharon  is  “a  man  of  peace.”129   Bush  repeated  this  statement  publicly  upon  Powell’s  return  from  his  abortive  mission,  and  he  told  reporters  that  Sharon  had  responded  satisfactorily  to  his  call  for  a  full  and  immediate  withdrawal.130   Sharon  had  done  no  such  thing,  but  the  President  of  the  United  States  was  no  longer  willing  to  make  an  issue  of  it.  

Meanwhile,  Congress  was  also  moving  to  back  Sharon.   On  May  2,  it  overrode  the  Administration’s  objections  and  passed  two  resolutions  reaffirming  support  for  Israel.   (The  Senate  vote  was  94  to  2;  the  House  version  passed  352‐21).   Both  resolutions  emphasized  that  the  United  States  “stands  in  solidarity  with  Israel”  and  that  the  two  countries  are,  to  quote  the  House  resolution,  “now  engaged  in  a  common  struggle  against  terrorism.”   The  House  version  also  condemned  “the  

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ongoing  support  of  terror  by  Yasir  Arafat,”  who  was  portrayed  as  a  central  element  of  the  terrorism  problem.131    A  few  days  later,  a  bipartisan  congressional  delegation  on  a  fact‐finding  mission  in  Israel  publicly  proclaimed  that  Sharon  should  resist  U.S.  pressure  to  negotiate  with  Arafat.132   On  May  9,  a  House  appropriations  subcommittee  met  to  consider  giving  Israel  an  extra  $200  million  to  fight  terrorism.   Secretary  of  State  Powell  opposed  the  package,  but  the  Lobby  backed  it,  just  as  it  had  helped  author  the  two  congressional  resolutions.133   Powell  lost.  

 In  short,  Sharon  and  the  Lobby  took  on  the  President  of  the  United  States  and  triumphed.   Hemi  Shalev,  a  journalist  for  the  Israel  newspaper  Ma’ariv,  reported  that  Sharon’s  aides  “could  not  hide  their  satisfaction  in  view  of  Powell’s  failure.   Sharon  saw  the  white  in  President  Bush’s  eyes,  they  bragged,  and  the  President  blinked  first.”134  But  it  was  the  pro‐Israel  forces  in  the  United  States,  not  Sharon  or  Israel,  that  played  the  key  role  in  defeating  Bush.   

The  situation  has  changed  little  since  then.   The  Bush  Administration  refused  to  deal  further  with  Arafat,  who  eventually  died  in  November  2004.   It  has  subsequently  embraced  the  new  Palestinian  leader,  Mahmoud  Abbas,  but  has  done  little  to  help  him  gain  a  viable  state.   Sharon  continued  to  develop  his  plans  for  unilateral  “disengagement”  from  the  Palestinians,  based  on  withdrawal  from  Gaza  coupled  with  continued  expansion  on  the  West  Bank,  which  entails  building  the  so‐called  “security  fence,”  seizing  Palestinian‐owned  land,  and  expanding  settlement  blocs  and  road  networks.   By  refusing  to  negotiate  with  Abbas  (who  favors  a  negotiated  settlement)  and  making  it  impossible  for  him  to  deliver  tangible  benefits  to  the  Palestinian  people,  Sharon’s  strategy  contributed  directly  to  Hamas’  recent  electoral  victory.135   With  Hamas  in  power,  however,  Israel  has  another  excuse  not  to  negotiate.   The  administration  has  supported  Sharon’s  actions  (and  those  of  his  successor,  Ehud  Olmert),  and  Bush  has  even  endorsed  unilateral  Israeli  annexations  in  the  Occupied  Territories,  reversing  the  stated  policy  of  every  president  since  Lyndon  Johnson.136     

 U.S.  officials  have  offered  mild  criticisms  of  a  few  Israeli  actions,  but  have  done  little  to  help  create  a  viable  Palestinian  state.   Former  national  security  advisor  Brent  Scowcroft  even  declared  in  October  2004  that  Sharon  has  President  Bush  “wrapped  around  his  little  finger.ʺ137   If  Bush  tries  to  distance  the  United  States  from  Israel,  or  even  criticizes  Israeli  actions  in  the  occupied  territories,  he  is  certain  to  face  the  wrath  of  the  Lobby  and  its  supporters  in  Congress.   Democratic  Party  presidential  candidates  understand  these  facts  of  life  too,   

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which  is  why  John  Kerry  went  to  great  lengths  to  display  his  unalloyed  support  for  Israel  in  2004  and  why  Hillary  Clinton  is  dong  the  same  thing  today.138   

 Maintaining  U.S.  support  for  Israel’s  policies  against  the  Palestinians  is  a  core  goal  of  the  Lobby,  but  its  ambitions  do  not  stop  there.   It  also  wants  America  to  help  Israel  remain  the  dominant  regional  power.   Not  surprisingly,  the  Israeli  government  and  pro‐Israel  groups  in  the  United  States  worked  together  to  shape  the  Bush  Administration’s  policy  towards  Iraq,  Syria,  and  Iran,  as  well  as  its  grand  scheme  for  reordering  the  Middle  East.   

 Israel  and  the  Iraq  War  

 Pressure  from  Israel  and  the  Lobby  was  not  the  only  factor  behind  the  U.S.  decision  to  attack  Iraq  in  March  2003,  but  it  was  a  critical  element.   Some  Americans  believe  that  this  was  a  “war  for  oil,”  but  there  is  hardly  any  direct  evidence  to  support  this  claim.   Instead,  the  war  was  motivated  in  good  part  by  a  desire  to  make  Israel  more  secure.   According  to  Philip  Zelikow,  a  member  of  the  President’s  Foreign  Intelligence  Advisory  Board  (2001‐2003),  executive  director  of  the  9/11  Commission,  and  now  Counselor  to  Secretary  of  State  Condoleezza  Rice,  the  “real  threat”  from  Iraq  was  not  a  threat  to  the  United  States.139   The  “unstated  threat”  was  the  “threat  against  Israel,”  Zelikow  told  a  University  of  Virginia  audience  in  September  2002,  noting  further  that  “the  American  government  doesn’t  want  to  lean  too  hard  on  it  rhetorically,  because  it  is  not  a  popular  sell.”  

 On  August  16,  2002,  eleven  days  before  Vice  President  Cheney  kicked  off  the  campaign  for  war  with  a  hard‐line  speech  to  the  Veterans  of  Foreign  Wars,  the  Washington  Post  reported  that  “Israel  is  urging  U.S.  officials  not  to  delay  a  military  strike  against  Iraq’s  Saddam  Hussein.”140   By  this  point,  according  to  Sharon,  strategic  coordination  between  Israel  and  the  U.S.  had  reached  “unprecedented  dimensions,”  and  Israeli  intelligence  officials  had  given  Washington  a  variety  of  alarming  reports  about  Iraq’s  WMD  programs.141   As  one  retired  Israeli  general  later  put  it,  “Israeli  intelligence  was  a  full  partner  to  the  picture  presented  by  American  and  British  intelligence  regarding  Iraq’s  non‐conventional  capabilities.”142

 Israeli  leaders  were  deeply  distressed  when  President  Bush  decided  to  seek  U.N.  Security  Council  authorization  for  war  in  September,  and  even  more  worried  when  Saddam  agreed  to  let  U.N.  inspectors  back  into  Iraq,  because  these  developments  seemed  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  war.   Foreign  Minister  Shimon  

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Peres  told  reporters  in  September  2002  that  “the  campaign  against  Saddam  Hussein  is  a  must.   Inspections  and  inspectors  are  good  for  decent  people,  but  dishonest  people  can  overcome  easily  inspections  and  inspectors.”143    

 At  the  same  time,  former  Prime  Minister  Ehud  Barak  wrote  a  New  York  Times  op‐ed  warning  that  “the  greatest  risk  now  lies  in  inaction.”144  His  predecessor,  Benjamin    Netanyahu,  published  a  similar  piece  in  the  Wall  Street  Journal  entitled  “The  Case  for  Toppling  Saddam.”145   Netanyahu  declared,  “Today  nothing  less  than  dismantling  his  regime  will  do,”  adding  that  “I  believe  I  speak  for  the  overwhelming  majority  of  Israelis  in  supporting  a  pre‐emptive  strike  against  Saddam’s  regime.”   Or  as  Ha’aretz  reported  in  February  2003:  “The  [Israeli]  military  and  political  leadership  yearns  for  war  in  Iraq.”146    

 But  as  Netanyahu  suggests,  the  desire  for  war  was  not  confined  to  Israel’s  leaders.   Apart  from  Kuwait,  which  Saddam  conquered  in  1990,  Israel  was  the  only  country  in  the  world  where  both  the  politicians  and  the  public  enthusiastically  favored  war.147   As  journalist  Gideon  Levy  observed  at  the  time,  “Israel  is  the  only  country  in  the  West  whose  leaders  support  the  war  unreservedly  and  where  no  alternative  opinion  is  voiced.”148  In  fact,  Israelis  were  so  gung‐ho  for  war  that  their  allies  in  America  told  them  to  damp  down  their  hawkish  rhetoric,  lest  it  look  like  the  war  was  for  Israel.149   

 The  Lobby  and  the  Iraq  War  

 Within  the  United  States,  the  main  driving  force  behind  the  Iraq  war  was  a  small  band  of  neoconservatives,  many  with  close  ties  to  Israel’s  Likud  Party.150   In  addition,  key  leaders  of  the  Lobby’s  major  organizations  lent  their  voices  to  the  campaign  for  war.151   According  to  the  Forward,  “As  President  Bush  attempted  to  sell  the  .  .  .  war  in  Iraq,  America’s  most  important  Jewish  organizations  rallied  as  one  to  his  defense.   In  statement  after  statement  community  leaders  stressed  the  need  to  rid  the  world  of  Saddam  Hussein  and  his  weapons  of  mass  dstruction.”152   The  editorial  goes  on  to  say  that  “concern  for  Israel’s  safety  rightfully  factored  into  the  deliberations  of  the  main  Jewish  groups.”  

 Although  neoconservatives  and  other  Lobby  leaders  were  eager  to  invade  Iraq,  the  broader  American  Jewish  community  was  not.153   In  fact,  Samuel  Freedman  reported  just  after  the  war  started  that  “a  compilation  of  nationwide  opinion  polls  by  the  Pew  Research  Center  shows  that  Jews  are  less  supportive  of  the  Iraq  war  than  te  population  at  large,  52%  to  62%.”154   Thus,  it  would  be  wrong  to  

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blame  the  war  in  Iraq  on  “Jewish  influence.”   Rather,  the  war  was  due  in  large  part  to  the  Lobby’s  influence,  especially  the  neoconservatives  within  it.  

The  neoconservatives  were  already  determined  to  topple  Saddam  before  Bush  became  President.155   They  caused  a  stir  in  early  1998  by  publishing  two  open  letters  to  President  Clinton  calling  for  Saddam’s  removal  from  powr.156   The  signatories,  many  of  whom  had  close  ties  to  pro‐Israel  groups  like  JINSA  or  WINEP,  and  whose  ranks  included  Elliot  Abrams,  John  Bolton,  Douglas  Feith,  William  Kristol,  Bernard  Lewis,  Donald  Rumsfeld,  Richard  Perle  and  Paul  Wolfowitz,  had  little  trouble  convincing  the  Clinton  Administration  to  adopt  the  general  goal  of  ousting  Saddam.157   But  the  neoconservatives  were  unable  to  sell  a  war  to  achieve  that  objective.     Nor  were  they  able  to  generate  much  enthusiasm  for  invading  Iraq  in  the  early  months  of  the  Bush  Administration.158   As  important  as  the  neoconservatives  were  for  making  the  Iraq  war  happen,  they  needed  help  to  achieve  their  aim.    

 That  help  arrived  with  9/11.   Specifically,  the  events  of  that  fateful  day  led  Bush  and  Cheney  to  reverse  course  and  become  strong  proponents  of  a  preventive  war  to  toppl  Saddam.   Neoconservatives  in  the  Lobby—most  notably  Scooter  Libby,  Paul  Wolfowitz,  and  Princeton  historian  Bernard  Lewis—played  especially  critical  roles  in  persuading  the  President  and  Vice‐President  to  favor  war.  

 For  the  neoconservatives,  9/11  was  a  golden  opportunity  to  make  the  case  for  war  with  Iraq.   At  a  key  meeting  with  Bush  at  Camp  David  on  September  15,  Wolfowitz  advocated  attacking  Iraq  before  Afghanistan,  even  though  there  was  no  evidence  that  Saddam  was  involved  in  the  attacks  on  the  United  States  and  bin  Laden  was  known  to  be  i  Afghanistan.159   Bush  rejected  this  advice  and  chose  to  go  after  Afghanistan  instead,  but  war  with  Iraq  was  now  regarded  as  a  serious  possibility  and  the  President  tasked  U.S.  military  planners  on  November  21,  2001  with  developing  concrete  plans  for  an  invasion.160

 Meanwhile,  other  neoconservatives  were  at  work  within  the  corridors  of  power.   We  do  not  have  the  full  story  yet,  but  scholars  like  Lewis  and  Fouad  Ajami  of  John  Hopkins  University  reportedly  played  key  roles  in  convincing  Vice  President  Chney  to  favor  the  war.161   Cheney’s  views  were  also  heavily  influenced  by  the  neoconservatives  on  his  staff,  especially  Eric  Edelman,  John  Hannah,  and  chief  of  staff  Libby,  one  of  the  most  powerful  individuals  in  the  Administration.162   The  Vice  President’s  influence  helped  convince  President  Bush  by  early  2002.   With  Bush  and  Cheney  on  board,  the  die  for  war  was  cast.   

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Outside  the  administration,  neoconservative  pundits  lost  no  time  making  the  case  that  invading  Iraq  was  essential  to  winning  the  war  on  terrorism.   Their  efforts  were  partly  aimed  at  keeping  pressure  on  Bush  and  partly  intended  to  overcome  opposition  to  the  war  inside  and  utside  of  the  government.   On  September  20,  a  group  of  prominent  neoconservatives  and  their  allies  published  another  open  letter,  telling  the  President  that  “even  if  evidence  does  not  link  Iraq  directly  to  the  [9/11]  attack,  any  strategy  aiming  at  the  eradication  of  terrorism  and  its  sponsors  must  include  a  determined  effort  to  remove  Saddam  Husseinfrom  power  in  Iraq.”163   The  letter  also  reminded  Bush  that,  “Israel  has  been  and  remains  America’s  staunchest  ally  against  international  terrorism.”  In  the  October  1  issue  of  the  Weekly  Standard,  Robert  Kagan  and  William  Kristol  called  for  regime  change  in  Iraq  immediately  after  the  Taliban  was  defeated.   That  same  day,  Charles  Krauthammer  argued  in  the  Washington  Post  that  after  we  were  done  with  Afghanistan,  Syria  should  be  next,  followed  by  Iran  and  Iraq.  “The  war  on  terrorism,”  he  argued,  “will  conclude  in  Baghdad,”  when  we  finish  off  “the  most  dangerous  terrorist  regime  in  the  world.”164   

These  salvoes  were  the  beginning  of  an  unrelenting  public  relations  campaign  to  win  support  for  invading  Iraq.165   A  key  part  of  this  campaign  was  the  manipulation  of  intelligence  information,  so  as  to  make  Saddam  look  like  an  imminent  threat.   For  example,  Libby  visited  the  CIA  several  times  to  pressure  analysts  to  find  evidence  that  would  make  the  case  for  war,  and  he  helped  prepare  a  detailed  briefing  on  the  Iraq  threat  in  early  2003  that  was  pushed  on  Colin  Powell,  then  preparing  his  infamous  briefing  to  the  U.N.  Security  Council  on  the  Iraqi  threat.166   According  to  Bob  Woodward,  Powell  “was  appalled  at  what  he  considered  overreaching  and  hyperbole.  Libby  was  drawing  only  the  worst  conclusions  from  fragments  and  silky  threads.”167   Although  Powell  discarded  Libby’s  most  outrageous  claims,  his  U.N.  presentation  was  still  riddled  with  errors,  as  Powell  now  acknowledges.  

The  campaign  to  manipulate  intelligence  also  involved  two  organizations  that  were  created  after  9/11  and  reported  directly  to  Undersecretary  of  Defense  Douglas  Feith.168   The  Policy  Counterterrorism  Evaluation  Group  was  tasked  to  find  links  between  al  Qaeda  and  Iraq  that  the  intelligence  commnity  supposedly  missed.   Its  two  key  members  were  Wurmser,  a  hard  core  neoconservative,  and  Michael  Maloof,  a  Lebanese‐American  who  had  close  ties  with  Perle.   The  Office  of  Special  Plans  was  tasked  with  finding  evidence  that  could  be  used  to  sell  war  with  Iraq.  It  was  headed  by  Abram  Shulsky,  a  neoconservative  with  longstanding  ties  to  Wolfowitz,  and  its  ranks  included  recruits  from  pro‐Israel  think  tanks.169

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Like  virtually  all  the  neoconservatives,  Feith  is  deeply  committed  to  Israel.   He  also  has  long‐standing  ties  to  the  Likud  Party.   He  wrote  articles  in  the  1990s  supporting  the  settlements  and  arguing  that  Israel  should  retain  the  occupied  territories.170   More  importantly,  along  with  Perle  and  Wurmser,  he  wrote  the  famous  “Clean  Break”  report  in  June  1996  for  the  incoming  Israeli  Prime  Minister,  Benjamin  Netanyahu.171   Among  other  things,  it  recommended  that  Netanyahu  “focus  on  removing  Saddam  Hussein  from  power  in  Iraq  ‐‐ an  important  Israeli  strategic  objective  in  its  own  right.”   It  also  called  for  Israel  to  take  steps  to  reorder  the  entire  Middle  East.    Netanyahu  did  not  implement  their  advice,  but  Feith,  Perle  and  Wurmser  were  soon  advocating  that  the  Bush  Administration  pursue  those  same  goals.   This  situation  prompted  Ha’aretz  columnist  Akiva  Eldar  to  warn  that  Feith  and  Perle  “are  walking  a  fine  line  between  their  loyalty  to  American  governments  …  and  Israeli  interests.”172

Wolfowitz  is  equally  committed  to  Israel.   The  Forward  once  described  him  as  “the  most  hawkishly  pro‐Israel  voice  in  the  Administration,”  and  selected  him  in  2002  as  the  first  among  fifty  notables  who  “have  consciously  pursued  Jewish  activism.”173   At  about  the  same  time,  JINSA  gave  Wolfowitz  its  Henry  M.  Jackson  Distinguished  Service  Award  for  promoting  a  strong  partnership  between  Israel  and  the  United  States,  and  the  Jerusalem  Post,  describing  him  as  “devoutly  pro‐Israel,”  named  him  “Man  of  the  Year”  in  2003.174    

Finally,  a  brief  word  is  in  order  about  the  neoconservatives’  prewar  support  of  Ahmed  Chalabi,  the  unscrupulous  Iraqi  exile  who  headed  the  Iraqi  National  Congress  (INC).   They  embraced  Chalabi  because  he  had  worked  to  establish  close  ties  with  Jewish‐American  groups  and  had  pledged  to  foster  good  relations  with  Israel  once  he  gained  power.175   This  was  precisely  what  pro‐Israel  proponents  of  regime  change  wanted  to  hear,  so  they  backed  Chalabi  in  return.    Journalist  Matthew  Berger  laid  out  the  essence  of  the  bargain  in  the  Jewish  Journal:  “The  INC  saw  improved  relations  as  a  way  to  tap  Jewish  influence  in  Washington  and  Jerusalem  and  to  drum  up  increased  support  fo  its  cause.  For  their  part,  the  Jewish  groups  saw  an  opportunity  to  pave  the  way  for  better  relations  between  Israel  and  Iraq,  if  and  when  the  INC  is  involved  in  replacing  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime.”176

Given  the  neoconservatives’  devotion  to  Israel,  their  obsession  with  Iraq,  and  their  influence  in  the  Bush  Administration,  it  is  not  surprising  that  many  Americans  suspected  that  the  war  was  designed  to  further  Israeli  interests.   For  example,  Barry  Jacobs  of  the  American  Jewish  Committee  acknowledged  in  

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March  2005  that  the  belief  that  Israel  and  the  neoconservatives  conspired  to  get  the  United  States  into  a  war  in  Iraq  was  “pervasive”  in  the  U.S.  intelligence  community.177   Yet  few  people  would  say  so  publicly,  and  most  that  did  ‐‐ including  Senator  Ernest  Hollings  (D‐SC)  and  Representative  James  Moran  (D‐VA)  ‐‐ were  condemned  for  raising  the  issue.178   Michael  Kinsley  put  the  point  well  in  late  2002,  when  he  wrote  that  “the  lack  of  public  discussion  about  the  role  of  Israel  …  is  the  proverbial  elephant  in  the  room:  Everybody  sees  it,  no  one  mentions  it.”179   The  reason  for  this  reluctance,  he  observed,  was  fear  of  being  labeled  an  anti‐Semite.   Even  so,  there  is  little  doubt  that  Israel  and  the  Lobby  were  key  factors  in  shaping  the  decision  for  war.   Without  the  Lobby’s  efforts,  the  United  States  would  have  been  far  less  likely  to  have  gone  to  war  in  March  2003.  

Dreams  of  Regional  Transformation  

The  Iraq  war  was  not  supposed  to  be  a  costly  quagmire.   Rather,  it  was  intended  as  the  first  step  in  a  larger  plan  to  reorder  the  Middle  East.   This  ambitious  strategy  was  a  dramatic  departure  from  previous  U.S.  policy,  and  the  Lobby  and  Israel  were  critical  driving  forces  behind  this  shift.   This  point  was  made  clearly  after  the  Iraq  war  began  in  a  front‐page  story  in  the  Wall  Street  Journal.  The  headline  says  it  all:  “President’s  Dream:  Changing  Not  Just  Regime  but  a  Region:  A  Pro‐U.S.,  Democratic  Area  is  a  Goal  that  Has  Israeli  and  Neo  Conservative  Roots.”180

Pro‐Israel  forces  have  long  been  interested  in  getting  the  U.S.  military  more  directly  involved  in  the  Middle  East,  so  it  could  help protect  Israel.181   But  they  had  limited  success  on  this  front  during  the  Cold  War,  because  America  acted  as  an  “off‐shore  balancer”  in  the  region.   Most  U.S.  forces  designated  for  the  Middle  East,  like  the  Rapid  Deployment  Force,  were  kept  “over  the  horizon”  and  out  of  harm’s  way.   Washington  maintained  a  favorable  balance  of  power  by  playing  local  powers  off  against  each  other,  which  is  why  the  Reagan  Administration  supported  Saddam  against  revolutionary  Iran  during  the  Iran‐Iraq  war  (1980‐88).   

This  policy  changed  after  the  first  Gulf  War,  when  the  Clinton  Administration  adopted  a  strategy  of  “dual  containment.”   It  called  for  stationing  substantial  U.S.  forces  in  the  region  to  contain  both  Iran  and  Iraq,  instead  of  using  one  to  check  the  other.   The  father  of  dual  containment  was  none  other  than  Martin  Indyk,  who  first  articulated  the  strategy  in  May  1993  at  the  pro‐Israel  think  tank  WINEP  and  then  implemented  it  as  Director  for  Near  East  and  South  Asian  Affairs  at  the  National  Security  Counil.182

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There  was  considerable  dissatisfaction  with  dual  containment  by  the  mid‐1990s,  because  it  made  the  United  States  the  mortal  enemy  of  two  countries  who  also  hated  each  other,  and  it  forced  Washington  to  bear  the  burden  of  containing  both  of  them.183   Not  surprisingly,  the  Lobby  worked  actively  in  Congress  to  save  dual  containment.184   Pressed  by  AIPAC  and  other  pro‐Israel  forces,  Clinton  toughened  up  the  policy  in  the  spring  of  1995  by  imposing  an  economic  embargo  on  Iran.   But  AIPAC  et  al  wanted  more.   The  result  was  the  1996  Iran  and  Libya  Sanctions  Act,  which  imposed  sanctions  on  any  foreign  companies  investing  more  than  $40  million  to  develop  petroleum  resources  in  Iran  or  Libya.   As  Ze’ev  Schiff,  the  military  correspondent  for  Ha’aretz,  noted  at  the  time,  “Israel  is  but  a  tiny  element  in  the  big  scheme,  but  one  should  not  conclude  that  it  cannot  influence  those  within  the  Beltway.”185

By  the  late  1990s,  however,  the  neoconservatives  were  arguing  that  dual  containment  was  not  enough  and  that  regime  change  in  Iraq  was  now  essential.   By  toppling  Saddam  and  turning  Iraq  into  a  vibrant  democracy,  they  argued,  the  United  States  would  trigger  a  far‐reaching  process  of  change  throughout  the  Middle  East.   This  line  of  thinking,  of  course,  was  evident  in  the  “Clean  Break”  study  the  neoconservatives  wrote  for  Netanyahu.   By  2002,  when  invading  Iraq  had  become  a  front‐burner  issue,  regional  transformation  had  become  an  article  of  faith  in  neoconservative  circles.186    

Charles  Krauthammer  describes  this  grand  scheme  as  the  brainchild  of  Natan  Sharansky,  the  Israeli  politician  whose  writings  have  impressed  President  Bush.187   But  Sharansky  was  hardly  a  lone  voice  in  Israel.   In  fact,  Israelis  across  the  political  spectrum  believed  that  toppling  Saddam  would  alter  the  Middle  East  to  Israel’s  advantage.   Aluf  Benn  reported  in  Ha’aretz  (February  17,  2003),  “Senior  IDF  officers  and  those  close  to  Prime  Minister  Ariel  Sharon,  such  as  National  Security  Advisor  Ephraim  Halevy,  paint  a  rosy  picture  of  the  wonderful  future  Israel  can  expect  after  the  war.  They  envision  a  domino  effect,  with  the  fall  of  Saddam  Hussein  followed  by  that  of  Israel’s  other  enemies  …  Along  with  these  leaders  will  disappear  terror  and  weapons  of  mass  destruction.”188    

In  short,  Israeli  leaders,  neoconservatives,  and  the  Bush  Administration  all  saw  war  with  Iraq  as  the  first  step  in  an  ambitious  campaign  to  remake  the  Middle  East.   And  in  the  first  flush  of  victory,  they  turned  their  sights  on  Israel’s  other  regional  opponents.   

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Gunning  for  Syria  

Israeli  leaders  did  not  push  the  Bush  Administration  to  put  its  crosshairs  on  Syria  before  March  2003,  because  they  were  too  busy  pushing  for  war  against  Iraq.   But  once  Baghdad  fell  in  mid‐April,  Sharon  and  his  lieutenants  began  urging  Washington  to  target  Damascus.189   On  April  16,  for  example,  Sharon  and  Shaul  Mofaz,  his  defense  minister,  gave  high  profile  interviews  in  different  Israeli  newspapers.   Sharon,  in  Yedioth  Ahronoth,  called  for  the  United  States  to  put  “very  heavy”  pressure  on  Syria.190   Mofaz  told  Ma’ariv  that,  “We  have  a  long  list  of  issues  that  we  are  thinking  of  demanding  of  the  Syrians  and  it  is  appropriate  that  it  should  be  done  thrugh  the  Americans.”191   Sharon’s  national  security  advisor,  Ephraim  Halevy,  told  a  WINEP  audience  that  it  was  now  important  for  the  United  States  to  get  rough  with  Syria,  and  the  Washington  Post  reported  that  Israel  was  “fueling  the  campaign”  against  Syria  by  feeding  the  United  States  intelligence  reports  about  the  actions  of  Syrian  President  Bashar  Assad.192

Prominent  members  of  the  Lobby  made  the  same  arguments  after  Baghdad  fell.193   Wolfowitz  declared  that  “there  has  got  to  be  regime  change  in  Syria,”  and    Richard  Perle  told  a  journalist  that  “We  could  deliver  a  short  message,  a  two‐worded  message  [to  other  hostile  regimes  in  the  Middle  East]:  ‘You’re  next’.”194   In  early  April,  WINEP  released  a  bipartisan  report  stating  that  Syria  “should  not  miss  the  message  that  countries  that  pursue  Saddam’s  reckless,  irresponsible  and  defiant  behavior  could  end  up  sharing  his  fate.”195   On  April  15,  Yossi  Klein  Halevi  wrote  a  piece  in  the  Los  Angeles  Times  entitled  “Next,  Turn  the  Screws  on  Syria,”  while  the  next  day  Zev  Chafets  wrote  an  article  for  the  New  York  Daily  News  entitled  “Terror‐Friendly  Syria  Needs  a  Change,  Too.”   Not  to  be  outdone,  Lawrence  Kaplan  wrote  in  the  New  Republic  on  April  21  that  Syrian  leader  Assad  was  a  serious  threat  to  America.196

 Back  on  Capitol  Hill,  Congressman  Eliot  Engel  (D‐NY)  had  reintroduced  the  Syria  Accountability  and  Lebanese  Sovereignty  Restoration  Act  on  April  12.197   It  threatened  sanctions  aginst  Syria  if  it  did  not  withdraw  from  Lebanon,  give  up  its  WMD,  and  stop  supporting  terrorism,  and  it  also  called  for  Syria  and  Lebanon  to  take  concrete  steps  to  make  peace  with  Israel.   This  legislation  was  strongly  endorsed  by  the  Lobby—especially  AIPAC—and  “framed,”  according  to  the  Jewish  Telegraph  Agency,  “by  some  of  Israel’s  best  friends  in  Congress.”198   It  had  been  on  the  back  burner  for  some  time,  largely  because  the  Bush  Administration  had  little  enthusiasm  for  it,  but  the  anti‐Syrian  act  passed  overwhelmingly  (398‐4  

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in  the  House;  89‐4  in  the  Senate),  and  Bush  signed  it  into  law  on  December  12,  2003.199    

Yet  the  Bush  Administration  was  still  divided  about  the  wisdom  of  targeting  Syria  at  this  time.   Although  the  neoconservatives  were  eager  to  pick  a  fight  with  Damascus,  the  CIA  and  the  State  Department  were  opposed.   And  even  after  Bush  signed  the  new  law,  he  emphasized  that  he  would  go  slowly  in  implementing  it.200   

Bush’s  ambivalence  is  understandable.   First,  the  Syrian  government  had  been  providing  the  United  States  with  important  intelligence  about  al  Qaeda  since  9/11  and  had  also  warned  Washington  about  a  planned  terrorist  attack  in  the  Gulf.201   Syria  had  also  given  CIA  interrogators  access  to  Mohammed  Zammar,  the  alleged  recruiter  of  some  of  the  9/11  hijackers.   Targeting  the  Assad  regime  would  jeopardize  these  valuable  connections,  and  thus  undermine  the  larger  war  on  terrorism.    

 Second,  Syria  was  not  on  bad  terms  with  Washington  before  the  Iraq  war  (e.g.,  it  had  even  voted  for  U.N.  Resolution  1441),  and  it  was  no  threat  to  the  United  States.   Playing  hardball  with  Syria  would  make  the  United  States  look  like  a  bully  with  an  insatiable  appetite  for  beating  up  Arab  sttes.   Finally,  putting  Syria  on  the  American  hit  list  would  give  Damascus  a  powerful  incentive  to  cause  trouble  in  Iraq.   Even  if  one  wanted  to  pressure  Syria,  it  made  good  sense  to  finish  the  job  in  Iraq  first.  

 Yet  Congress  insisted  on  putting  the  screws  to  Damascus,  largely  in  response  to  pressure  from  Israel  officials  and  pro‐Israel  groups  like  AIPAC.202   If  there  were  no  Lobby,  there  would  have  been  no  Syria  Accountability  Act  and  U.S.  policy  toward  Damascus  would  have  been  more  in  line  with  the  U.S.  national  interest.  

 Putting  Iran  in  the  Crosshairs  

 Israelis  tend  to  describe  every  threat  in  the  starkest  terms,  but  Iran  is  widely  seen  as  their  most  dangerous  enemy  because  it  is  the  most  likely  adversary  to  acquire  nuclear  weapons.   Virtually  all  Israelis  regard  an  Islamic  country  in  the  Middle  East  with  nuclear  weapons  as  an  existential  threat.    As  Israeli  Defense  Minister  Binyamin  Ben‐Eliezer  remarked  one  month  before  the  Iraq  war:  “Iraq  is  a  problem  ….  But  you  should  understand,  if  you  ask  me,  today  Iran  is  more  dangerous  than  Iraq.”203

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 Sharon  began  publicly  pushing  the  United  States  to  confront  Iran  in  November  2002,  in  a  high  profile  interview  in  The  Times  (London).204   Describing  Iran  as  the  “center  of  world  terror,”  and  bent  on  acquiring  nuclear  weapons,  he  declared  that  the  Bush  Administration  should  put  the  strong  arm  on  Iran  “the  day  after”  it  conquered  Iraq.   In  late  April  2003,  Ha’aretz  reported  that  the  Israeli  ambassador  in  Washington  was  now  calling  for  regime  change  in  Iran.205   The  overthrow  of  Saddam,  he  noted,  was  “not  enough.”   In  his  words,  America  “has  to  follow  through.  We  still  have  great  threats  of  that  magnitude  coming  from  Syria,  coming  from  Iran.”  

 The  neoconservatives  also  lost  no  time  in  making  the  case  for  regime  change  in  Tehran.206   On  May  6,  the  AEI  co‐sponsored  an  all‐day  conference  on  Iran  with  the  pro‐Israel  Foundation  for  the  Defense  of  Democracies  and  the  Hudson  Institute.207   The  speakers  were  all  strongly  pro‐Israel,  and  many  called  for  the  United  States  to  replace  the  Iranian  regime  with  a  democracy.   As  usual,  there  were  a  bevy  of  articles  by  prominent  neoconservatives  making  the  case  for  going  after  Iran.   For  example,  William  Kristol  wrote  in  the  Weekly  Standard  on  May  12  that,  “The  liberation  of  Iraq  was  the  first  great  battle  for  the  future  of  the  Middle  East  ….  But  the  next  great  battle  ‐‐ not,  we  hope,  a  military  one  ‐‐ will  be  for  Iran.”208

 The  Bush  Administration  has  responded  to  the  Lobby’s  pressure  by  working  overtime  to  shut  down  Iran’s  nuclear  program.   But  Washington  has  had  little  success,  and  Iran  seems  determined  to  get  a  nuclear  arsenal.   As  a  result,  the  Lobby  has  intensified  its  pressure  on  the  U.S.  government,  using  all  of  the  strategies  in  its  playbook.209   Op‐eds  and  articles  now  warn  of  imminent  dangers  from  a  nuclear  Iran,  caution  against  any  appeasement  of  a  “terrorist”  regime,  and  hint  darkly  of  preventive  action  should  diplomacy  fail.   The  Lobby  is  also  pushing  Congress  to  approve  the  Iran  Freedom  Support  Act,  which  would  expand  existing  sanctions  on  Iran.   Israeli  officials  also  warn  they  may  take  preemptive  action  should  Iran  continue  down  the  nuclear  road,  hints  partly  intended  to  keep  Washington  focused  on  this  issue.  

 One  might  argue  that  Israel  and  the  Lobby  have  not  had  much  influence  on  U.S.  policy  toward  Iran,  because  the  United  States  has  its  own  reasons  to  keep  Iran  from  going  nuclear.   This  is  partly  true,  but  Iran’s  nuclear  ambitions  do  not  pose  an  existential  threat  to  the  United  States.   If  Washington  could  live  with  a  nuclear  Soviet  Union,  a  nuclear  China,  or  even  a  nuclear  North  Korea,  then  it  can  live  with  a  nuclear  Iran.   And  that  is  why  the  Lobby  must  keep  constant  pressure  on  U.S.  politicians  to  confront  Tehran.   Iran  and  the  United  States  would  hardly  be  

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allies  if  the  Lobby  did  not  exist,  but  U.S.  policy  would  be  more  temperate  and  preventive  war  would  not  be  a  serious  option.   

 Summary  

 It  is  not  surprising  that  Israel  and  its  American  supporters  want  the  United  States  to  deal  with  any  and  all  threats  to  Israel’  security.   If  their  efforts  to  shape  U.S.  policy  succeed,  then  Israel’s  enemies  get  weakened  or  overthrown,  Israel  gets  a  free  hand  with  the  Palestinians,  and  the  United  States  does  most  of  the  fighting,  dying,  rebuilding,  and  paying.    

 But  even  if  the  United  States  fails  to  transform  the  Middle  East  and  finds  itself  in  conflict  with  an  increasingly  radicalized  rab  and  Islamic  world,  Israel  still  ends  up  protected  by  the  world’s  only  superpower.210   This  is  not  a  perfect  outcome  from  the  Lobby’s  perspective,  but  it  is  obviously  preferable  to  Washington  distancing  itself  from  Israel,  or  using  its  leverage  to  force  Israel  to  make  peace  with  the  Palestinians.   

 CONCLUSION  

 Can  the  Lobby’s  power  be  curtailed?   One  would  like  to  think  so,  given  the  Iraq  debacle,  the  obvious  need  to  rebuild  America’s  image  in  the  Arab  and  Islamic  world,  and  the  recent  revelations  about  AIPAC  officials  passing  U.S.  government  secrets  to  Israel.   One  might  also  think  that  Arafat’s  death  and  the  election  of  the  more  moderate  Abu  Mazen  would  cause  Washington  to  press  vigoously  and  evenhandedly  for  a  peace  agreement.   In  short,  there  are  ample  grounds  for  U.S.  leaders  to  distance  themselves  from  the  Lobby  and  adopt  a  Middle  East  policy  more  consistent  with  broader  U.S.  interests.   In  particular,  using  American  power  to  achieve  a  just  peace  between  Israel  and  the  Palestinians  would  help  advance  the  broader  goals  of  fightng  extremism  and  promoting  democracy  in  the  Middle  East.     

 But  that  is  not  going  to  happen  anytime  soon.  AIPAC  and  its  allies  (including  Christian  Zionists)  have  no  serious  opponents  in  the  lobbying  world.   They  know  it  has  become  more  difficult  to  make  Israel’s  case  today,  and  they  are  responding  by  expanding  their  activities  and  staffs.211   Moreover,  American  politicians  remain  acutely  sensitive  to  campaign  contributions  and  other  forms  of  political  pressure  and  major  media  utlets  are  likely  to  remain  sympathetic  to  Israel  no  matter  what  it  does.     

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This  situation  is  deeply  worrisome,  because  the  Lobbyʹs  influence  causes  trouble  on  several  fronts.   It  increases  the  terrorist  danger  that  all  states  face—including  Americaʹs  European  allies.   By  preventing  U.S.  leaders  from  pressuring  Israel  to  make  peace,  the  Lobby  has  also  made  it  impossible  to  end  the  Israeli‐Palestinian  conflict.   This  situation  gives  extremists  a  powerful  recruiting  tool,  increases  the  pool  of  potential  terrorists  and  sympathizers,  and  contributes  to  Islamic  radicalism  around  the  world.  

 Furthermore,  the  Lobby’s  campaign  for  regime  change  in  Iran  and  Syria  could  lead  the  United  States  to  attack  those  countries,  with  potentially  disastrous  effects.   We  do  not  need  another  Iraq.   At  a  minimum,  the  Lobby’s  hostility  toward  these  countries  makes  it  especially  difficult  for  Washington  to  enlist  them  against  al  Qaeda  and  he  Iraqi  insurgency,  where  their  help  is  badly  needed.   

 There  is  a  moral  dimension  here  as  well.   Thanks  to  the  Lobby,  the  United  States  has  become  the  de  facto  enabler  of  Israeli  expansion  in  the  occupied  territories,  making  it  complicit  in  the  crimes  perpetrated  against  the  Palestinians.   This  situation  undercuts  Washington’s  efforts  to  promote  democracy  abroad  and  makes  it  look  hypocritical  when  it  presses  othe  states  to  respect  human  rights.  U.S.  efforts  to  limit  nuclear  proliferation  appear  equally  hypocritical  given  its  willingness  to  accept  Israel’s  nuclear  arsenal,  which  encourages  Iran  and  others  to  seek  similar  capabilities.   

 Moreover,  the  Lobby’s  campaign  to  squelch  debate  about  Israel  is  unhealthy  for  democracy.   Silencing  skeptics  by  organizing  blacklists  and  boycotts—or  by  suggesting  that  critics  are  anti‐Semites—violates  the  principle  of  open  debate  upon  which  democracy  depends.   The  inability  of  the  U.S.  Congress  to  conduct  a  genuine  debate  on  these  vital  issues  paralyzes  the  entire  process  of  democratic  deliberation.   Israel’s  backers  should  be  free  to  make  their  case  and  to  challenge  those  who  disagree  with  them.   But  efforts  to  stifle  debate  by  intimidation  must  be  roundly  condemned  by  those  who  believe  in  free  speech  and  open  discussio  of  important  public  issues.  

 Finally,  the  Lobby’s  influence  has  been  bad  for  Israel.   Its  ability  to  persuade  Washington  to  support  an  expansionist  agenda  has  discouraged  Israel  from  seizing  opportunities  ‐‐ including  a  peace  treaty  with  Syria  and  a  prompt  and  full  implementation  of  the  Oslo  Accords  ‐‐ that  would  have  saved  Israeli  lives  and  shrunk  the  ranks  of  Palestinian  extremists.   Denying  the  Palestinians  their  legitimate  political  rights  certainly  has  not  made  Israel  more  secure,  and  the  long  campaign  to  kill  or  marginalize  a  generation  of  Palestinian  leaders  has  

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empowered  extremist  groups  like  Hamas,  and  reduced  the  number  of  Palestinian  leaders  who  would  be  both  willing  to  accept  a  fair  settlement  and  able  to  make  it  work.   This  course  raises  the  awful  specter  of  Israel  one  day  occupying  the  pariah  status  once  reserved  for  apartheid  states  like  Soth  Africa.   Ironically,  Israel  itself  would  probably  be  better  off  if  the  Lobby  were  less  powerful  and  U.S.  policy  were  more  evenhanded.  

 But  there  is  a  ray  of  hope.   Although  the  Lobby  remains  a  powerful  force,  the  adverse  effects  of  its  influence  are  increasingly  difficult  to  hide.   Powerful  states  can  maintain  flawed  policies  for  quite  some  time,  but  reality  cannot  be  ignored  forever.   What  is  needed,  therefore,  is  a  candid  discussion  of  the  Lobby’s  influence  and  a  more  open  debate  about  U.S.  interests  in  this  vital  region.   Israel’s  well‐being  is  one  of  those  interests,  but  not  its  continued  occupation  of  the  West  Bank  or  its  broader  regional  agenda.   Open  debate  will  expose  the  limits  of  the  strategic  and  moral  case  for  one‐sided  U.S.  support  and  could  move  the  United  States  to  a  position  more  consistent  with  its  own  national  interest,  with  the  interests  of  the  other  states  in  the  region,  and  with  Israel’s  long‐term  interests  as  well.   

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ENDNOTES

1  Indeed,  the  mere  existence  of  the  Lobby  suggests  that  unconditional  support  for  Israel  is  not  in  the  American  national  interest.   If  it  was,  one  would  not  need  an  organized  special  interest  group  to  bring  it  about.   But  because  Israel  is  a  strategic  and  moral  liability,  it  takes  relentless  political  pressure  to  keep  U.S.  support  intact.   As  Richard  Gephardt,  the  former  House  Minority  Leader,  told  the  American‐Israel  Public  Affairs  Committee  (AIPAC),  “Without  [your]  constant  support  .  .  .  and  all  your  fighting  on  a  daily  basis  to  strengthen  that  relationship,  it  would  not  be.”  This  quote  was  downloaded  from  the  AIPAC  website  [http://www.aipac.org/]  on  January  12,  2004.  Also  see  Michael  Kinsley,  “J’Accuse,  Sort  Of,”  Slate,  March  12,  2003.  

2  According  to  the  U.S.  Agency  for  International  Development’s  (USAID)  “Greenbook,”  which  reports  “overseas  loans  and  grants,”  Israel  has  received  $140,142,800  (in  constant  2003  dollars)  from  the  United  States  through  2003.  Downloaded  from  the  “Greenbook”  web  site  [http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/]  on  November  8,  2005.  

3  According  to  the  “Greenbook,”  Israel  received  about  $3.7  billion  in  direct  aid  from  the  United  States  in  2003.  Israel’s  population  according  to  the  International  Institute  for  Strategic  Studies  [IISS]  and  the  CIA  is  6,276,883.  IISS,  The  Military  Balance:  2005‐2006  (Oxfordshire:  Routledge,  2005),  p.  192;  http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/.   

That  averages  out  to  $589  per  Israeli.  If  one  assumes  the  same  population  size  and  $3  billion  in  total  aid,  then  each  Israeli  receives  $478.  

4  See  http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/;  World  Bank  Atlas  (Washington,  DC:  Development  Data  Group,  World  Bank,  September  2004),  pp.  64‐65.  

5  For  a  discussion  of  the  various  special  deals  that  Israel  receives,  see  Clyde  R.  Mark,  “Israel:  U.S.  Foreign  Assistance,”  Issue  Brief  for  Congress  (Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service,  April  26,  2005).   

6  Avner  Cohen,  Israel  and  the  Bomb  (New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  1999);  Seymour  M.  Hersh,  The  Samson  Option:  Israel’s  Nuclear  Arsenal  and  American  Foreign  Policy  (New  York:  Random  House,  1991).  

7  “Report  of  the  Open‐Ended  Working  Group  on  the  Question  of  Equitable  Representation  on  and  Increase  in  the  Membership  of  the  Security  Council  and  Oher  Matters  Related  to  the  Security  Council,”  Annex  III,  U.N.  General  Assembly  Official  Records,  58th  Session,  Supplement  No.  47,  2004,  pp.  13‐14;  Donald  Neff,  “An  Updated  List  of  Vetoes  Cast  by  the  United  States  to  Shield  Israel  from  Criticism  by  the  U.N.  Security  Council,”  Washington  Report  on  Middle  East  Affairs,  May/June  2005;  Stephen  Zunes,  “U.S.  Declares  Open  Season  on  UN  Workers,”  CommonDreams.org,  January  10,   

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2003.  There  were  also  many  resolutions  that  never  came  to  a  vote  because  Security  Council  members  knew  that  the  United  States  would  eto  them.  Given  the  difficulty  of  criticizing  specific  Israeli  actions  in  the  Security  Council,  criticism  has  often  come  from  the  U.N.  General  Assembly,  where  no  state  has  a  veto.  In  those  instances,  the  United  States  invariably  finds  itself  on  the  short  end  of  lopsided  votes  on  the  order  of  say  133‐4,  where  the  dissenters  include  Micronesia  and  the  Marshall  Islands  as  well  as  Israel  and  the  United  States.   In  response,  the  Forward  reported  in  November  2003  that  the  Bush  Administration,  at  the  instigation  of  the  American  Jewish  Committee,  was  “embarking  on  the  most  comprehensive  campaign  in  years  to  reduce  the  number  of  anti‐Israel  resolutions  routinely  passed  by  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly.”  Marc  Perelman,  “Washington  Seeking  to  Reduce  Number  of  Anti‐Israel  Votes  at  U.N.,”  Forward,  November  14,  2003.  

8  Marc  Perelman,  “International  Agency  Eyes  Israeli  Nukes,”  Forward,  September  5,  2003.  

9  William  B.  Quandt,  Peace  Process:  American  Diplomacy  and  the  Arab‐Israeli  Conflict  since  1967,  3rd  ed.  (Washington,  DC:  Brookings  Institution  Press,  2005),  chapters  5‐7,  10‐12.  

10  Nathan  Guttman,  “U.S.  Accused  of  Pro‐Israel  Bias  at  2000  Camp  David,”  Ha’aretz,  April  29,  2005.  Also  see  Aaron  D.  Miller,  “Israel’s  Lawyer,”  Washington  Post,  May  23,  2005;  “Lessons  of  Arab‐Israeli  Negotiating:  Four  Negotiators  Look  Back  and  Ahead,”  Transcript  of  panel  discussion,  Middle  East  Institute,  April  25,  2005.   For  general  discussions  of  how  the  United  States  consistently  favors  Israel  over  the  Palestinians,  see  Noam  Chomsky,  Fateful  Triangle:  The  United  States,  Israel  and  the  Palestinians  (Cambridge,  MA:  South  End  Press,  1999);  Kathleen  Christison,  Perceptions  of  Palestine:  Their  Influence  on  U.S.  Middle  East  Policy  (Berkeley,  CA:  University  of  California  Press,  2001);  Naseer  H.  Aruri,  Dishonest  Broker:  The  U.S.  Role  in  Israel  and  Palestine  (Cambridge,  MA:  South  End  Press,  2003).   It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the  British  favored  the  Zionists  over  the  Palestinians  during  the  period  of  the  British  Mandate  1919‐1948).  See  Tom  Segev,  One  Palestine,  Complete:  Jews  and  Arabs  under  the  British  Mandate  (New  York:  Henry  Holt,  2000).  

11  Downloaded  from  AIPAC’s  website  [http://aipac.org/documents/unitedefforts.html]  on  January  12,  2006.  

12  See,  for  example,  Warren  Bass,  Support  Any  Friend:  Kennedy’s  Middle  East  and  the  Making  of  the  US‐Israel  Alliance  (NY:  Oxford  University  Press,  2003);  A.F.K.  Organski,  The  $36  Billion  Bargain:  Strategy  and  Politics  in  U.S.  Assistance  to  Israel  (New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  1990);  Steven  L.  Spiegel,  “Israel  as  a  Strategic  Asset,”  Commentary,  June  1983,  pp.  51‐ 55;  Idem,  The  Other  Arab‐Israeli  Conflict:  Making  America’s  Middle  East  Policy,  from  Truman  to  Reagan  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1985).   

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13  This  point  was  not  lost  on  Moshe  Dayan,  who,  remembering  a  talk  he  had  with  Henry  Kissinger  at  the  time  of  the  October  1973  War,  noted  that  “though  I  happened  to  remark  that  the  United  States  was  the  only  country  that  was  ready  to  stand  by  us,  my  silent  reflection  was  that  the  United  States  would  really  rather  support  the  Arabs.”  Moshe  Dayan,  Moshe  Dayan:  Story  of  My  Life  (NY:  William  Morrow,  1976),  pp.  521‐513.  Also  see  Zach  Levey,  “The  United  States’  Skyhawk  Sale  to  Israel,  1966:  Strategic  Exigencies  of  an  Arms  Deal,”  Diplomatic  History,  Vol.  28,  No.  2  (April  2004),  pp.255‐276.  

14  Bernard  Lewis  wrote  in  1992,  “Whatever  value  Israel  might  have  had  as  a  strategic  asset  during  the  Cold  War,  that  value  obviously  ended  when  the  Cold  War  itself  came  to  a  close.  The  change  was  clearly  manifested  in  the  Gulf  War  last  year,  when  what  the  United  States  most  desired  from  Israel  was  to  keep  out  of  the  conflict  ‐‐ to  be  silent,  inactive  and,  as  far  as  possible,  invisible  ….  Israel  was  not  an  asset,  but  an  irrelevance  ‐‐ some  even  said  a  nuisance.  Some  of  the  things  that  the  Israeli  government  later  said  and  did  were  unlikely  to  change  this  perception.”  “Rethinking  the  Middle  East,”  Foreign  Affairs,  Vol.  71,  No.  4,  (Fall  1992),  pp.  110‐111.  

15  According  to  Middle  East  expert  Shibley  Telhami,  “No  other  issue  resonates  with  the  public  in  the  Arab  world,  and  many  other  parts  of  the  Muslim  world,  more  deeply  than  Palestine.   No  other  issue  shapes  the  regional  perceptions  of  America  more  fundamentally  than  the  issue  of  Palestine.”  The  Stakes:  America  and  the  Middle  East  (Boulder,  CO:  Westview  Press,  2002),  p.  96.   Lakhdar  Brahimi,  the  former  U.N.  special  envoy  to  Iraq,  who  the  Bush  Administration  enlisted  to  help  form  an  interim  Iraqi  government  in  June  2004,  said  that  Israeli  policy  toward  the  Palestinians  is  “the  great  poison  in  the  region,”  and  that  “in  the  region,  and  beyond”  people  recognized  the  “injustice  of  this  policy  and  the  equally  unjust  support  of  the  United  States  for  this  policy.”   See  Warren  Hoge,  “U.N.  Moves  to  Disassociate  Itself  from  Remarks  by  Envoy  to  Iraq,”  New  York  Times,  April  23,  2004;  “Brahimi’s  Israel  Comments  Draw  Annan,  Israel  Ire,”  Ha’aretz,  April  24,  2004.  Also  see  the  comments  of  Egyptian  President  Hosni  Mubarak  in  “Mubarak:  Arab  Hatred  of  America  Growing,”  Washington  Post,  April  20,  2004.  Finally,  see  Ami  Eden,  “9/11  Commission  Finds  Anger  at  Israel  Fueling  Islamic  Terrorism  Wave,”  Forward,  July  30,  2004.  

16  National  Commission  on  Terrorist  Attacks  against  the  United  States,  “Outline  of  the  9/11  Plot,”  Staff  Statement  No.  16,  June  16,  2004.   Also  see  Nathan  Guttman,  “Al‐Qaida  Planned  Attacks  during  PM’s  Visit  to  White  House,”  Ha’aretz,  June  17,  2004;  and  Marc  Perelman,  “Bin  Laden  Aimed  to  Link  Plot  to  Israel,”  Forward,  June  25,  2004.   Pro‐Israel  supporters  often  argue  that  bin  Laden  only  became  interested  in  the  Israel‐Palestinian  conflict  after  9/11,  and  only  because  he  thought  that  it  was  good  for  recruiting  purposes.  Thus,  there  is  virtually  no  connection  between  what  happened  on  9/11  and  U.S.  support  for  Israel.   See  Andrea  Levin,  “Don’t  Scapegoat  Israel,”  Boston  Globe,  October  6,  2001;  Norman  Podhoretz,  “Israel  Isn’t  the  Issue,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  September  20,  2001.  Note  

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that  both  of  these  pieces  were  published  right  after  the  Twin  Towers  fell.  However,  we  now  have  a  substantial  number  of  bin  Laden’s  writings  and  talks  from  the  1980s  and  1990s,  and  it  is  clear  that  he  cared  deeply  about  matters  relating  to  Jerusalem  and  the  Palestinians  long  before  9/11.   See,  for  example,  “Jihad  against  Jews  and  Crusaders,”  World  Islamic  Front  Statement,  February  23,  1998;  Transcript  of  Osama  bin  Laden’s  March  20,  1997  interview  with  Peter  Arnett  of  CNN  (first  broadcast  on  May  10,  1997).   Also  “New  Osama  bin  Laden  Video  Contains  Anti‐Israel  and  Anti‐American  Statements,”  downloaded  from  the  Anti‐Defamation  League  (ADL)  website  [http://www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l_print.asp]  on  March  8,  2004.  

 17  Changing  Minds,  Winning  Peace:  A  New  Strategic  Direction  for  U.S.  Public  Diplomacy  in  the  Arab  and  Muslim  World,  Report  of  the  Advisory  Group  on  Public  Diplomacy  for  the  Arab  and  Muslim  World,  Submitted  to  the  Committee  on  Appropriations,  U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  October  1,  2003,  p.  18.  Also  see  The  Pew  Global  Attitudes  Project,  Views  of  a  Changing  World  2003:  War  With  Iraq  Further  Divides  Global  Publics  (Washington,  DC:  The  Pew  Research  Center  for  the  People  and  the  Press,  June  3,  2003);  Report  of  the  Defense  Science  Board  Task  Force  on  Strategic  Communication  (Washington,  DC:  Office  of  the  Undersecretary  of  Defense  for  Acquisition,  Technology,  and  Logistics,  September  2004);  Shibley  Telhami,  “Arab  Public  Opinion:  A  Survey  in  Six  Countries,”  San  Jose  Mercury,  March  16,  2003;  John  Zogby,  The  Ten  Nation  Impressions  of  America  Poll  (Utica,  NY:  Zogby  International,  April  11,  2002);  Idem,  Impressions  of  America  2004:  How  Arabs  View  America,  How  Arabs  Learn  about  America  (Six  Nation  Survey),  (Utica,  NY:  Zogby  International,  2004).  

 18  See  The  Pew  Global  Attitudes  Project,  America  Admired,  Yet  Its  New  Vulnerability  Seen  As  Good  Thing,  Say  Opinion  Leaders  (Washington,  DC:  The  Pew  Research  Center  for  the  People  and  the  Press,  December  19,  2001);  Pew  Global  Attitudes  Project,  Views  of  a  Changing  World  2003,  p.  5.  

 19  For  a  copy  of  the  letter,  see  “Doomed  to  Failure  in  the  Middle  East,”  The  Guardian,  April  27,  2004.   Also  see  Nicholas  Blanford,  “US  Moves  Inflame  Arab  Moderates,”  The  Christian  Science  Monitor,  April  26,  2004;  Rupert  Cornwell,  “Allies  Warn  Bush  that  Stability  in  Iraq  Demands  Arab‐Israeli  Deal,”  The  Independent,  June  10,  2004;  Glenn  Kessler  and  Robin  Wright,  “Arabs  and  Europeans  Question  ‘Greater  Middle  East’  Plan,”  Washington  Post,  February  22,  2004;  Paul  Richter,  “U.S.  Has  Fresh  Hope  for  Mideast,”  Los  Angeles  Times,  November  7,  2004;  Robin  Wright  and  Glenn  Kessler,  “U.S.  Goals  for  Middle  East  Falter,”  Washington  Post,  April  21,  2004.  Even  some  Israelis  understand  that  “the  continuation  of  this  conflict,  including  the  Israeli  occupation,  will  most  certainly  lead  to  new  waves  of  terror;  international  terrorism,  which  the  Americans  fear  so  much,  will  spread.”  Ze’ev  Schiff,  “Fitting  into  America’s  Strategy,”  Ha’aretz,  August  1,  2003.   It  is  also  worth  noting  that  some  50  retired  American  diplomats  wrote  a  letter  in  May  2004  to  President  Bush  similar  to  the  ltter  that  the  British  diplomats  sent  to  Tony  Blair.   A  

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copy  of  the  American  letter  was  published  in  The  New  York  Review  of  Books,  November  18,  2004.  

20  Consider,  for  example,  the  controversy  that  erupted  in  2005  over  Israel’s  decision  to  expand  its  settlements  in  the  West  Bank.  See  Aluf  Benn,  “We  Can’t  Expect  Explicit  U.S.  Okay  to  Build  in  Settlements,”  Ha’aretz,  March  28,  2005;  Akiva  Eldar,  “Bush:  End  Expansion  of  Settlements,”  Ha’aretz,  May  27,  2005;  “Bush  Warns  Israel  over  West  Bank,”  BBC  News  Online,  April  11,  2005;  Donald  Macintyre,  “Sharon  Vows  to  Defy  Bush  over  Expansion  of  Israeli  Settlements,”  Independent,  April  22,  2005;  “Sharon  Brushes  Off  Warning  from  Bush,”  MSNBC.com,  April  12,  2005;  Amy  Teibel,  “U.S.  to  Israel:  Stop  Expanding  Settlements,”  Washington  Post,  June  26,  2005;  Ze’ev  Schiff,  “U.S.:  Israel  Shirking  Its  Promises  on  Settlement  Boundaries,”  Ha’aretz,  March  15,  2005.  Regarding  targeted  assassinations  Prime  Minister  Sharon  promised  Secretary  of  State  Colin  Powell  in  May  2003  that  Israel  wouldrefrain  from  killing  Palestinian  leaders  unless  there  was  a  “ticking  bomb”  (an  imminent  attack).  Ze’ev  Schiff,  “Focus/Americans  Fear  Abu  Mazen  Is  Further  Weakened,”  Ha’aretz,  June  12,  2003.  But  one  month  later,  after  Bush  made  a  high‐profile  visit  to  the  Middle  East  and  the  prospects  for  negotiations  between  the  warring  parties  looked  promising,  Sharon  launched  seven  assassination  missions  in  five  days,  none  involving  a  “ticking  bomb.”  Bradley  Burston,  “Background:  Has  Sharon’s  Hamas  Hitlist  Converted  Bush?”  Ha’aretz,  June  17,  2003.  Also  see  Uri  Avnery,  “Avoiding  a  Road  Map  to  the  Abyss,”  Arab  News  (online),  August  26,  2003;  Glenn  Kessler,  “White  House  Backs  Latest  Israeli  Attacks,”  Washington  Post,  June  13,  2003;  Laura  King,  “Sharon  Lauds  Hebron  Killing,”  Los  Angeles  Times,  June  23,  2003;  Gideon  Levy,  “Who  Violated  the  Hudna?”  Tikkun  (online),  August  17,  2003.  In  March  2004,  the  IDF  killed  Hamas  spiritual  leader  Sheik  Yassin,  even  though  he  was  not  an  imminent  threat,  and  even  though  his  death  damaged  America’s  position  in  the  Middle  East.  Georgie  Anne  Geyer,  “Ariel  Sharon  Complicates  U.S.  Mission,”  Chicago  Tribune,  March  26,  2004;  H.D.S.  Greenway,  “Assassination  Fallout  Bodes  Ill  for  US,”  Boston  Globe,  March  26,  2004;  Tony  Karon,  “How  Israel’s  Hamas  Killing  Affects  the  U.S.,”  Time,  March  23,  2004;  David  R.  Sands,  “Israel’s  Killing  of  Yassin  Puts  US  in  Line  of  Fire,”  Washington  Times,  March  23,  2004.  As  Jim  Hoagland  said  in  the  wake  of  Yassin’s  killing,  “With  the  possible  exception  of  Charles  de  Gaulle,  no  friendly  foreign  leader  has  complicated  modern  American  diplomacy  more  consistently  or  gravely  than  Ariel  Sharon.  He  pursues  Israel’s  interests  with  a  warrior’s  tenacity  and  directness  that  takes  away  the  breath,  and  the  options,  of  everyone  else.”  See  “Consequences  for  Sharon  ‐‐ and  the  U.S.,”  Chicago  Tribune,  March  26,  2004.  

 21  Quoted  in  Duncan  L.  Clarke,  “Israel’s  Unauthorized  Arms  Transfers,”  Foreign  Policy,  No.  99  (Summer  1995),  p.  94.   This  article  provides  an  excellent  discussion  of  the  problem.  There  was  a  bitter  controversy  in  2004‐2005  between  the  United  States  and  Israel  over  Israeli  arms  sales  to  China.  See  Aluf  Benn  and  Amnon  Barzilai,  “Pentagon  Official  Wants  Yaron  Fired,”  Ha’aretz,  December  16,  2004;  Aluf  Benn,  “U.S.  Keeps  Israel  

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Out  of  New  Fighter‐Jet  Development  Program,”  Ha’aretz,  October  12,  2005;  Nina  Gilbert,  “Yaron  Won’t  Give  Info  on  Arms  Sales  to  China,”  Jerusalem  Post,  December  30,  2004;  “Israeli,  U.S.  Talks  on  Weapons  Deals  with  China  End  without  Result,”  Ha’aretz,  June  29,  2005;  Marc  Perelman,  “Spat  Over  Sales  of  Weapons  Chilling  Ties  between  Jerusalem  and  Beijing,”  Forward,  December  23,  2004;  Marc  Perelman,  “China  Crisis  Straining  U.S.‐Israel  Ties,”  Forward,  August  5,  2005;  Marc  Perelman,  “Israel  Miffed  over  Lingering  China  Flap,”  Forward,  October  7,  2005;  Ze’ev  Schiff,  “U.S.‐Israel  Crisis  Deepens  over  Defense  Exports  to  China,”  Ha’aretz,  July  27,  2005.  

 22  Quoted  in  Duncan  L.  Clarke,  “Israel’s  Economic  Espionage  in  the  United  States,”  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.  27,  No.  4  (Summer  1998),  p.  21.  Also  see  Bob  Drogin  and  Greg  Miller,  “Israel  Has  Long  Spied  on  U.S.  Say  Officials,”  Los  Angeles  Times,  September  3,  2004;  “FBI  Says  Israel  a  Major  Player  in  Industrial  Espionage,”  Jewish  Bulletin,  January  16,  1998;  Clyde  R.  Mark,  “Israeli‐United  States  Relations,”  Issue  Brief  for  Congress  (Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service,  November  9,  2004),  pp.  14‐15;  Joshua  Mitnick,  “U.S.  Accuses  Officials  of  Spying,”  Washington  Times,  December  16,  2004.  

 23  On  the  Pollard  affair,  see  Hersh,  Samson  Option,  pp.  285‐305;  Idem,  “The  Traitor:  Why  Pollard  Should  Never  Be  Released,”  New  Yorker,  Vol.  74,  issue  42  (January  18,  1999),  pp.  26‐33.  There  are  a  huge  number  of  articles  on  the  internet  dealing  with  the  Franklin  Affair.  For  a  good  overview  of  the  case,  see  Jeffrey  Goldberg,  “Real  Insiders:  A  Pro‐Israel  Lobby  and  an  F.B.I.  Sting,”  New  Yorker,  Vol.  81,  issue  19  (July  4,  2005),  pp.  34‐40.  

24  Trevor  N.  Dupuy,  Elusive  Victory:  The  Arab‐Israeli  Wars,  1947‐1974  (New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  1978),  pp.  3‐19,  121‐125,  146‐147,  212‐214,  231‐244,  333‐340,  388‐390,  597‐605,  623‐633;  Simha  Flapan,  The  Birth  of  Israel:  Myths  and  Realities  (New  York:  Pantheon  Books,  1987),  pp.  189‐199;  Rashid  Khalidi,  “The  Palestinians  and  1948:  The  Underlying  Causes  of  Failure,”  in  Eugene  L.  Rogan  and  Avi  Shlaim,  eds.,  The  War  for  Palestine:  Rewriting  the  History  of  1948  (NY:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2001),  pp.  12‐36;  Haim  Levenberg,  Military  Preparations  of  the  Arab  Community  in  Palestine,  1945‐1948  (London:  Frank  Cass,  1993);  Benny  Morris,  The  Birth  of  the  Palestinian  Refugee  Problem  Revisited  (New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2004),  chapters  1,3.  Idem,  Righteous  Victims:  A  History  of  the  Zionist‐Arab  Conflict,  1881‐1999  (New  York:  Alfred  Knopf,  1999),  pp.  187‐189,  191‐196,  217‐223,  235‐236,  241‐242,  286‐291,  311‐313,  393‐395;  Martin  Van  Creveld,  The  Sword  and  the  Olive:  A  Critical  History  of  the  Israeli  Defense  Forces  (NY:  Public  Affairs,  1998),  pp.  77‐82,  137‐138,  179‐182.  

25  Amos  Harel,  “Israel  Maintains  Its  Strategic  Advantage,  Says  Jaffee  Center,”  Ha’aretz,  November  23,  2005.   Also  see,  Uri  Bar‐Joseph,  “The  Paradox  of  Israeli  Power,”  Survival,  Vol.  46,  No.  4  (Winter  2004‐05),  pp.  137‐156;  Martin  Van  Creveld,  “Opportunity  Beckons,”  Jerusalem  Post,  May  15,  2003.   

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26  For  three  instructive  pieces  on  this  matter  from  the  Israeli  press,  see  Amiram  Barkat,  “Majority  of  Israelis  Are  Opposed  to  Intermarriage,  Survey  Finds,”  Ha’aretz,  September  15,  2003;  Nicky  Blackburn,  “Better  a  Jew,”  Ha’aretz,  April  21,  2004;  Lily  Galili,  “Hitting  Below  the  Belt,”  Ha’aretz,  August  8,  2004.    

27  See  “The  Official  Summation  of  the  Or  Commission  Report,”  published  in  Ha’aretz,  September  2,  2003.   For  evidence  of  how  hostile  many  Israelis  were  to  the  report’s  findings  and  recommendations,  see  “No  Avoiding  the  Commission  Recommendations,”  Ha’aretz,  September  4,  2003;  Molly  Moore,  “Israeli  Report  Is  Welcomed,  Dismissed,”  Washington  Post,  September  3,  2003.   Also  see  Bernard  Avishai,  “Saving  Israel  from  Itself:  A  Secular  Future  for  the  Jewish  State,”  Harper’s  Magazine,  January  2005.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the  Israel  Democracy  Institute  reported  in  May  2003  that:  53  percent  of  Israeli  Jews  “are  against  full  equality  for  the  Arabs”;  77  percent  of  Israeli  Jews  believe  that  “there  should  be  a  Jewish  majority  on  crucial  political  decisions”;  only  31  percent  “support  having  Arab  political  parties  in  the  government”;  57  percent  “think  that  the  Arabs  should  be  encouraged  to  emigrate.”   See  “The  Democracy  Index:  Major  Findings  2003.”   Imagine  the  outcry  that  would  occur  if  a  majority  of  white  Americans  declared  that  blacks,  Hispanics,  and  Asians  “should  be  encouraged”  to  leave  the  United  States.   For  more  recent  surveys,  which  show  little  change  in  Israeli  attitudes,  see  Yulie  Khromchenko,  “Survey:  Most  Jewish  Israelis  Support  Transfer  of  Arabs,”  Ha’aretz,  June  22,  2004;  Yoav  Stern,  “Poll:  Most  Israeli  Jews  Say  Israeli  Arabs  Should  Emigrate,”  Ha’aretz,  April  4,  2005.    

28  Quoted  in  Justin  Huggler,  “Israel  Imposes  ‘Racist’  Marriage  Law,”  Guardian,  August  1,  2003.  Also  see  James  Bennet,  “Israel  Blocks  Palestinians  from  Marrying  into  Residency,”  New  York  Times,  July  31,  2003;  “Racist  Legislation,”  Ha’aretz  editorial,  July,  19,  2004;  “Racist  Legislation,”  Ha’aretz  editorial,  January  18,  2005.  Even  the  Anti‐Defamation  League  (ADL)  criticized  the  legislation,  albeit  mildly.  Nathan  Guttman,  Yair  Ettinger,  Sharon  Sadeh,  “ADL  Criticizes  Law  Denying  Citizenship  to  Palestinians,”  Ha’aretz,  August  5,  2003.  

29  The  first  wave  of  European  Jews  to  come  to  Palestine  is  known  as  the  First  Aliyah,  and  it  covers  the  years  from  1882  to  1903.  There  were  slightly  more  than  15,000  Jews  in  Palestine  in  1882.   Justin  McCarthy,  The  Population  of  Palestine:  Population  History  and  Statistics  of  the  Late  Ottoman  Period  and  the  Mandate  (NY:  Columbia  University  Press,  1990),  p.11,  which  has  excellent  data  for  the  years  from  1850  to  1915.  Also  see  Mark  Tessler,  A  History  of  the  Israeli‐Palestinian  Conflict  (Bloomington,  IN:  Indiana  University  Press,  1994),  p.  124.  

30  The  total  population  of  Palestine  in  1893  was  roughly  530,000,  of  whom  about  19,000  were  Jewish  (3.6  percent).  Arabs  comprised  the  vast  majority  of  the  remaining  population.  McCarthy,  Population  of  Palestine,  p.  11.    

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31  Flapan,  Birth  of  Israel,  p.  44;  Morris,  Righteous  Victims,  p.  186.   

32  Flapan,  Birth  of  Israel,  p  22.  Similarly,  Ben‐Gurion  told  his  son,  “I  am  certain  we  will  be  able  to  settle  in  all  the  other  parts  of  the  country,  whether  through  agreement  and  mutual  agreement  with  our  Arab  neighbors  or  in  another  way.”  He  went  on  to  say,  “Erect  a  Jewish  State  at  once,  even  if  it  is  not  in  the  whole  of  the  land.  The  rest  will  come  in  the  course  of  time.  It  must  come.”  Avi  Shlaim,  The  Iron  Wall:  Israel  and  the  Arab  World  (NY:  Norton,  2000),  p.  21.  Also  see  Flapan,  Birth  of  Israel,    pp.  13‐53;  Nur  Masalah,  Expulsion  of  the  Palestinians:  The  Concept  of  Transfer  in  Zionist  Political  Thought,  1882‐1948  (Washington,  DC:  Institute  for  Palestine  Studies,  1992),  chapter  2;  Morris,  Righteous  Victims,  pp.  138‐139;  Avi  Shlaim,  The  Politics  of  Partition:  King  Abdullah,  the  Zionists,  and  Palestine,  1921‐1951  (NY:  Oxford  University  Press,  1999).  

33  Masalah,  Expulsion  of  the  Palestinians,  p.  128.   Also  see  Morris,  Righteous  Victims,  pp.  140,  142,  168‐169.  

34  Benny  Morris,  “A  New  Exodus  for  the  Middle  East?”  Guardian,  October  3,  2002.   On  the  pervasiveness  of  transfer  thinking  among  Zionists  before  Israel  was  established  in  1948,  see  Masalha,  Expulsion  of  the  Palestinians;  Morris,  “Revisiting  the  Palestinian  Exodus  of  1948,”  in  Rogan  and  Shlaim,  War  for  Palestine,  pp.  39‐48;  Morris,  Birth  Revisited,  chapter  2;  Ari  Shavit,  “Survival  of  the  Fittest,”  Ha’aretz,  January  9,  2004.  

35  Morris,  Birth  Revisited,  provides  a  detailed  account  of  this  event.   Also  see  Meron  Benvenisti,  Sacred  Landscape:  The  Buried  History  of  the  Holy  Land  since  1948,  trans.  Maxine  Kaufman‐Lacusta  (Berkeley,  CA:  University  of  California  Press,  2000),  chapters  3‐4.  The  only  remaining  debate  of  real  significance  regarding  the  expulsion  of  the  Palestinians  from  their  homeland  is  whether  it  ws  “born  of  war,”  as  Morris  argues,  or  by  design,  as  Norman  Finkelstein  argues  in  Image  and  Reality  of  the  Israel‐Palestine  Conflict  (London:  Verso,  1995),  chapter  3.  

36  Erskine  Childers,  “The  Other  Exodus,”  Spectator,  May  12,  1961;  Flapan,  Birth  of  Israel,  pp.  81‐118;  Walid  Khalidi,  “Why  Did  the  Palestinians  Leave  Revisited,”  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.  34,  No.  2  (  Winter  2005),  pp.  42‐54;  Idem,  “The  Fall  of  Haifa,”  Middle  East  Forum,  Vol.  35,  No.  10  (December,  1959),  pp.  22‐32;  Morris,  Birth  Revisited.  

37  Nahum  Goldmann,  The  Jewish  Paradox,  trans.  Steve  Cox  (NY:  Grosset  and  Dunlap,  1978),  p.  99.   Ze’ev  Jabotinsky,  the  founding  father  of  the  Israeli  right,  made  essentially  the  same  point  when  he  wrote,  “Colonization  is  self‐explanatory  and  what  it  implies  is  fully  understood  by  every  sensible  Jew  and  Arab.   There  can  only  be  one  purpose  in  colonization.   For  the  country’s  Arabs  that  purpose  is  essentially  unacceptable.   This  is  a  natural  reaction  and  nothing  will  change  it.”   Quoted  in  Ian  Lustick,  “To  Build  and  To  

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Be  Built  By:  Israel  and  the  Hidden  Logic  of  the  Iron  Wall,”  Israel  Studies,  Vol.  1,  No.  1  (Spring  1996),  p.  200.    

38  See  Geoffrey  Aronson,  Israel,  Palestinians,  and  the  Intifada:  Creating  Facts  on  the  West  Bank  (London:  Kegan  Paul  International,  1990);  Amnon  Barzilai,  “A  Brief  History  of  the  Missed  Opportunity,”  Ha’aretz,  June  5,  2002;  Idem,  “Some  Saw  the  Refugees  as  the  Key  to  Peace,”  Ha’aretz,  June  11,  2002;  Moshe  Behar,  “The  Peace  Process  and  Israeli  Domestic  Politics  in  the  1990s,”  Socialism  and  Democracy,  Current  Issue  Number  32,  Vol.  16,  No.  2  (Summer‐Fall  2002),  pp.  34‐47;  Adam  Hanieh  and  Catherine  Cook,  “A  Road  Map  to  the  Oslo  Cul‐de‐Sac,”  Middle  East  Report  Online,  May  15,  2003;  “Israel’s  Interests  Take  Primacy:  An  Interview  with  Dore  Gold,”  in  bitterlemons.org,  “What  Constitutes  a  Viable  Palestinian  State?”  March  15,  2004,  Edition  10;  Nur  Masalha,  Imperial  Israel  and  the  Palestinians:  The  Politics  of  Expansion  (London:  Pluto  Press,  2000);  Sara  Roy,  “Erasing  the  ‘Optics’  of  Gaza,”  The  Daily  Star  On  Line,  February  14,  2004;  “36  Years,  and  Still  Counting,”  Ha’aretz,  September  26,  2003.  

39  Rahid  Khalidi,  Palestinian  Identity:  The  Construction  of  Modern  National  Consciousness  (NY:  Columbia  University  Press,  1997),  p.  147.   Meir  also  said,  “It  was  not  as  though  there  was  a  Palestinian  people  in  Palestine  considering  itself  as  a  Palestinian  people  and  we  came  and  thrw  them  out  and  took  their  country  away  from  them.  They  did  not  exist.”  Masalha,  Imperial  Israel,  p.  47.   Rabin  said  in  1995,  two  years  after  signing  the  Oslo  accords,  “I  seek  peaceful  coexistence  between  Israel  as  a  Jewish  state,  not  all  over  the  land  of  Israel,  or  most  of  it;  its  capital,  the  united  Jerusalem;  its  security  border  with  Jordan  rebuilt;  next  to  it,  a  Palestinian  entity,  less  than  a  state,  that  runs  the  life  of  Palestinians  ….  This  is  my  goal,  not  to  return  to  the  pre‐Six  Day  War  lines  but  to  create  two  entities,  a  separation  between  Israel  and  the  Palestinians  who  reside  in  the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip.”  Hanieh  and  Cook,  “Road  Map.”  Also  see  Akiva  Eldar,  “On  the  Same  Page,  Ten  Years  On,”  Ha’aretz,  November  5,  2005;  David  Grossman,  “The  Night  Our  Hope  for  Peace  Died,”  Guardian,  November  4,  2005;  Michael  Jansen,  “A  Practice  that  Prevents  the  Emergence  of  a  Palestinian  State,”  Jordan  Times,  November  10,  2005.  It  is  worth  noting  that  in  the  spring  of  1998,  Israel  and  its  American  supporters  sharply  criticized  First  Lady  Hillary  Clinton  for  saying  that,  “It  would  be  in  the  long‐term  interests  of  peace  in  the  Middle  East  for  there  to  be  a  state  of  Palestine,  a  functioning  modern  state  that  is  on  the  same  footing  as  other  states.”  Tom  Rhodes  and  Christopher  Walker,  “Congress  Tells  Israel  to  Reject  Clinton’s  Pullout  Plan,”  New  York  Times,  May  8,  1998;  James  Bennet,  “Aides  Disavow  Mrs.  Clinton  on  Mideast,”  New  York  Times,  May  8,  1998.  

40  Charles  Enderlein,  Shattered  Dreams:  The  Failure  of  the  Peace  Process  in  the  Middle  East,  1995‐2002,  trans.  Susan  Fairfield  (NY:  Other  Press,  2003),  pp.  201,  207‐208;  Jeremy  Pressman,  “Visions  in  Collision:  What  Happened  at  Camp  David  and  Taba?  International  Security,  Vol.  28,  No.  2  (Fall  2003),  p.  17;  Deborah  Sontag,  “Quest  for  Mideast  Peace:   

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presented  to  the  Palestinians  at  Camp  David,  a  copy  of  which  can  be  found  in  Roane  Carey,  ed.,  The  New  Intifada:  Resisting  Israel’s  Apartheid  (London:  Verso,  2001),  p.  36. How  and  Why  It  Failed,”  New  York  Times,  July  26,  2001;  Clayton  E.  Swisher,  The  Truth  about  Camp  David:  The  Untold  Story  about  the  Collapse  of  the  Peace  Process  (NY:  Nation  Books,  2004),  pp.  284,  318,  325.   Barak  himself  said  after  Camp  David  that  “the  Palestinians  were  promised  a  continuous  piece  of  sovereign  territory  except  for  a  razor‐thin  Israeli  wedge  running  from  Jerusalem  through  from  Maale  Adumim  to  the  Jordan  River,”  which  effectively  would  have  been  under  Israel’s  control.  Benny  Morris,  “Camp  David  and  After:  An  Exchange  (1.  An  Interview  with  Ehud  Barak)”,  New  York  Review  of  Books,  Vol.  49,  No.  10  (June  13,  2002),  p.  44.  Also  see  the  map  Israeli  negotiators  

41  See  Alan  Dershowitz,  The  Case  for  Israel  (Hoboken,  NJ:  John  Wiley  &  Sons,  2003).   For  a  telling  critique  of  Dershowitz’s  book,  see  Norman  G.  Finkelstein,  Beyond  Chutzpah:  On  the  Misuse  of  Anti‐Semitism  and  the  Abuse  of  History  (Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  2005).   Also  see  “Dershowitz  v.  Desch,”  American  Conservative,  January  16,  2005.  

42  Morris,  Righteous  Victims,  chapters  2‐5.  

43  Morris,  Birth  Revisited.  It  should  be  noted  that  many  Israeli  documents  concerning  the  events  of  1948  remain  classified;  Morris  expects  “that  with  respect  to  both  expulsions  and  atrocities,  we  can  expect  additional  revelations  as  the  years  pass  and  more  Israeli  records  become  available.”  Morris,  “Revisiting  the  Palestinian  Exodus,”  in  Rogan  and  Shlaim,  War  for  Palestine,  p.  49.  In  fact,  he  maintains  that  the  reported  cases  of  rape  he  knows  about  are  “just  the  tip  of  the  iceberg.”  See  Shavit,  “Survival  of  the  Fittest.”  

44  Benny  Morris,  Israel’s  Border  Wars,  1949‐1956  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1997),  p.  432.  Also  see  ibid.,  pp.  126‐153,  178‐184.  For  evidence  of  similar  behavior  after  the  1967  War,  see  Uri  Avnery,  “Crying  Wolf?”  CounterPunch,  March  15,  2003;  Ami  Kronfeld,  “Avnery  on  Ethnic  Cleansing  and  a  Personal  Note,”  in  Jewish  Voice  for  Peace,  Jewish  Peace  News,  March  17,  2003;  Katherine  M.  Metres,  “As  Evidence  Mounts,  Toll  of  Israeli  Prisoner  of  War  Massacres  Grows,”  Washington  Report  on  Middle  East  Affairs,  February/March  1996,  pp.  17,  104‐105.  

45  During  his  negotiations  with  the  British  and  French  governments  over  the  launching  of  the  1956  war,  Ben‐Gurion  proposed  a  grand  plan  for  reordering  the  region  that  would  have  divided  Jordan  between  Israel  and  Iraq,  transferred  all  of  Lebanon  south  of  the  Litani  River  to  Israel,  and  given  Israel  portions  of  the  Sinai  as  well.   On  Israel’s  policies  in  the  1950s,  see  Morris,  Israel’s  Border  Wars;  Morris,  Righteous  Victims,  chapter  6,  especially  pp.  289‐290;  Shlaim,  Iron  Wall,  chapters  3‐4,  especially  pp.184‐185;  Kennett  Love,  Suez:  the  Twice  Fought  War  (New  York:  McGraw‐Hill,  1969),  pp.  589‐638;  Michael  Brecher,  Decisions  in  Israel’s  Foreign  Policy  (New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  1975),  pp.  282‐283.   

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46  Gabby  Bron,  “Egyptian  POWs  Ordered  to  Dig  Graves,  Then  Shot  by  Israeli  Army,”  Yedioth  Ahronoth,  August  17,  1995;  Ronal  Fisher,  “Mass  Murder  in  the  1956  Sinai  War,”  Ma’ariv,  August  8,  1995  [Copies  of  these  two  pieces  can  be  found  in  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.  25,  No.  3  (Spring  1996),  pp.  148‐155];  Galal  Bana,  “Egypt:  We  Will  Turn  to  the  International  War  Crimes  Tribunal  in  the  Hague  if  Israel  Will  Not  Compensate  Murdered  Prisoners  of  War,”  Ha’aretz,  July  24,  2002;  Zehavat,  Friedman,  “Personal  Reminiscence:  Remembering  Ami  Kronfeld,”  in  Jewish  Voice  for  Peace,  Jewish  Peace  News,  September  25,  2005;  Metres,  “As  Evidence  Mounts.”   

47  Avnery,  “Crying  Wolf”;  Robert  Blecher,  “Living  on  the  Edge:  The  Threat  of  ‘Transfer’  in  Israel  and  Palestine,”  MERIP,  Middle  East  Report  225,  Winter  2002;  Baruch  Kimmerling,  Politicide:  Ariel  Sharon’s  War  against  the  Palestinians  (London:  Verso,  2003),  p.  28.  Also  see  Chomsky,  Fateful  Triangle,  p.  97;  Morris,  Righteous  Victims,  pp.  328‐329;  Tanya  Reinhart,  Israel/Palestine:  How  to  End  the  War  of  1948  (NY:  Seven  Stories  Press,  2002),  p.  8.  Morris  reports  (p.  329)  that  120,000  Palestinians  applied  to  return  to  their  homes  right  after  the  1967  War,  but  Israel  allowed  only  about  17,000  to  come  back.   Amnesty  International  estimated  in  mid‐2003  that  in  the  years  since  Israel  had  acquired  the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip,  it  had  destroyed  more  than  10,000  Palestinian  homes  in  those  areas.  Danny  Rubinstein,  “Roads,  Fences  and  Outposts  Maintain  Control  in  the  Territories,”  Ha’aretz,  August  12,  2003.  

48  “Report  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  into  the  Events  at  the  Refugee  Camps  in  Beirut,”  February  7,  1983.  The  report  is  commonly  called  “The  Kahan  Commission  Report”  after  its  chairman,  Yitzhak  Kahan.  

49  Swedish  Save  the  Children,  “The  Status  of  Palestinian  Children  during  the  Uprising  in  the  Occupied  Territories,”  Excerpted  Summary  Material,  Jerusalem,  1990,  in  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.  19,  No.  4  (Summer  1990),  pp.  136‐146.  Also  see  Joshua  Brilliant,  “Officer  Tells  Court  Villagers  Were  Bound,  Gagged  and  Beaten.  ‘Not  Guilty’  Plea  at  ‘Break  Bones’  Trial,”  Jerusalem  Post,  March  30,  1990;  Joshua  Brilliant,  “‘Rabin  Ordered  Beatings’,  Meir  Tells  Military  Court,”  Jerusalem  Post,  June  22,  1990;  Jackson  Diehl,  “Rights  Group  Accuses  Israel  of  Violence  Against  Children  in  Palestinian  Uprising,”  Washington  Post,  May  17,  1990;  James  A.  Graff,  “Crippling  a  People:  Palestinian  Children  and  Israeli  State  Violence,”  Alif,  No.  13  (1993),  pp.  46‐63;  Ronald  R.  Stockton,  “Intifada  Deaths,”  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.  19,  No.  4  (Summer  1990),  pp.  86‐95.   Ehud  Barak,  the  IDF’s  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  during  the  First  Intifada,  said  at  the  time,  “We  do  not  want  children  to  be  shot  under  any  circumstances  ….  When  you  see  a  child  you  don’t  shoot.”   Nevertheless,  the  Swedish  Save  the  Children  report  estimated  that  6,500  to  8,000  children  were  wounded  by  gunfire  during  the  first  two  yearsof  the  Intifada.   Researchers  investigated  66  of  the  106  recorded  cases  of  “child  gunshot  deaths.”   They  concluded  that:  almost  all  of  them  “were  hit  by  directed  ‐‐ not  random  or  ricochet  ‐‐  

52

gunfire”;  nearly  twenty  percent  suffered  multiple  gunshot  wounds;  twelve  percent  were  shot  from  behind;  fifteen  percent  of  the  children  were  ten  years  of  age  or  younger;  “most  children  were  not  participating  in  a  stone‐throwing  demonstration  when  shot  dead”;  and  “nearly  one‐fifth  of  the  children  were  shot  dead  while  at  home  or  within  ten  meters  of  their  homes.”  

50  “Unbridled  Force,”  Ha’aretz  editorial,  March  16,  2003.  For  other  evidence,  see  Jonathan  Cook,  “Impunity  on  Both  Sides  of  the  Green  Line,”  MERIP,  Middle  East  Report  Online,  November  23,  2005;  “When  Everything  Is  Permissible,”  Ha’aretz  editorial,  June  6,  2005;  “It  Can  Happen  Here,”  Ha’aretz  editorial,  November  22,  2004;  Chris  McGreal,  “Snipers  with  Children  in  Their  Sights,”  Guardian,  June  28,  2005;  Idem,  “Israel  Shocked  by  Image  of  Soldiers  Forcing  Violinist  to  Play  at  Roadblock,”  Guardian,  November  29,  2004;  Greg  Myre,  “Former  Israeli  Soldiers  Tell  of  Harassment  of  Palestinians,”  New  York  Times,  June  24,  2004;  Reuven  Pedatzur,  “The  Message  to  the  Soldiers  Was  Clear,”  Ha’aretz,  December  13,  2004;  Conal  Urquhart,  “Israeli  Soldiers  Tell  of  Indiscriminate  Killings  by  Army  and  A  Culture  of  Impunity,”  Guardian,  September  6,  2005.   

51  See  Swisher,  Truth  about  Camp  David,  p.  387.   

52  According  to  B’tselem,  between  September  29,  2000,  and  December  31,  2005,  3,386  Palestinians  were  killed  by  the  Israelis,  of  whom  676  were  children.  Of  those  3,386  deaths,  1,185  were  bystanders,  1,008  were  killed  while  fighting  the  Israelis,  and  the  circumstances  of  563  deaths  are  unknown.  During  the  same  period,  992  Israelis  were  killed  by  the  Palestinians,  118  of  whom  were  children.  Of  those  992  deaths,  683  were  civilians  and  309  belonged  to  Israeli  security  forces.  B’tselem  press  release,  January  4,  2006.  

53  Nathan  Guttman,  “‘It’s  a  Terrible  Thing,  Living  with  the  Knowledge  that  You  Crushed  Our  Daughter’,”  Ha’aretz,  April  30,  2004;  Adam  Shapiro,  “Remembering  Rachel  Shapiro,”    Nation,  March  18,  2004;  Tsahar  Rotem,  “British  Peace  Activist  Shot  by  IDF  Troops  in  Gaza  Strip,”  Ha’aretz,  April  11,  2003.  

54  Molly  Moore,  “Ex‐Security  Chiefs  Turn  on  Sharon,”  Washington  Post,  November  15,  2003;  “Ex‐Shin  Bet  Heads  Warn  of  ‘Catastrophe’  without  Peace  Deal,”  Ha’aretz,  November  15,  2003.  These  comments  were  based  on  an  interview  in  the  Israeli  newspaper  Yedioth  Ahronoth  on  November  14,  2003.  For  a  copy  of  that  interview,  see  “We  Are  Seriously  Concerned  about  the  Fate  of  the  State  of  Israel,”  The  Alternative  Information  Center,  December  1,  2003.  

55  Bill  Maxwell,  “U.S.  Should  Reconsider  Aid  to  Israel,”  St.  Petersburg  Times,  December  16,  2001.   

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56  See  J.  Bowyer  Bell,  Terror  Out  of  Zion:  The  Fight  for  Israeli  Independence  (  New  Brunswick,  NJ:  Transaction  Publishers,  1996);  Joseph  Heller,  The  Stern  Gang:  Ideology,  Politics  and  Terror,  1940‐1949  (London:  Frank  Cass,  1995);  Bruce  Hoffmann,  The  Failure  of  British  Military  Strategy  within  Palestine,  1939‐1947  (Israel:  Bar‐Ilan  University,  1983);  Morris,  Righteous  Victims,  pp.  173‐180;  Segev,  One  Palestine,  pp.  468‐486.  According  to  Haim  Levenberg,  210  of  the  429  casualties  from  Jewish  terrorism  in  Palestine  during  1946  were  civilians.   The  other  219  were  police  and  soldiers.  Levenberg,  Military  Preparations,  p.  72.  Furthermore,  it  was  Jewish  terrorists  from  the  infamous  Irgun  who  in  late  1937  introduced  the  practice  of  placing  bombs  in  buses  and  large  rowds.   Benny  Morris  speculates  that,  “The  Arabs  may  well  have  learned  the  value  of  terrorist  bombings  from  the  Jews.”  Righteous  Victims,  pp.  147,  201.   Also  see  Lenni  Brenner,  The  Iron  Wall:  Zionist  Revisionism  from  Jabotinsky  to  Shamir  (London:  Zed  Books,  1984),  p.  100;  Yehoshua  Porath,  The  Palestinian  Arab  National  Movement:  from  Riots  to  Rebellion,  Vol.  II,  1929‐1939  (London:  Frank  Cass,  1977),  p.  238.  Finally,  Morris  notes  that  during  the  1948  war  the  main  Jewish  terrorist  groups  “knowingly  planted  bombs  in  bus  stops  with  the  aim  of  killing  non‐combatants,  including  women  and  children.”  Birth  Revisited,  p.  80.  

57  Bell,  Terror  Out  of  Zion,  pp.  336‐340.  

58  Quoted  in  Chomsky,  Fateful  Triangle,  pp.  485‐486.  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Levi  Eshkol  used  to  call  Menachem  Begin  “the  terrorist.”  Barzilai,  “Brief  History.”  On  Shamir,  see  Avishai  Margalit,  “The  Violent  Life  of  Yitzhak  Shamir,”  New  York  Review  of  Books,  May  14,  1992,  pp.  18‐24.  

59  Moreover,  Israel’s  claim  to  a  morally  superior  status  is  undermined  by  some  of  its  other  policies.   Israel  once  cultivated  close  ties  with  apartheid‐era  South  Africa  and  aided  the  white  minority  government’s  nuclear  weapons  program.   Peter  Liberman,  “Israel  and  the  South  African  Bomb,”  The  Nonproliferation  Review,  Vol.  11,  No.  2  (Summer  2004),  pp.  46‐80.   In  1954,  Israeli  intelligence  forces  bombed  a  U.S.  diplomatic  facility  in  Cairo  in  a  bungled  attempt  to  sow  discord  between  Egypt  and  the  United  States.  Shlaim,  Iron  Wall,  pp.  110‐113.    

60  Steven  M.  Cohen,  The  2004  National  Survey  of  American  Jews,  sponsored  by  the  Jewish  Agency  for  Israel’s  Department  of  Jewish‐Zionist  Education,  February  24,  2005.  The  figure  two  years  earlier  was  28  percent.  See  Steven  M.  Cohen,  The  2002  National  Survey  of  American  Jews,  sponsored  by  the  Jewish  Agency  for  Israel’s  Department  of  Jewish‐Zionist  Education,  conducted  in  November‐December  2002.  Also  see  Amiran  Barkat,  “Young  American  Jews  Are  More  Ambivalent  Toward  Israel,  Study  Shows,”  Ha’aretz,  March  7,  2005;  Steven  M.  Cohen,  “Poll:  Attachment  of  U.S.  Jews  to  Israel  Falls  in  Past  2  Years,”  Forward,  March  4,  2005;  M.J.  Rosenberg,  “Letting  Israel  Sell  Itself,”  Israel  Policy  Forum  Issue  Brief  #218,  March  18,  2005.   

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61  J.J.  Goldberg,  “Old  Friend,  Shattered  Dreams,”  Forward,  December  24,  2004;  Esther  Kaplan,  “The  Jewish  Divide  on  Israel,”  Nation,  July  12,  2004;  Michael  Massing,  “Conservative  Jewish  Groups  Have  Clout,”  Los  Angeles  Times,  March  10,  2002;  Eric  Yoffie,  “Reform  the  Conference,”  Forward,  August  2,  2002.  

62  Ori  Nir,  “FBI  Probe:  More  Questions  Than  Answers.”  Forward,  May  13,  2005.  

63  Inigo  Gilmore,  “U.S.  Jewish  Leader  Hit  over  Letter,”  London  Sunday  Telegraph,  August  12,  2003;  Isi  Liebler,  “When  Seymour  Met  Condi,”  Jerusalem  Post,  November  24,  2005.  Also  see  Sarah  Bronson,  “Orthodox  Leader:  U.S.  Jews  Have  No  Right  to  Criticize  Israel,  Ha’aretz,  August  2,  2004.  

64  Liebler,  “When  Seymour  Met  Condi”;  Ori  Nir,  “O.U.  Chief  Decries  American  Pressure  on  Israel,”  Forward,  December  2,  2005;  Idem,  “Rice  Trip  Raises  Concern  over  U.S.  Pressure  on  Israel,”  Forward,  November  18,  2005;  Seymour  D.  Reich,  “Listen  to  America,”  Jerusalem  Post,  November  13,  2005.  

65  Jeffrey  H.  Birnbaum,  “Washington’s  Power  25,”  Fortune,  December  8,  1997.  AIPAC  was  ranked  number  4  in  a  similar  study  conducted  in  2001.  See  Jeffrey  H.  Birnbaum  and  Russell  Newell,  “Fat  and  Happy  in  D.C.,”  Fortune,  May  28,  2001.  

66  Richard  E.  Cohen  and  Peter  Bell,  “Congressional  Insiders  Poll,”  National  Journal.  March  5,  2005;  James  D.  Besser,  “Most  Muscle?  It’s  NRA,  Then  AIPAC  and  AARP,”  Chicago  Jewish  Star,  March  11‐24,  2005.  

67  See  Max  Blumenthal,  “Born‐Agains  for  Sharon,”  salon.com,  October  30,  2004;  Darrell  L.  Bock,  “Some  Christians  See  a  ‘Road  Map’  to  End  Times,”  Los  Angeles  Times,  June  18,  2003;  Nathan  Guttman,  “Wiping  Out  Terror,  Brining  On  Redemption,”  Ha’aretz,  April  29,  2002;  Tom  Hamburger  and  Jim  VandeHei,  “Chosen  People:  How  Israel  Became  a  Favorite  Cause  of  Christian  Right,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  May  23,  2002;  Paul  Nussbaum,  “Israel  Finds  an  Ally  in  American  Evangelicals,”  Philadelphia  Inquirer,  November  17,  2005.  Daniel  Pipes  maintains  that,  “other  than  the  Israel  Defense  Forces,  America’s  Christian  Zionists  may  be  the  Jewish  state’s  ultimate  strategic  asset.”  “[Christian  Zionism:]  Israel’s  Best  Weapon?”  New  York  Post,  July  15,  2003.  

68  The  weakness  of  the  “Palestinian  Lobby”  in  the  United  States  is  captured  in  the  headlines  of  these  two  articles:  Nora  Boustany,  “Palestinians’  Lone  Hand  in  Washington,”  Washington  Post,  April,  19,  2002;  George  Gedda,  “PLO  Loses  D.C.  Office  Because  of  Unpaid  Rent,”  Chicago  Tribune,  April  12,  2002.  On  the  weak  impact  of  the  “Arab  Lobby,”  see  Ali  A.  Mazrui,  “Between  the  Crescent  and  the  Star‐Spangled  Banner:  American  Muslims  and  U.S.  Foreign  Policy,”  International  Affairs,  Vol.  72,  No.  3  (July  1996),  pp.  493‐506;  Nabeel  A.  Khoury,  “The  Arab  Lobby:  Problems  and  Prospects,”   

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Middle  East  Journal,  Vol.  41,  No.  3  (Summer  1987),  pp.  379‐396;  Andrea  Barron,  “Jewish  and  Arab  Diasporas  in  the  United  States  and  Their  Impact  on  U.S.  Middle  East  Policy,”  in  Yehuda  Lukacs  and  Abdalla  M.  Battah,  eds.,  The  Arab‐Israeli  Conflict:  Two  Decades  of  Change  (London:  Westview,  1988),  pp.  238‐259.  

69  Jake  Tapper,  “Questions  for  Dick  Armey:  Retiring,  Not  Shy,”  New  York  Times  Magazine,  September  1,  2002.   Also,  Tom  DeLay  has  called  himself  “an  Israeli  at  heart.”  See  James  Bennet,  “DeLay  Says  Palestinians  Bear  Burden  for  Achieving  Peace,”  New  York  Times,  July  30,  2003.  

70  Quoted  in  Mitchell  Bard,  “Israeli  Lobby  Power,”  Midstream,  Vol.  33,  No.  1  (January  1987),  pp.  6‐8.   

71  Quoted  in  Edward  Tivnan,  The  Lobby:  Jewish  Political  Power  and  American  Foreign  Policy  (NY:  Simon  and  Schuster,  1987),  p.  191.   J.J.  Goldberg,  the  editor  of  the  Forward,  said  in  2002,  “There  is  this  image  in  Congress  that  you  don’t  cross  these  people  or  they  take  you  down.”  Quoted  in  John  Diamond  and  Brianna  B.  Piec,  “Pro‐Israel  Groups  Intensify  Political  Front  in  U.S.,”  Chicago  Tribune,  April  16,  2002.  

72  Quoted  in  Camille  Mansour,  Beyond  Alliance:  Israel  in  U.S.  Foreign  Policy,  trans.  James  A.  Cohen  (NY:  Columbia  University  Press,  1994),  p.  242.  

73  Although  AIPAC  has  been  able  to  use  its  political  muscle  to  avoid  having  to  register  as  a  foreign  agent  for  another  governmet,  it  is  especially  concerned  about  that  problem  today  because  of  the  Larry  Franklin  spy  scandal,  and  thus  it  is  going  to  considerable  lengths  to  emphasize  its  “American  side.”   See  Ori  Nir,  “Leaders  Fear  Probe  Will  Force  Pro‐Israel  Lobby  to  File  as  ‘Foreign  Agent’  Could  Fuel  Dual  Loyalty  Talk,”  Forward,  December  31,  2004;  Idem,  “Leaders  Stress  American  Side  of  AIPAC,”  Forward,  May  27,  2005.  

74  “Sen.  Hollings  Floor  Statement  Setting  the  Record  Straight  on  His  Mideast  Newspaper  Column,”  May  20,  2004,  a  copy  of  which  can  be  found  on  the  former  Senator’s  web  site.  

75  Published  in  an  AIPAC  advertisement  in  the  Chicago  Jewish  Star,  August  29  –  September  11,  2003.  Sharon  is  not  alone  in  his  appraisal  of  AIPAC’s  power.   Senate  Minority  Leader  Harry  Reid  says  that  “I  canʹt  think  of  a  policy  organization  in  the  country  as  well‐organized  or  respected  [as  AIPAC]”  and  former  House  Speaker  Newt  Gingrich  called  it  “the  most  effective  general  interest  group  .  .  .  across  the  entire  planet.”  Former  President  Bill  Clinton  described  AIPAC  as  “stunningly  effective”  and  “better  than  anyone  else  lobbying  in  this  town.”   Quotations  downloaded  from  the  AIPAC  website  on  January  14,  2005  [www.aipac.org/documents/whoweare.html#say].    

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76  Thomas  B.  Edsall  and  Alan  Cooperman,  “GOP  Uses  Remarks  to  Court  Jews,”  Washington  Post,  March  13,  2003.  Also  see  James  D.  Besser,  “Jews’  Primary  Role  Expanding,”  Jewish  Week,  January  23,  2004;  Alexander  Bolton,  “Jewish  Defections  Irk  Democrats,”  The  Hill,  March  30,  2004;  E.J.  Kessler,  “Ancient  Woes  Resurfacing  as  Dean  Eyes  Top  Dem  Post,”  Forward,  January  28,  2005.   Hamilton  Jordan  wrote  a  memorandum  to  President  Jimmy  Carter  in  June  1977,  in  which  he  said:  “Out  of  125  members  of  the  Democratic  National  Finance  Council,  over  70  are  Jewish;  In  1976,  over  60%  of  the  large  donors  to  the  Democratic  Party  were  Jewish;  Over  60%  of  the  monies  raised  by  Nixon  in  1972  was  from  Jewish  contributors;  Over  75%  of  the  monies  raised  in  Humphrey’s  1968  campaign  was  from  Jewish  contributors;  Over  90%  of  the  monies  raised  by  Scoop  Jackson  in  the  Democratic  primaries  was  from  Jewish  contributors;  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  you  were  a  long  shot  and  came  from  an  area  of  the  country  where  there  is  a  smaller  Jewish  community,  approximately  35%  of  our  primary  funds  were  from  Jewish  supporters.  Wherever  there  is  major  political  fundraising  in  this  country,  you  will  find  American  Jews  playing  a  significant  role.”  Hamilton  Jordan,  Confidential  File,  Box  34,  File  “Foreign  Policy/Domestic  Politics  Memo,  HJ  Memo,  6/77,”  declassified  June  12,  1990.  

77  Douglas  Brinkley,  “Out  of  the  Loop,”  The  New  York  Times,  December  29,  2002.  Lawrence  Kaplan  reports  that  after  Bruce  Riedel,  the  Middle  East  expert  on  the  National  Security  Council,  left  his  job  at  the  end  of  2001,  the  Pentagon  “held  up  the  appointment  of  Riedel’s  designated  successor,  Middle  East  expert  Alina  Romanowski,  whom  Pentagon  officials  suspect  of  being  insufficiently  supportive  of  the  Jewish  state.”  “Torpedo  Boat:  How  Bush  Turned  on  Arafat,”  New  Republic,  February  18,  2003.  The  position  was  eventually  filled  by  Elliot  Abrams,  a  fervent  supporter  of  Israel.  “Indeed,  for  the  government  of  Israel,”  Nathan  Guttman  wrote,  “it  is  a  gift  from  heaven.”  See  “From  Clemency  to  a  Senior  Post,”  Ha’aretz,  December  16,  2002.  

78  E.J.  Kessler,  “Lieberman  and  Dean  Spar  Over  Israel,”  Forward,  September  9,  2003;  Stephen  Zunes,  “Attacks  on  Dean  Expose  Democrats’  Shift  to  the  Right,”  Tikkun,  November/December  2003.  

79  Zunes,  “Attacks  on  Dean”;  James  D.  Besser,  “Dean’s  Jewish  Problem,”  Chicago  Jewish  Star,  December  19,  2003  ‐‐ January  8,  2004.  

80  E.J.  Kessler,  “Dean  Plans  to  Visit  Israel,  Political  Baggage  in  Tow,”  Forward,  July  8,  2005;  Zunes,  “Attacks  on  Dean.”  

81  Laura  Blumenfeld,  “Three  Peace  Suits;  For  These  Passionate  American  Diplomats,  a  Middle  East  Settlement  is  the  Goal  of  a  Lifetime,”  Washington  Post,  February  24,  1997.   

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82  Samuel  (“Sandy”)  Berger,  President  Clinton’s  National  Security  Advisor,  reports  that  at  one  point  during  the  negotiations  at  Camp  David  (July  2000),  Dennis  Ross  made  the  remarkable  comment  that,  “If  Barak  offers  anything  more,  I’ll  be  against  this  agreement.”  Unedited  transcript  of  “Comments  by  Sandy  Berger  at  the  Launch  of  How  Israelis  and  Palestinians  Negotiate  (USIP  Press,  2005),”  U.S.  Institute  of  Peace,  Washington,  DC,  June  7,  2005.   

83  Quoted  in  Blumenfeld,  “Three  Peace  Suits.”  

84  Eric  Alterman,  “Intractable  Foes,  Warring  Narratives,”  MSNBC.com,  March  28,  2002.  

85  Quoted  in  Bret  Stephens,  “Eye  on  the  Media  by  Bret  Stephens:  Bartley’s  Journal,”  Jerusalem  Post,  November  21,  2002.  

86  Max  Frankel,  The  Times  of  My  Life  And  My  Life  with  the  Times  (NY:  Random  House,  1999),  pp.  401‐403.  

87  Felicity  Barringer,  “Some  U.S.  Backers  of  Israel  Boycott  Dailies  Over  Mideast  Coverage  That  They  Deplore,”  New  York  Times,  May  23,  2002.  

88  Barringer,  “Some  U.S.  Backers”;  Gaby  Wenig,  “NPR  Israel  Coverage  Sparks  Protests,”  The  Jewish  Journal  of  Greater  Los  Angeles,  May  9,  2003;  Gila  Wertheimer,  “NPR  Dismisses  Protest  Rallies,”  Chicago  Jewish  Star,  May  30  –  June  12,  2003.  Also  see  James  D.  Besser,  “NPR  Radio  Wars  Putting  Jewish  Groups  in  a  Bind,”  Jewish  Week,  May  20,  2005;  Samuel  Freedman,  “From  ‘Balance’  to  Censorship:  Bush’s  Cynical  Plan  for  NPR,”  Forward,  May  27,  2005;  Nathan  Guttman,  “Enough  Already  from  Those  Pro‐Israel  Nudniks,”  Ha’aretz,  February  1,  2005;  E.J.  Kessler,  “Hot  Seat  Expected  for  New  Chair  of  Corporation  for  Public  Broadcasting,”  Forward,  October  28,  2005.  

89  Joel  Beinin,  “Money,  Media  and  Policy  Consensus:  The  Washington  Institute  for  Near  East  Policy,”  Middle  East  Report,  January‐February  1993,  pp.  10‐15;  Mark  H.  Milstein,  “Washington  Institute  for  Near  East  Policy:  An  AIPAC  ‘Image  Problem’,”  Washington  Report  on  Middle  East  Affairs,  July  1991.  

90  Quoted  in  Milstein,  “Washington  Institute.”  

91  “Brookings  Announces  New  Saban  Center  for  Middle  East  Policy,”  Brookings  Institution  Press  Release,  May  9,  2002;  Andrew  Ross  Sorkin,  “Schlepping  to  Moguldom,”  New  York  Times,  September  5,  2004.  

92  James  D.  Besser,  “Turning  up  Heat  in  Campus  Wars,”  Jewish  Week,  July  25,  2003;  Ronald  S.  Lauder  and  Jay  Schottenstein,  “Back  to  School  for  Israel  Advocacy,”  Forward,   

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November  14,  2003;  Rachel  Pomerance,  “Israel  Forces  Winning  Campus  Battle,  Say  Students  Attending  AIPAC  Meeting,”  JTA,  December  31,  2002.   Jewish  groups  are  also  targeting  high  schools.  See  Max  Gross,  “Israel  Advocacy  Coalition  Targeting  High  Schools,”  Forward,  January  23,  2004;  “New  Pro‐Israel  Campaign  Targets  High  School  Students,”  JTA,  June  2,  2004.  

93  Besser,  “Turning  up  Heat.”  In  2002  and  2003,  AIPAC  brought  240  college  students  to  Washington,  DC  for  intensive  advocacy  training,  sending  them  back  to  school  to  win  over  campus  leaders  to  Israel’s  cause.  Besser,  “Turning  up  Heat”;  Pomerance,  “Israel  Forces  Winning.”  In  the  spring  of  2005,  it  hosted  100  student  government  presidents  (80  of  whom  were  not  Jewish)  at  its  annual  conference.  Nathaniel  Popper,  “Pro‐Israel  Groups:  Campuses  Improving,”  Forward,  June  24,  2005.  

94  Michael  Dobbs,  “Middle  East  Studies  under  Scrutiny  in  U.S.,”  Washington  Post,  January  13,  2004;  Michele  Goldberg,  “Osama  University?”  Salon.com,  November  6,  2003;  Kristine  McNeil,  “The  War  on  Academic  Freedom,”  Nation,  November  11,  2002;  Zachary  Lockman,  “Behind  the  Battle  over  US  Middle  East  Policy,”  Middle  East  Report  Online,  January  2004.  

95  Jonathan  R.  Cole,  “The  Patriot  Act  on  Campus:  Defending  the  University  Post‐‐9/11,”  Boston  Review,  Summer  2003.  

96  Chanakya  Sethi,  “Khalidi  Candidacy  for  New  Chair  Draws  Fire,”  Daily  Princetonian,  April  22,  2005;  Idem,  “Debate  Grows  over  Khalidi  Candidacy,”  Daily  Princetonian,  April  28,  2005.  

97  Robert  Gaines,  “The  Battle  at  Columbia  University,”  Washington  Report  on  Middle  East  Affairs,  April  2005,  pp.  56‐57;  Caroline  Glick,  “Our  World:  The  Columbia  Disaster,”  Jerusalem  Post,  April  4,  2005;  Joseph  Massad,  “Witch  Hunt  at  Columbia:  Targeting  the  University,”  CounterPunch,  June  3,  2005;  Nathaniel  Popper,  “Columbia  Students  Say  Firestorm  Blurs  Campus  Reality,”  Forward,  February  11,  2005;  Scott  Sherman,  “The  Mideast  Comes  to  Columbia,”  Nation,  April  4,  2005;  Chanan  Weissman,  “Columbia  Unbecoming,”  Jerusalem  Post,  February  6,  2005.  

98  “Columbia  University  Ad  Hoc  Grievance  Committee,  Final  Report,  New  York,  28  March  2005  (excerpts),”  in  Journal  of  Palestine  Studies,  Vol.  34,  No.  4  (Summer  2005),  pp.  90‐100.  

99  Goldberg,  “Osama  University?”;  Ron  Kampeas,  “Campus  Oversight  Passes  Senate  as  Review  Effort  Scores  a  Victory,”  JTA,  November  22,  2005;  Stanley  Kurtz,  “Reforming  the  Campus:  Congress  Targets  Title  VI,”  National  Review  Online,  October  14,  2003;  McNeil,  “War  on  Academic  Freedom”;  Ori  Nir,  “Groups  Back  Bill  to  Monitor  Universities,”   

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Forward,  March  12,  2004;  Sara  Roy,  “Short  Cuts,”  London  Review  of  Books,  April  1,  2004;  Anders  Strindberg,  “The  New  Commissars,”  American  Conservative,  February  2,  2004.  

100  The  number  130  comes  from  Mitchell  G.  Bard,  “Tenured  or  Tenuous:  Defining  the  Role  of  Faculty  in  Supporting  Israel  on  Campus,”  Report  published  by  The  Israel  on  Campus  Coalition  and  The  American‐Israeli  Cooperative  Enterprise,  May  2004,  p.  11.  Also  see  Nacha  Cattan,  “NYU  Center:  New  Addition  to  Growing  Academic  Field,”  Forward,  May  2,  2003;  Samuel  G.  Freedman,  “Separating  the  Political  Myths  from  the  Facts  in  Israel  Studies,”  New  York  Times,  February  16,  2005;  Jennifer  Jacobson,  “The  Politics  of  Israel  Studies,”  Chronicle  of  Higher  Education,  June  24,  2005,  pp.  10‐12;  Michael  C.  Kotzin,  “The  Jewish  Community  and  the  Ivory  Tower:  An  Urgent  Need  for  Israel  Studies,”  Forward,  January  30,  2004;  Nathaniel  Popper,  “Israel  Studies  Gain  on  Campus  as  Disputes  Grow,”  Forward,  March  25,  2005.  

101  Quoted  in  Cattan,  “NYU  Center.”   

102  Jonathan  Kessler,  “Pro‐Israel  Activism  Makes  Comeback  on  Campus,”  Forward,  December  26,  2003;  Popper,  “Campuses  Improving”;  Barry  Silverman  and  Randall  Kaplan,  “Pro‐Israel  College  Activists  Quietly  Successful  on  Campus,”  JTA,  May  9,  2005;  Chanan  Tigay,  “As  Students  Return  to  Campus,  Activists  Prepare  a  New  Approach,”  JTA,  September  1,  2005.  Nevertheless,  there  are  limits  to  the  Lobby’s  effectiveness  on  campuses.  See  Joe  Eskenazi,  “Book:  College  Campuses  Quiet,  but  Anti‐Israel  Feeling  Is  Growing,”  JTA,  November  29,  2005;  Gary  Rosenblatt,  “U.S.  Grad  Students  Seen  Hostile  to  Israel,”  Jewish  Week,  June  17,  2005.  

103  Quoted  in  Tony  Judt,  “Goodbye  to  All  That?”  Nation,  January  3,  2005.  

104  Anti‐Defamation  League  (ADL),  “Attitudes  toward  Jews,  Israel  and  the  Palestinian‐Israeli  Conflict  in  Ten  European  Countries,”  April  2004;  The  Pew  Global  Attitudes  Project,  A  Year  After  Iraq  War:  Mistrust  of  America  in  Europe  Even  Higher,  Muslim  Anger  Persists  (Washington,  DC:  The  Pew  Research  Center  for  the  People  and  the  Press,  March  16,  2004),  pp.  4‐5,  26.   On  the  ADL  survey,  see  “ADL  Survey  Finds  Some  Decrease  in  Anti‐Semitic  Attitudes  in  Ten  European  Countries,”  ADL  Press  Release,  April  26,  2004;  Shlomo  Shamir,  “Poll  Shows  Decrease  in  Anti‐Semitic  Views  in  Europe,”  Ha’aretz,  April  27,  2004.  These  findings  had  virtually  no  effect  on  pro‐Israel  pundits,  who  continued  to  argue  that  anti‐Semitism  was  rampant  in  Europe.  See,  for  example,  Daniel  J.  Goldhagen,  “Europe’s  Toothless  Reply  to  Anti‐Semitism:  Conference  Fails  to  Build  Tools  to  Fight  a  Rising  Sickness”  Los  Angeles  Times,  April  30,  2004;  Charles  Krauthammer,  “The  Real  Mideast  ‘Poison’,”  Washington  Post,  April  30,  2004.  

105  Martin  Peretz,  the  editor‐in‐chief  of  the  New  Republic,  says,  “The  headquarters  of  anti‐Semitic  Europe  today,  just  as  during  the  Third  Republic,  is  Paris.”  “Cambridge  Diarist:   

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Regrets,”  New  Republic,  April  22,  2002,  p.  50.  The  data  in  this  paragraph  are  from  “Anti‐Semitism  in  Europe:  Is  It  Really  Rising?”  Economist,  May  4,  2002.  

106  Quoted  in  Marc  Perelman,  “Community  Head:  France  No  More  Antisemitic  Than  U.S.,”  Forward,  August  1,  2003.  Also  see  Francois  Bujon  de  l’Estang,  “A  Slander  on  France,”  Washington  Post,  June  22,  2002;  “French  President  Accuses  Israel  of  Conducting  Anti‐French  Campaign,”  Ha’aretz,  May  12,  2002.  

107  “French  Police:  Anti‐Semitism  in  France  Sharply  Decreased  in  2005,”  Ha’aretz,  January  19,  2006.  

108  “French  Protest  for  Murdered  Jew,”  BBC  News  Online,  February  26,  2006;  Michel  Zlotowski,  “Large  Memorial  Held  for  Parisian  Jew,”  Jerusalem  Post,  February  23,  2006.  

109  Avi  Beker,  “The  Eternally  Open  Gate,”  Ha’aretz,  January  11,  2005;  Josef  Joffe,  “A  Boom,  if  Not  A  Renaissance,  in  Modern‐Day  Germany,”  Forward,  July  25,  2003;  Nathaniel  Popper,  “Immigrant  Policy  Eyed  as  German  Community  Swells,”  Forward,  July  25,  2003;  Eliahu  Salpeter,  “Jews  from  the  CIS  Prefer  Germany  to  the  Jewish  State,”  Ha’aretz,  May  28,  2005.  Also,  the  Times  of  London  reported  in  the  spring  of  2005,  that,  “An  estimated  100,000  Jews  have  returned  to  Russia  in  the  past  few  years,  sparking  a  dramatic  renaissance  of  Jewish  life  in  a  country  with  a  long  history  of  anti‐Semitism.”  Jeremy  Page,  “Once  Desperate  to  Leave,  Now  Jews  Are  Returning  to  Russia,  Land  of  Opportunity,”  Times,  April  28,  2005.  Also  see  Lev  Krichevsky,  “Poll:  Russians  Don’t  Dislike  Jews,  and  More  Are  against  Anti‐Semitism,”  JTA,  February  2,  2006.  

110  The  chairman  of  the  Education  Department  of  the  Jewish  Agency  recently  said  that  “present  day  violent  anti‐Semitism  originates  from  two  separate  sources:  radical  Islamists  in  the  Middle  East  and  Western  Europe  as  well  as  the  neo‐Nazi  youth  element  in  Eastern  Europe  and  Latin  America.”  Jonathan  Schneider,  “Anti‐Semitism  Still  a  World  Problem,”  Jerusalem  Post,  January  26,  2006.  

111  In  the  ADL’s  April  2004  survey,  “Attitudes  toward  Jews,  Israel  and  the  Palestinian‐Israeli  Conflict  in  Ten  European  Countries,”  the  following  question  was  asked:  “In  your  opinion,  is  it  very  important,  somewhat  important,  somewhat  unimportant  or  not  important  at  all  for  our  government  to  take  a  role  in  combating  anti‐Semitism  in  our  country?”  The  percentages  for  those  who  strongly  agree  or  somewhat  agree  were  Italy  (92),  Britain  (83),  Netherlands  (83),  France  (82),  Germany  (81),  Belgium  (81),  Denmark  (79),  Austria  (76),  Switzerland  (74),  Spain  (73).  See  p.  19.  

112  Phyllis  Chesler,  The  New  Anti‐Semitism:  The  Current  Crisis  and  What  We  Must  Do  about  It  (San  Francisco:  Jossey‐Bass,  2003);  Hillel  Halkin,  “The  Return  of  Anti‐Semitism:  To  Be  against  Israel  Is  to  Be  against  the  Jews,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  February  5,  2002;  Barry  

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Kosmin  and  Paul  Iganski,  “Judeophobia  –  Not  Your  Parent’s  Anti‐Semitism,”  Ha’aretz,  June  3,  2003;  Amnon  Rubinstein,  “Fighting  the  New  Anti‐Semitism,”  Ha’aretz,  December  2,  2003;  Gabriel  Schoenfeld,  The  Return  of  Anti‐Semitism  (San  Francisco:  Encounter  Books,  2003);  Natan  Sharansky,  “Anti‐Semitism  is  our  Problem,”  Ha’aretz,  August  10,  2003;  Yair  Sheleg.  “A  World  Cleansed  of  the  Jewish  State,”  Ha’aretz.  April  18,  2002;  Yair  Sheleg,  “Enemies,  a  Post‐National  Story,”  Ha’aretz,  March  8,  2003.   For  criticism  of  this  perspective,  see  Akiva  Eldar,  “Anti‐Semitism  Can  Be  Self‐Serving,”  Ha’aretz,  May  3,  2002;  Brian  Klug,  “The  Myth  of  the  New  Anti‐Semitism,”  Nation,  February  2,  2004;  Ralph  Nader,  “Criticizing  Israel  is  Not  Anti‐Semitism,”  CounterPunch,  October  16/17,  2004;  Henri  Picciotto  and  Mitchell  Plitnick,  eds.,    Reframing  Anti‐Semitism:  Alternative  Jewish  Perspectives  (Oakland,  CA:  Jewish  Voice  for  Peace,  2004);  and  especially  Finkelstein,  Beyond  Chutzpah,  chapters  1‐3.  

113  Helen  Nugent,  “Chief  Rabbi  Flays  Church  over  Vote  on  Israel  Assets,”  Times  Online,  February  17,  2006.  Also  see  Bill  Bowder,  “Sacks  Seeks  Talks  after  Synod  Vote  on  Disinvestment,”  Church  Times,  February  24,  2006;  “Bulldozer  Motion  ‘Based  on  Ignorance’,”  in  ibid;  Ruth  Gledhill,  “Church  Urged  to  Reconsider  Investments  with  Israel,”  Times  Online,  May  28,  2005;  Irene  Lancaster,  “Anglicans  Have  Betrayed  the  Jews,”  Downloaded  from  Moriel  Ministries  (UK)  website,  February  20,  2006;  “U.K.  Chief  Rabbi  Attacks  Anglicans  over  Israel  Divestment  Vote,”  Ha’aretz,  February  17,  2006.  

114  That  the  Church  of  England  was  merely  criticizing  Israeli  policy  and  not  engaging  in  anti‐Semitism  is  clearly  reflected  in  the  February  10,  2006  letter  that  the  Archbishop  of  Canterbury  (Dr.  Rowan  Williams)  sent  to  England’s  Chief  Rabbi  (Jonathan  Sacks)  explaining  the  Church’s  decision  on  divestment.  For  a  copy  of  the  letter,  see  “Archbishop:  Synod  Call  Was  Expression  of  Concern,”  February  10,  2006,  Downloaded  from  Church  of  England  website,  February  20,  2006.  

115  Steven  Kull  (Principal  Investigator),  Americans  on  the  Middle  East  Road  Map  (Program  on  International  Policy  Attitudes,  University  of  Maryland,  May  30,  2003),  pp.  9‐11,  18‐19.  Also  see  Steven  Kull  et  al.,  Americans  on  the  Israeli‐Palestinian  Conflict  (Program  on  International  Policy  Attitudes,  University  of  Maryland,  May  6,  2002).  A  2005  Anti‐Defamation  League  public  opinion  survey  found  that  78  percent  of  Americans  believe  that  their  government  should  favor  neither  Irael  nor  the  Palestinians.  “American  Attitudes  toward  Israel  and  the  Middle  East,”  Survey  conducted  on  March  18‐25,  2005,  and  June  19‐23,  2005,  by  the  Marttila  Communications  Group  for  the  Anti‐Defamation  League.  

116  Robert  G.  Kaiser,  “Bush  and  Sharon  Nearly  Identical  on  Mideast  Policy,”  Washington  Post,  February  9,  2003.   

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117  Lee  Hockstader  and  Daniel  Williams,  “Israel  Says  It  Won’t  ‘Pay  Price’  of  Coalition,”  Washington  Post,  September  18,  2001;  Jonathan  Karp,  “Sharon  Cancels  Peace  Talks  in  Rebuff  to  U.S.  Concerns,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  September  24,  2001;  Thomas  Oliphant,  “A  Delicate  Balance,”  Boston  Globe,  September  18,  2001:  “Israel’s  Opportunity,”  Los  Angeles  Times  editorial,  September  18,  2001.  

118  Kurt  Eichenwald,  “U.S.  Jews  Split  on  Washington’s  Shift  on  Palestinian  State,”  New  York  Times,  October  5,  2001.  At  the  same  time,  Prime  Minister  Tony  Blair  made  “Britain’s  strongest  endorsement  yet  of  Palestinian  statehood.”  Michael  Dobbs,  “Blair  Backs  Creation  of  Palestinian  State,”  Washington  Post,  October  16,  2001.  

119  James  Bennet,  “Sharon  Invokes  Munich  in  Warning  U.S.  on  ‘Appeasement’,”  New  York  Times,  October  5,  2001;  Jane  Perlez  and  and  Katharine  Q.  Seelye.  “U.S.  Stongly  Rebukes  Sharon  for  Criticism  of  Bush,  Calling  it  ‘Unacceptable’.”  New  York  Times  October  6,  2001;  Shlomo  Shamir,  “U.S.  Jews:  Sharon  is  ‘Worried’  by  Terrorism  Distinction,”  Ha’aretz,  September  18,  2001;  Alan  Sipress  and  Lee  Hockstader,  “Sharon  Speech  Riles  U.S.,”  Washington  Post,  October  6,  2001.   For  evidence  that  other  Israelis  shared  Sharon’s  fears,  see  Israel  Harel,  “Lessons  from  the  Next  War,”  Ha’aretz,  October  6,  2001.  

120  Jack  Donnelly,  “Nation  Set  to  Push  Sharon  on  Agreement,”  Boston  Globe,  October  10,  2001;  Hockstader  and  Sipress,  “Sharon  Speech  Riles  U.S.”;  Perlez  and  Seelye.  “U.S.  Strongly  Rebukes  Sharon.”  

121  Lee  Hockstader,  “Sharon  Apologetic  over  Row  with  U.S.,”  Washington  Post,  October  7,  2001;  Serge  Schmemann,  “Raising  Munich,  Sharon  Reveals  Israeli  Qualms,”  New  York  Times,  October  6,  2001.  

122  Aluf  Benn,  “Analysis:  Clutching  at  Straws,”  Ha’aretz,  September  18,  2001;  “Excerpts  from  Talk  by  Sharon,”  New  York  Times,  December  4,  2001;  William  Safire,  “‘Israel  or  Arafat’,”  New  York  Times,  December  3,  2001.  

123  Elaine  Sciolino,  “Senators  Urge  Bush  Not  to  Hamper  Israel,”  New  York  Times,  November  17,  2001.  

124  Dana  Milbank,  “Bush  Spokesman  Gentle  on  Israeli  Assault,”  Washington  Post,  December  3,  2001;  Safire,  “Israel  or  Arafat”;  David  Sanger,  “U.S.  Walks  a  Tightrope  on  Terrorism  in  Israel,”  New  York  Times,  December  4,  2001.  

125  Keith  B.  Richburg  and  Molly  Moore,  “Israel  Rejects  Demands  to  Withdraw  Troops,”  Washington  Post,  April  11,  2002.  All  quotes  in  this  paragraph  are  from  Fareed  Zakaria,  “Colin  Powell’s  Humiliation:  Bush  Should  Clearly  Support  His  Secretary  of  State  –   

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Otherwise  He  Should  Get  a  New  One,”  Newsweek,  April  29,  2002.   Also  see  Mike  Allen  and  John  Lancaster,  “Defiant  Sharon  Losing  Support  in  White  House,”  Washington  Post,  April  11,  2002,  which  describes  the  Bush  Administration’s  anger  with  Sharon.  

126  It  is  worth  noting  that  the  American  people  were  generally  supportive  of  Bush’s  efforts  to  put  pressure  on  Israel  in  the  sping  of  2002.   A  Time/CNN  poll  taken  on  April  10‐11  found  that  60  percent  of  Americans  felt  that  U.S.  aid  to  Israel  should  be  cut  off  or  reduced  if  Sharon  refused  to  withdraw  from  the  Palestinian  areas  he  had  recently  occupied.  “Poll:  Americans  Support  Cutting  Aid  to  Israel,”  Reuters  News  Release,  April  12,  2002;  AFP  News  Release,  April  13,  2002.   Also  see  Israel  and  the  Palestinians  (Program  on  International  Policy  Attitudes,  University  of  Maryland,  last  updated  on  August  15,  2002).   Moreover,  75  percent  of  those  surveyed  thought  that  Powell  should  meet  with  Arafat  when  he  visited  Israel.   Regarding  Sharon,  only  35  percent  found  him  trustworthy,  while  35  percent  thought  he  was  a  warmonger,  20  percent  saw  him  as  a  terrorist,  and  25  percent  considered  him  an  enemy  of  the  United  States.  

127  William  Kristol  and  Robert  Kagan,  “‘Senior  White  House  Aides:’  Speak  Up!”  Weekly  Standard,  April  11,  2002.   For  a  graphic  description  of  the  heat  that  the  Lobby  put  on  Powell  when  he  was  in  the  Middle  East,  see  Bob  Woodward,  Bush  at  War  (New  York:  Simon  and  Schuster,  2002),  pp.  323‐326.  Also  see  John  Simpson,  “Israeli  Leader  Has  More  Power  in  Washington  than  Powell,”  Sunday  Telegraph  (London),  April  14,  2002,  which  describes  a  joint  press  conference  Powell  and  Sharon  conducted  by  noting  that:  “the  Secretary  of  State’s  language,  body  and  verbal,  certainly  were  not  that  of  the  paymaster  coming  to  call  a  client  to  account.  Far  from  it.  Mr.  Powell  seemed  ingratiating,  deferential;  no  doubt  he  realizes  how  much  support  Mr.  Sharon  has  back  in  Washington  and  how  much  influence  his  friends  have  there  with  the  President.”  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  former  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Benjamin  Netanyahu,  who  was  making  Israel’s  case  in  the  United  States  at  the  time,  said  even  before  Powell  arrived  in  Israel  that  his  trip  “won’t  amount  to  anything.”  Elaine  Sciolino,  “Netanyahu  Says  Powell  Mission  ‘Won’t  Amount  to  Anything’  and  Urges  Arafat’s  Exile,”  New  York  Times,  April  11,  2002.  

128  James  D.  Besser,  “No  Tennessee  Waltz,”  Jewish  Week,  December  27,  2002.  Also  see  Mike  Allen  and  Juliet  Eilperin,  “White  House  and  DeLay  at  Odds,”  Washington  Post  April  26,  2002;  Judith  Eilperin  and  Helen  Dewar,  “Lawmakers  Endorse  Israel’s  Offensive,”  Washington  Post,  May  3,  2002.   Bush  was  feeling  intense  pressure  not  just  from  lawmakers,  but  from  Jewish  leaders  and  Christian  Evangelicals.  See  Mike  Allen  and  John  Lancaster,  “Defiant  Sharon  Losing  Support  in  White  House,”  Washington  Post,  April  11,  2002;  Dan  Balz,  “Bush  Statement  on  Mideast  Reflects  Tension  in  GOP,”  Washington  Post,  April  7,  2003;  Elisabeth  Bumiller,  “Bush  Sends  Aide  to  Speak  at  Rally  to  Quell  a  Growing  Furor,”  New  York  Times,  April  16,  2002;  Bradley  Burston,  “Background:  Can  Bush  Afford  to  Press  Sharon  for  Peace?”  Ha’aretz,  May  6,  2002;  Akiva  Eldar,  “Bush  and  Israel,  1991  and  2002,”  Ha’aretz,  May  6,  2002;  Alison  Mitchell,  “U.S.  Political  Leaders  

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Seek  Unity  on  Mideast,  for  Now,”  Washington  Post,  April  12,  2002;  William  Safire,  “On  Being  an  Ally,”  New  York  Times,  April  11,  2002;  Alan  Sipress,  “Policy  Divide  Thwarts  Powell  in  Mideast  Effort,”  Washington  Post,  April  26,  2002;  and  Alan  Sipress  and  Karen  DeYoung,  “U.S.  Presses  Ahead  with  Peace  Efforts,”  Washington  Post,  May  9,  2002.  

129  Randall  Mikkelsen,  “White  House  Calls  Sharon  ‘Man  of  Peace’,”  Reuters,  April  11,  2002;  Bill  Sammon,  “White  House  Softens  Tone  with  Israel,”  Washington  Times,  April  12,  2002.  

130  Peter  Slevin  and  Mike  Allen,  “Bush:  Sharon  A  ‘Man  of  Peace’,”  Washington  Post,  April  19,  2002;  David  Sanger,  “President  Praises  Effort  by  Powell  in  the  Middle  East,”  New  York  Times,  April  19,  2002.   For  a  transcript  of  the  press  conference,  see  “President  Bush,  Secretary  Powell  Discuss  Middle  East,”  White  House,  Office  of  the  Press  Secretary,  April  18,  2002.  

131  Eilperin  and  Dewar,  “Lawmakers  Endorse  Israel’s  Offensive”;  Juliet  Eilperin  and  Mike  Allen,  “Hill  Leaders  Plan  Votes  on  Pro‐Israel  Relations,”  Washington  Post,  May  2,  2002;  Alison  Mitchell,  “House  and  Senate  Support  Israel  in  Strong  Resolutions,”  New  York  Times,  May  3,  2002.  For  copies  of  the  two  resolutions,  see  “2  Resolutions  ‘Expressing  Solidarity  with  Israel’,”  New  York  Times,  May  3,  2002.   Also  see  Matthew  E.  Berger,  “Bills  in  Congress  Boost  Israel,  Treat  Arafat  as  Terrorist,”  Jewish  Bulletin,  April  26,  2002.  

132  Arieh  O’Sullivan,  “Visiting  Congressmen  Advise  Israel  to  Resist  Administration  Pressure  to  Deal  with  Arafat,”  Jerusalem  Post¸  May  6,  2002.  

133  Eli  Lake,  “Israeli  Lobby  Wins  $200  Million  Fight,”  United  Press  International,  May  11,  2002.  

134  Quoted  in  Jefferson  Morley,  “Who’s  in  Charge?”  Washington  Post,  April  26,  2002.   As  Akiva  Eldar  noted  just  before  Sharon  steamrolled  Bush,  “Sharon  has  a  lot  of  experience  sticking  it  to  the  Americans  ….  Ultimately,  whether  it  was  Palestinian  terror,  Arafat’s  mistakes,  or  domestic  politics,  the  Americans  were  sent  to  the  peanut  gallery.”  See  his  “Words  Are  Not  Enough,”  Ha’aretz,  April  8,  2002.  Nor  was  Bush’s  humiliation  lost  on  commentators  around  the  world.   Spain’s  leading  daily,  El  Pais,  expressed  the  views  of  many  outside  observers  when  it  commented,  “If  a  country’s  weight  is  measured  by  its  degree  of  influence  on  events,  the  superpower  is  not  the  USA  but  Israel.”  Quoted  in  Morley,  “Who’s  in  Charge?”  

135  Bradley  Burston,  “Hamas  ‘R’  Us,”  Ha’aretz,  January  18,  2006;  Akiva  Eldar,  “Kadima  to  A  New  Middle  East,”  Ha’aretz,  December  19,  2005;  Idem,  “Who  Needs  Abu  Mazen?”  Ha’aretz,  November  7,  2005;  Ran  HaCohen,  “Hamas  and  Israel:  Rival  Twins,”  AntiWar.com,  February  6,  2006;  M.J.  Rosenberg,  “No  Partner  ‐‐ As  Always,”  IPF  Friday,   

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Issue  No.  260,  February  3,  2006;  Danny  Rubenstein,  “All  We  Did  Was  Switch  the  Non‐Partner,”  Ha’aretz,  February  5,  2006;  “Disarray  Among  the  Palestinians,”  New  York  Times  editorial,  January  17,  2006.  

136  Regarding  the  views  of  previous  Presidents,  see  Clyde  R.  Mark,  “Israeli‐United  States  Relations,”  Issue  Brief  for  Congress  (Washington,  DC:  Congressional  Research  Service,  August  29,  2002),  p.  7.   On  April  14,  2004,  Bush  broke  with  his  predecessors  and  proclaimed  that  Israel  would  not  have  to  return  all  of  the  territories  that  it  occupied  i  1967,  and  that  Palestinian  refugees  would  not  be  allowed  to  return  to  their  former  homes  in  Israel,  but  would  have  to  settle  in  a  new  Palestinian  state.  See  “Statement  by  the  President  Regarding  Israel‐Arab  Peace  Process,”  April  14,  2004;  and  “President  Bush’s  Letter  to  Prime  Minister  Sharon,”  April  14,  2004.

137  “US  Scowcroft  Criticizes  Bush  Admin’s  Foreign  Policy,”  Financial  Times,  October  13,  2004.  Also  see  Glenn  Kessler,  “Scowcroft  is  Critical  of  Bush,”  Washington  Post,  October  16,  2004.  

138  On  Kerry,  see  Gadi  Dechter,  “Analysis:  President  Kerry  on  Israel,”  United  Press  International  press  release,  July  9,  2004;  Nathan  Guttman,  “Kerry  Position  Paper  Outlines  Support  for  Israel,”  Ha’aretz,  July  2,  2004:  Nathan  Guttman,  “Kerry  Jumps  on  Sharon  Bandwagon  in  Favoring  Gaza  Disengagement  Plan,”  Ha’aretz,  April  25,  2004.   On  Clinton,  see  Adam  Dickter,  “Hillary:  ‘I  Had  A  Lot  to  Prove’,”  Jewish  Week,  November  18,  2005;  Kristen  Lombardi,  “Hillary  Calls  Israel  a  ‘Beacon’  of  Democracy,”  Village  Voice,  December  11,  2005;  Sonia  Verma,  “Clinton  Stressed  U.S.‐Israel  Coalition,”  Newsday,  November  15,  2005;  Rachel  Zabarkes  Friedman,  “Senator  Israel,”  National  Review  Online,  May  25,  2005.  

139  Emad  Mekay,  “Iraq  Was  Invaded  ‘to  Protect  Israel’  –  US  Official,”  Asia  Times  Online,  March  31,  2004.   Zelikow  also  served  with  Rice  on  the  National  Security  Council  when  George  H.  W.  Bush  was  President,  and  co‐authored  a  book  with  her  on  German  reunification.   He  was  also  one  of  the  principal  authors  of  the  second  Bush  Administration’s  2002  National  Security  Strategy,  which  is  the  most  comprehensive  official  presentation  of  the  so‐called  Bush  Doctrine.  

140  Jason  Keyser,  “Israel  Urges  U.S.  to  Attack,”  Washington  Post,  August  16,  2002.  Also  see  Aluf  Benn,  “PM  Urging  U.S.  Not  to  Delay  Strike  against  Iraq,”  Ha’aretz,  August  16,  2002;  Idem,  “PM  Aide:  Delay  in  U.S.  Attack  Lets  Iraq  Speed  Up  Arms  Program,”  Ha’aretz,  August  16,  2002;  Reuven  Pedhatzur,  “Israel’s  Interest  in  the  War  on  Saddam,”  Ha’aretz,  August  4,  2002;  Ze’ev  Schiff,  “Into  the  Rough,”  Ha’aretz,  August  16,  2002.  

141  Gideon  Alon,  “Sharon  to  Panel:  Iraq  is  Our  Biggest  Danger,”  Ha’aretz,  August  13,  2002.   At  a  White  House  press  conference  with  President  Bush  on  October  16,  2002,   

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Sharon  said:  “I  would  like  to  thank  you,  Mr.  President,  for  the  friendship  and  cooperation.  And  as  far  as  I  remember,  as  we  look  back  towards  many  years  now,  I  think  that  we  never  had  such  relations  with  any  President  of  the  United  States  as  we  have  with  you,  and  we  never  had  such  cooperation  in  everything  as  we  have  with  the  current  administration.”  For  a  transcript  of  the  press  conference,  see  “President  Bush  Welcomes  Prime  Minister  Sharon  to  White  House;  Question  and  Answer  Session  with  the  Press,”  U.S.  Department  of  State,  October  16,  2002.  Also  see  Kaiser,  “Bush  and  Sharon  Nearly  Identical  on  Mideast  Policy.”  

142  Shlomo  Brom,  “An  Intelligence  Failure,”  Strategic  Assessment  (Jaffee  Center  for  Strategic  Studies,  Tel  Aviv  University),  Vol.  6,  No.  3  (November  2003),  p.  9.   Also  see  “Intelligence  Assessment:  Selections  from  the  Media,  1998‐2003,”  in  ibid.,  pp.  17‐19;  Gideon  Alon,  “Report  Slams  Assessment  of  Dangers  Posed  by  Libya,  Iraq,”  Ha’aretz,  March  28,  2004;  Dan  Baron,  “Israeli  Report  Blasts  Intelligence  for  Exaggerating  the  Iraqi  Threat,”  JTA,  March  28,  2004;  Greg  Myre,  “Israeli  Report  Faults  Intelligence  on  Iraq,”  New  York  Times,  March  28,  2004;  James  Risen,  State  of  War:  The  Secret  History  of  the  CIA  and  the  Bush  Administration  (New  York:  Simon  &  Schuster,  2006),  pp.  72‐73.  

143  Marc  Perelman,  “Iraqi  Move  Puts  Israel  in  Lonely  U.S.  Corner,”  Forward,  September  20,  2002.   This  article  begins,  “Saddam  Hussein’s  surprise  acceptance  of  ‘unconditional’  United  Nations  weapons  inspections  put  Israel  on  the  hot  seat  this  week,  forcing  it  into  the  open  as  the  only  nation  actively  supporting  the  Bush  administration’s  goal  of  Iraqi  regime  change.”   Peres  became  so  frustrated  with  the  UN  process  in  the  following  months  that  in  mid‐February  2003  he  lashed  out  at  the  French  by  questioning  France’s  status  as  a  permanent  member  of  the  Security  Council.  “Peres  Questions  France  Permanent  Status  on  Security  Council,”  Ha’aretz,  February  20,  2003.   On  a  visit  to  Moscow  in  late  September  2002,  Sharon  made  it  clear  to  Russian  President  Putin,  who  was  leading  the  charge  for  new  inspections,  “that  the  time  when  these  inspectors  could  have  been  effective  has  passed.”  Herb  Keinon,  “Sharon  to  Putin:  Too  Late  for  Iraq  Arms  Inspection,”  Jerusalem  Post,  October  1,  2002.   

144  Ehud  Barak,  “Taking  Apart  Iraq’s  Nuclear  Threat,”  New  York  Times,  September  4,  2002.   

145  Benjamin  Netanyahu,  “The  Case  for  Toppling  Saddam,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  September  20,  2002.   The  Jerusalem  Post  was  particularly  hawkish  on  Iraq,  frequently  running  editorials  and  op‐eds  promoting  the  war,  and  hardly  ever  running  pieces  against  it.   Representative  editorials  include  “Next  Stop  Baghdad,”  Jerusalem  Post,  November  15,  2001;  “Don’t  Wait  for  Saddam,”  Jerusalem  Post,  August  18,  2002;  “Making  the  Case  for  War,”  Jerusalem  Post,  September  9,  2002.   For  some  representative  op‐eds,  see  Ron  Dermer,  “The  March  to  Baghdad,”  Jerusalem  Post,  December  21,  2001;  Efraim  

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Inbar,  “Ousting  Saddam,  Instilling  Stability,”  Jerusalem  Post,  October  8,  2002;  Gerald  M.  Steinberg,  “Imagining  the  Liberation  of  Iraq,”  Jerusalem  Post,  November  18,  2001.  

146  Aluf  Benn,  “Background:  Enthusiastic  IDF  Awaits  War  in  Iraq,”  Ha’aretz,  February  17,  2002.  Also  see  James  Bennet,  “Israel  Says  War  on  Iraq  Would  Benefit  the  Region,”  New  York  Times,  February  27,  2003;  Chemi  Shalev,  “Jerusalem  Frets  As  U.S.  Battles  Iraq  War  Delays,”  Forward,  March  7,  2003.  

147  Indeed,  a  February  2003  poll  reported  that  77.5  percent  of  Israeli  Jews  wanted  the  United  States  to  attack  Iraq.   Ephraim  Yaar  and  Tamar  Hermann,  “Peace  Index:  Most  Israelis  Support  the  Attack  on  Iraq,”  Ha’aretz,  March  6,  2003.   Regarding  Kuwait,  a  public  opinion  poll  released  in  March  2003  found  that  89.6  percent  of  Kuwaitis  favored  the  impending  war  against  Iraq.  James  Morrison,  “Kuwaitis  Support  War,”  Washington  Times,  March  18,  2003.  

148  Gideon  Levy,  “A  Deafening  Silence,”  Ha’aretz,  October  6,  2002.  

149  See  Dan  Izenberg,  “Foreign  Ministry  Warns  Israeli  War  Talk  Fuels  US  Anti‐Semitism,”  Jerusalem  Post,  March  10,  2003,  which  makes  clear  that  “the  Foreign  Ministry  has  received  reports  from  the  US”  telling  Israelis  to  cool  their  jets  because  “the  US  media”  is  portraying  Israel  as  “trying  to  goad  the  administration  into  war.”  There  is  also  evidence  that  Israel  itself  was  concerned  about  being  seen  as  driving  American  policy  toward  Iraq.   See  Benn,  “PM  Urging  U.S.  Not  to  Delay  Strike”;  Perelman,  “Iraq  Move  Puts  Israel  in  Lonely  U.S.  Corner.”  Finally,  in  late  September  2002,  a  group  of  political  consultants  known  as  the  “Israel  Project”  told  pro‐Israel  leaders  in  the  United  States  “to  keep  quiet  while  the  Bush  administration  purses  a  possible  war  with  Iraq.”   Dana  Milbank,  “Group  Urges  Pro‐Israel  Leaders  Silence  on  Iraq,”  Washington  Post,  November  27,  2002.  

150  The  influence  of  the  neoconservatives  and  their  allies  is  clearly  reflected  in  the  following  articles:  See  Joel  Beinin,  “Pro‐Israel  Hawks  and  the  Second  Gulf  War,”  Middle  East  Report  Online,  April  6,  2003;  Elisabeth  Bumiller  and  Eric  Schmitt,  “On  the  Job  and  at  Home,  Influential  Hawks’  30‐Year  Friendship  Evolves,”  New  York  Times,  September  11,  2002;  Kathleen  and  William  Christison,  “A  Rose  by  Another  Name:  The  Bush  Administration’s  Dual  Loyalties,”  CounterPunch,  December  13,  2002;  Robert  Dreyfuss,  “The  Pentagon  Muzzles  the  CIA,”  The  American  Prospect,  December  16,  2002;  Michael  Elliott  and  James  Carney,  “First  Stop,  Iraq,”  Time,  March  31,  2003;  Seymour  Hersh,  “The  Iraq  Hawks,”  New  Yorker,  Vol.  77,  issue  41  (December  24‐31,  2001),  pp.  58‐63;  Glenn  Kessler,  “U.S.  Decision  on  Iraq  Has  Puzzling  Past,”  Washington  Post,  January  12,  2003;  Joshua  M.  Marshall,  “Bomb  Saddam?”  Washington  Monthly,  June  2002;  Dana  Milbank,  “White  House  Push  for  Iraqi  Strike  Is  on  Hold,”  Washington  Post,  August  18,  2002;  Susan  

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Page,  “Showdown  with  Saddam:  The  Decision  to  Act,”  USA  Today,  September  11,  2002;  Sam  Tanenhaus,  “Bush’s  Brain  Trust,”  Vanity  Fair,  July  2003.   Note  that  all  these  articles  are  from  before  the  war  started.   

151  See  Mortimer  B.  Zuckerman,  “No  Time  for  Equivocation,”  U.S.  News  &  World  Report,  August  26/September  2,  2002;  Idem,  “Clear  and  Compelling  Proof,”  U.S.  News  &  World  Report,  February  10,  2003;  Idem,  “The  High  Price  of  Waiting,”  U.S.  News  &  World  Report,  March  10,  2003.  

152  “An  Unseemly  Silence,”  Forward,  May  7,  2004.  Also  see  Gary  Rosenblatt,  “Hussein  Asylum,”  Jewish  Week,  August  23,  2002;  Idem,  “The  Case  for  War  against  Saddam,”  Jewish  Week,  December  13,  2002.  

153  Just  before  the  U.S.  military  invaded  Iraq,  Congressman  James  P.  Moran  (D‐Va)  created  a  stir  when  he  said,  “If  it  were  not  for  the  strong  support  of  the  Jewish  community  for  this  war  with  Iraq,  we  would  not  be  doing  this.”  Spencer  S.  Hsu,  “Moran  Said  Jews  Are  Pushing  War,”  Washington  Post,  March  11,  2003.  However,  Moran  misspoke,  because  there  was  not  widespread  support  for  the  war  in  the  Jewish  community.   He  should  have  said,  “If  it  were  not  for  the  strong  support  of  the  neoconservatives  and  the  leadership  of  the  Israel  Lobby  for  this  war  with  Iraq,  we  would  not  be  doing  this.”  

154  Samuel  G.  Freedman,  “Don’t  Blame  Jews  for  This  War,”  USA  Today,  April  2,  2003.  Also  see  Ori  Nir,  “Poll  Finds  Jewish  Political  Gap,”  Forward,  February  4,  2005.  

155  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  in  the  wake  of  9/11,  the  neoconservatives  were  not  just  determined,  but  were  obsessed  with  removing  Saddam  from  power.  As  one  senior  Administration  figure  put  it  in  January,  2003,  “I  do  believe  certain  people  have  grown  theological  about  this.  It’s  almost  a  religion  –  that  it  will  be  the  end  of  our  society  if  we  don’t  take  action  now.”   Kessler,  “U.S.  Decision  on  Iraq  Has  Puzzling  Past.”  Kessler  also  describes  Colin  Powell  returning  from  White  House  meetings  on  Iraq,  “rolling  his  eyes”  and  saying,  “Jeez,  what  a  fixation  about  Iraq.”   Bob  Woodward  reports  in  Plan  of  Attack  (New  York:  Simon  and  Schuster,  2004),  p.  410,  that  Kenneth  Adelman  “said  he  had  worried  to  death  as  time  went  on  and  support  seemed  to  wane  that  there  would  be  no  war.”  Also  see  ibid.,  pp.  164‐165.  

156  The  first  letter  (January  26,  1998)  was  written  under  the  auspices  of  the  Project  for  the  New  American  Century  and  can  be  found  on  its  website.   The  second  letter  (February  19,  1998)  was  written  under  the  auspices  of  the  Committee  for  Peace  and  Security  in  the  Gulf  and  can  be  found  on  the  Iraq  Watch  website.   Also  see  the  May  29,  1998  letter  to  Speaker  of  the  House  Newt  Gingrich  and  Senate  Majority  Leader  Trent  Lott  written  

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under  the  auspices  of  the  Project  for  the  New  American  Century  and  found  on  its  website.  The  neoconservatives,  it  should  be  emphasized,  advocated  invading  Iraq  to  topple  Saddam.  See  “The  End  of  Containment,”  Weekly  Standard,  December  1,  1997,  pp.  13‐14;  Zalmay  M.  Khalizad  and  Paul  Wolfowitz,  “Overthrow  Him,”  in  ibid.,  pp.  14‐15;  Frederick  W.  Kagan,  “Not  by  Air  Alone,”  in  ibid.,  pp.  15‐16.  

157  See  Clinton’s  comments  after  he  signed  the  “Iraq  Liberation  Act  of  1998.”  Statement  by  the  President,  White  House  Press  Office,  October  31,  1998.  

158  One  might  think  from  the  publicity  and  the  controversy  surrounding  two  books  published  in  2004—Richard  Clarke’s  Against  All  Enemies:  Inside  America’s  War  on  Terror  (New  York:  Free  Press,  2004)  and  Ron  Suskind,  The  Price  of  Loyalty:  George  W.  Bush,  the  White  House,  and  the  Education  of  Paul  O’Neill  (New  York:  Simon  and  Schuster,  2004)—that  Bush  and  Cheney  were  bent  on  invading  Iraq  when  they  assumed  office  in  late  January  2001.   However,  this  interpretation  is  wrong.   They  were  deeply  interested  in  toppling  Saddam,  just  as  Bill  Clinton  and  Al  Gore  had  been.  But  there  is  no  evidence  in  the  public  record  showing  that  Bush  and  Cheney  were  seriously  contemplating  war  against  Iraq  befor  9/11.  In  fact,  Bush  made  it  clear  to  Bob  Woodward  that  he  was  not  thinking  about  going  to  war  against  Saddam  before  9/11.  See  Plan  of  Attack,  p.  12.  Also  see  Nicholas  Lehmann,  “The  Iraq  Factor,”  New  Yorker,  Vol.  76,  issue  43  (January  22,  2001),  pp.  34‐48;  Eric  Schmitt  and  Steven  Lee  Meyers,  “Bush  Administration  Warns  Iraq  on  Weapons  Programs,”  New  York  Times,  January  23,  2001.  And  Cheney  had  defended  the  decision  not  to  go  to  Baghdad  throughout  the  1990s  and  during  the  2000  campaign.  See  Timothy  Noah,  “Dick  Cheney,  Dove,”  Slate,  October  16,  2002;  “Calm  after  Desert  Storm,”  An  Interview  with  Dick  Cheney,  Policy  Review,  No.  65  (Summer  1993).   In  short,  even  though  the  neoconservatives  held  important  positions  in  the  Bush  Administration,  they  were  unable  to  generate  much  enthusiasm  for  attacking  Iraq  before  9/11.  Thus,  the  New  York  Times  reported  in  March  2001  that  “some  Republicans”  were  complaining  that  Rumsfeld  and  Wolfowitz  “are  failing  to  live  up  to  their  pre‐election  advocacy  of  stepping  up  efforts  to  overthrow  President  Hussein.”   At  the  same  time,  a  Washington  Times  editorial  asked,  “Have  Hawks  Become  Doves?”  See  Jane  Perlez,  “Capitol  Hawks  Seek  Tougher  Line  on  Iraq,”  New  York  Times,  March  7,  2001;  “Have  Hawks  Become  Doves?”  Washington  Times,  March  8,  2001.  

159  Woodward,  Plan  of  Attack,  pp.  25‐26.  Wolfowitz  was  so  insistent  on  conquering  Iraq  that  five  days  later  Cheney  had  to  tell  him  to  “stop  agitating  for  targeting  Saddam.”   Page,  “Showdown  with  Saddam.”   According  to  one  Republican  lawmaker,  he  “was  like  a  parrot  bringing  [Iraq]  up  all  the  time.  It  was  getting  on  the  President’s  nerves.”   Elliot  and  Carney,  “First  Stop,  Iraq.”   Woodward  describes  Wolfowitz  as  “like  a  drum  that  would  not  stop.”  Plan  of  Attack,  p.  22.  

160  Woodward,  Plan  of  Attack,  pp.  1‐44.   

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161  Regarding  the  neoconservatives’  influence  on  Cheney,  see  Elliott  and  Carney,  “First  Stop,  Iraq”;  Page,  “Showdown  with  Saddam”;  Michael  Hirsh,  “Bernard  Lewis  Revisited,”  Washington  Monthly,  November  2004,  pp.13‐19;  Frederick  Kempe,  “Lewis’s  ‘Liberation’  Doctrine  for  Mideast  Faces  New  Tests,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  December  13,  2005;  Carla  Anne  Robbins  and  Jeanne  Cummings,  “How  Bush  Decided  that  Hussein  Must  Be  Ousted  from  Atop  Iraq,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  June  14,  2002.   On  Cheney’s  critical  role  in  the  decision‐making  process,  see  Glenn  Kessler  and  Peter  Slevin,  “Cheney  is  Fulcrum  of  Foreign  Policy,”  Washington  Post,  October  13,  2002;  Barbara  Slavin  and  Susan  Page,  “Cheney  Rewrites  Roles  in  Foreign  Policy,”  USA  Today,  July  29,  2002.   

162  The  New  York  Times  reported  shortly  after  9/11  that,  “Some  senior  administration  officials,  led  by  Paul  D.  Wolfowitz  …  and  I.  Lewis  Libby  …  are  pressing  for  the  earliest  and  broadest  military  campaign  against  not  only  the  Osama  bin  Laden  network  in  Afghanistan,  but  also  against  other  suspected  terrorist  bases  in  Iraq  and  in  Lebanon’s  Bekka  region.”   Patrick  E.  Tyler  and  Elaine  Sciolino,  “Bush  Advisers  Split  on  Scope  of  Retaliation,”  New  York  Times,  September  20,  2001.   Also  see  William  Safire,  “Phony  War  II,”  New  York  Times,  November  28,  2002.   Woodward  succinctly  describes  Libby’s  influence  in  Plan  of  Attack  (pp.  48‐49):  “Libby  had  three  formal  titles.  He  was  chief  of  staff  to  Vice  President  Cheney;  he  was  also  national  security  adviser  to  the  vice  president;  and  he  was  finally  an  assistant  to  President  Bush.   It  was  a  trifecta  of  positions  probably  never  held  before  by  a  single  person.  Scooter  was  a  power  center  unto  himself  ….  Libby  was  one  of  only  two  people  who  were  not  principals  to  attend  the  National  Security  Council  meetings  with  the  president  ad  the  separate  principals  meetings  chaired  by  Rice.”  Also  see  ibid.,  pp  50‐51,  288‐292,  300‐301,  409‐410;  Bumiller  and  Schmitt,  “On  the  Job  and  at  Home”;  Karen  Kwiatkowski,  “The  New  Pentagon  Papers,”  Salon.com,  March  10,  2004;  Patrick  E.  Tyler  and  Elaine  Sciolino,  “Bush  Advisers  Split  on  Scope  of  Retaliation,”  New  York  Times,  September  20,  2001.  On  Libby’s  relationship  to  Israel,  an  article  in  the  Forward  reports  that  “Israeli  officials  liked  Libby.  They  described  him  as  an  important  contact  who  was  accessible,  genuinely  interested  in  Israel‐related  issues  and  very  sympathetic  to  their  cause.”  Ori  Nir,  “Libby  Played  Leading  Role  on  Foreign  Policy  Decisions,”  Forward,  November  4,  2005.  

163  This  letter  was  published  in  the  Weekly  Standard,  October  1,  2001.  

164  Robert  Kagan  and  William  Kristol,  “The  Right  War,”  Weekly  Standard,  October  1,  2001;  Charles  Krauthammer,  “Our  First  Move:  Take  Out  the  Taliban,”  Washington  Post,  October  1,  2001.  Also  see  “War  Aims,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  September  20,  2001.  

165  Even  before  the  dust  had  settled  at  the  World  Trade  Center,  pro‐Israel  forces  were  making  the  case  that  Saddam  was  responsible  for  9/11.  See  Michael  Barone,  “War  by  Ultimatum,”  U.S.  News  and  World  Report,  October  1,  2001;  Bill  Gertz,  “Iraq  Suspected  of  Sponsoring  Terrorist  Attacks,”  Washington  Times,  September  21,  2001;  “Drain  the  Pond  

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of  Terror,”  Jerusalem  Post  editorial,  September  25,  2001;  William  Safire,  “The  Ultimate  Enemy,”  New  York  Times,  September  24,  2001.  

166  See  James  Bamford,  A  Pretext  to  War  (New  York:  Doubleday,  2004);  chaps.  13‐14;  Woodward,  Plan  of  Attack,  pp.  288‐292,  297‐306.   Also  see  ibid.,  pp.  72,  163,  300‐301.  

167  Woodward,  Plan  of  Attack,  p.  290.  

168  See  Bamford,  Pretext  to  War,  pp.  287‐291,  307‐331;  David  S.  Cloud,  “Prewar  Intelligence  Inquiry  Zeroes  In  On  Pentagon,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  March  11,  2004;  Seymour  M.  Hersh,  “Selective  Intelligence,”  New  Yorker,  Vol.  79,  issue  11  (May  12,  2003),  pp.  44‐50;  Kwiatkowski,  “New  Pentagon  Papers”;  Jim  Lobe,  “Pentagon  Office  Home  to  Neo‐Con  Network,”  Inter  Press  Service  News  Agency,  August  7,  2003;  Greg  Miller,  “Spy  Unit  Skirted  CIA  on  Iraq,”  Los  Angeles  Times,  March  10,  2004;  Paul  R.  Pillar,  “Intelligence,  Policy,  and  the  War  in  Iraq,”  Foreign  Affairs,  Vol.  85,  No.  2  (March‐April  2006),  pp.  15‐27;  James  Risen,  “How  Pair’s  Finding  on  Terror  Led  to  Clash  on  Shaping  Intelligence,”  New  York  Times,  April  28,  2004;  Eric  Schmitt  and  Thom  Shanker,  “Threats  and  Responses:  A  C.I.A.  Rival;  Pentagon  Sets  Up  Intelligence  Unit.”  New  York  Times  October  24,  2002.  

169  The  Office  of  Special  Plans  relied  heavily  on  information  from  Ahmed  Chalabi  and  other  Iraqi  exiles  and  it  had  close  links  ith  various  Israeli  sources.   Indeed,  the  Guardian  reports  that  it  “forged  close  ties  to  a  parallel,  ad  hoc  intelligence  operation  inside  Ariel  Sharon’s  office  in  Israel  specifically  to  bypass  Mossad  and  provide  the  Bush  adminitration  with  more  alarmist  reports  on  Saddam’s  Iraq  than  Mossad  was  prepared  to  authorize.”  Julian  Borger,  “The  Spies  Who  Pushed  for  War,”  Guardian,  July  17,  2003.  

170  See,  for  example,  Douglas  J.  Feith,  “The  Inner  Logic  of  Israel’s  Negotiations:  Withdrawal  Process,  Not  Peace  Process,”  Middle  East  Quarterly,  March  1996.   For  useful  discussions  of  Feith’s  views,  see  Jeffrey  Goldberg,  “A  Little  Learning:  What  Douglas  Feith  Knew  and  When  He  Knew  It,”  New  Yorker,  Vol.  81,  issue  12  (May  9,  2005),  pp.  36‐41;  Jim  Lobe,  “Losing  Feith,  or  is  the  Bush  Team  Shedding  Its  Sharper  Edges?”  The  Daily  Star,  January  31,  2005;  James  J.  Zogby,  “A  Dangerous  Appointment:  Profile  of  Douglas  Feith,  Undersecretary  of  Defense  under  Bush,”  Middle  East  Information  Center,  April  18,  2001;  “Israeli  Settlements:  Legitimate,  Democratically  Mandated,  Vital  to  Israel’s  Security  and,  Therefore,  in  U.S.  Interest,”  The  Center  for  Security  Policy,  Transition  Brief  No.  96‐T  130,  December  17,  1996.  Note  that  the  title  of  the  latter  piece,  which  was  published  by  an  organization  in  the  Lobby,  says  that  what  is  in  Israel’s  interest  is  therefore  in  America’s  national  interest.  In  “Losing  Feith,”  Lobe  writes:  “In  2003,  when  Feith,  who  was  standing  in  for  Rumsfeld  at  an  interagency   ‘Principals’  Meeting’  on  the  Middle  East,  concluded  his  remarks  on  behalf  of  the  Pentagon,  according  to  the  Washington  insider  newsletter,  The  Nelson  Report,  [National  Security  Advisor  

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Condoleezza]  Rice  said,  ‘Thanks  Doug,  but  when  we  want  the  Israeli  position  we’ll  invite  the  ambassador’.”  

171  The  “Clean  Break”  study  was  prepared  for  The  Institute  for  Advanced  Strategic  and  Political  Studies  in  Jerusalem  and  published  in  June  1996.A  copy  can  be  found  on  the  Institute’s  web  site.  

172  Akiva  Eldar,  “Perles  of  Wisdom  for  the  Feithful,”  Ha’aretz,  October  1,  2002.   

173  “Rally  Unites  Anguished  Factions  under  Flag  of  ‘Stand  with  Israel’,”  Forward,  April  19,  2002;  “Forward  50,”  Forward,  November  15,  2002.  

174  John  McCaslin,  “Israeli‐Trained  Cops,”  Washington  Times,  November  5,  2002;  Bret  Stephens,  “Man  of  the  Year,”  Jerusalem  Post  (Rosh  Hashana  Supplement),  September  26,  2003;  Janine  Zacharia,  “Invasive  Treatment,”  in  ibid.   Other  useful  pieces  on  Wolfowitz  include  Michael  Dobbs,  “For  Wolfowitz,  A  Vision  May  Be  Realized,”  Washington  Post,  April  7,  2003;  James  Fallows,  “The  Unilateralist,”  Atlantic  Monthly,  March  2002,  pp.  26‐29;  Bill  Keller,  “The  Sunshine  Warrior,”  New  York  Times  Magazine,  September  22,  2002;  “Paul  Wolfowitz,  Velociraptor,”  Economist,  February  9‐15,  2002.   

175  According  to  Feith’s  former  law  partner,  L.  Marc  Zell,  Chalabi  also  promised  to  re‐build  the  pipeline  that  once  ran  from  Haifa  in  Israel  to  Mosul  in  Iraq.   See  John  Dizard,  “How  Ahmed  Chalabi  Conned  the  Neocons,”  Salon.com,  May  4,  2004.  In  mid‐June  2003,  Benjamin  Netanyahu  announced  that,  “It  won’t  be  long  before  you  will  see  Iraqi  oil  flowing  to  Haifa.”  Reuters,  “Netanyahu  Says  Iraq‐Israel  Oil  Line  Not  Pipe‐Dream,”  Ha’aretz,  June  20,  2003.   Of  course,  this  did  not  happen  and  it  is  unlikely  to  happen  in  the  foreseeable  future.  

176  Matthew  E.  Berger,  “New  Chances  to  Build  Israel‐Iraq  Ties,”  Jewish  Journal,  April  28,  2003.   Also  see  Bamford,  Pretext  to  War,  p.  293;  Ed  Blanche,  “Securing  Iraqi  Oil  for  Israel:  The  Plot  Thickens,”  Lebanonwire.com,  April  25,  2003.  Nathan  Guttman  reports  that  “the  American  Jewish  community  and  the  Iraqi  opposition”  had  for  years  “taken  pains  to  conceal”  the  links  between  them.  “Mutual  Wariness:  AIPAC  and  the  Iraqi  Opposition,”  Ha’aretz,  April  8,  2003.  

177  Nir,  “FBI  Probe.”  On  the  eve  of  the  war,  Bill  Keller,  who  is  now  the  executive  editor  of  the  New  York  Times,  wrote:  “The  idea  that  this  war  is  about  Israel  is  persistent  and  more  widely  held  than  you  think.”  Keller,  “Is  It  Good  for  the  Jews?”  New  York  Times,  March  8,  2003.   

178  In  an  op‐ed  written  in  mid‐2004,  Hollings  asked  why  the  Bush  Administration  invaded  Iraq  when  it  was  not  a  direct  threat  to  the  United  States.  “The  answer,”  which  

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he  says  “everyone  knows,”  is  “because  we  want  to  secure  our  friend  Israel.”   Senator  Ernest  F.  Hollings,  “Bush’s  Failed  Mideast  Policy  Is  Creating  More  Terrorism,”  Charleston  Post  and  Courier,  May  6,  2004;  “Sen.  Hollings  Floor  Statement.”   Not  surprisingly,  Hollings  was  called  an  anti‐Semite,  a  charge  he  furiously  rejected.  Matthew  E.  Berger,  “Not  So  Gentle  Rhetoric  from  the  Gentleman  from  South  Carolina,”  JTA,  May  23,  2004;  “Sen.  Hollings  Floor  Statement”;   “Senator  Lautenberg’s  Floor  Statement  in  Support  of  Senator  Hollings,”  June  3,  2004,  a  copy  of  which  can  be  found  on  Hollings’  web  site.  On  Moran,  see  note  151.  A  handful  of  other  public  figures  like  Patrick  Buchanan,  Maureen  Dowd,  Georgie  Anne  Geyer,  Gary  Hart,  Chris  Matthews,  and  General  Anthony  Zinni,  have  either  said  or  strongly  hinted  that  pro‐Israel  forces  in  the  United  States  were  the  principle  movers  behind  the  Iraq  war.   See  Aluf  Benn,  “Scapegoat  for  Israel,”  Ha’aretz,  May  13,  2004;  Matthew  Berger,  “Will  Some  Jews’  Backing  for  War  in  Iraq  Have  Repercussions  for  All?”  JTA,  June  10,  2004;  Patrick  J.  Buchanan,  “Whose  War?”  American  Conservative,  March  24,  2003;  Ami  Eden,  “Israel’s  Role:  The  ‘Elephant’  They’re  Talking  About,”  Forward,  February  28,  2003;  “The  Ground  Shifts,”  Forward,  May  28,  2004;  Nathan  Guttman,  “Prominent  U.S.  Jews,  Israel  Blamed  for  Start  of  Iraq  War,”  Ha’aretz,  May  31,  2004;  Lawrence  F.  Kaplan,  “Toxic  Talk  on  War,”  Washington  Post,  February  18,  2003;  E.J.  Kessler,  “Gary  Hart  Says  ‘Dual  Loyalty’  Barb  Was  Not  Aimed  at  Jews,”  Forward,  February  21,  2003;  Ori  Nir  and  Ami  Eden,  “Ex‐Mideast  Envoy  Zinni  Charges  Neocons  Pushed  Iraq  War  to  Benefit  Israel,”  Forward,  May  28,  2004.   

179  Michael  Kinsley,  “What  Bush  Isn’t  Saying  about  Iraq,”  Slate,  October  24,  2002.   Also  see  idem,  “J’Accuse.”  

180  Robert  S.  Greenberger  and  Karby  Leggett,  “President’s  Dream:  Changing  Not  Just  Regime  but  a  Region:  A  Pro‐U.S.,  Democratic  Area  is  a  Goal  that  Has  Israeli  and  Neo  Conservative  Roots,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  March  21,  2003.   Also  see  George  Packer,  “Dreaming  of  Democracy,”  New  York  Times  Magazine,  March  2,  2003.   Although  not  all  neoconservatives  are  Jewish,  most  of  the  founders  were  and  virtually  all  were  strong  supporters  of  Israel.   According  to  Gal  Beckerman  in  the  Forward,  “If  there  is  an  intellectual  movement  in  America  to  whose  invention  Jews  can  lay  sole  claim,  neoconservatism  is  it.”   See  “The  Neoconservative  Persuasion,”  Forward,  January  6,  2006.  

181  See,  for  example,  Rebuilding  America’s  Defenses:  Strategy,  Forces  and  Resources  for  a  New  Century,  A  Report  for  the  New  American  Century,  September  2000,  p.  14.  

182  Martin  Indyk,  “The  Clinton  Administration’s  Approach  to  the  Middle  East,”  Speech  to  Soref  Symposium,  Washington  Institute  for  Near  East  Policy,  May  18,  1993.   Also  see  Anthony  Lake,  “Confronting  Backlash  States,”  Foreign  Affairs,  Vol.  73.  No.  2  (March/April  1994),  pp.  45‐53.   

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183  Barbara  Conry,  “America’s  Misguided  Policy  of  Dual  Containment  in  the  Persian  Gulf,”  Foreign  Policy  Briefing  No.  33,  CATO  Institute,  November  10,  1994;  Gregory  F.  Gause  III,  “The  Illogic  of  Dual  Containment,”  Foreign  Affairs,  Vol.  73.  No.  2  (March/April  1994),  pp.  56‐66;  Zbigniew  Brzezinski  and  Brent  Scowcroft,  Differentiated  Containment:  U.S.  Policy  Toward  Iran  and  Iraq,  Report  of  an  Independent  Study  Group  on  Gulf  Stability  and  Security,  Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  New  York,  1997.   

184  Brzezinski  and  Scowcroft,  Differentiated  Containment,  p.  6.   

185  Brzezinski  and  Scowcroft,  Differentiated  Containment,  p.  130.  

186  For  example,  the  Jerusalem  Post  noted  in  an  editorial  (September  9,  2002)  that  “according  to  Middle  East  expert  Bernard  Lewis,  a  post‐Saddam  Iraq  is  one  that  would  be  more  likely  to  make  peace  with  Israel,  defang  Arab  radicalism,  and  perhaps  even  catalyze  revolutionary  forces  in  present‐day  Iran.”   Similarly,  Michael  Ledeen  wrote  on  August  6,  2002  in  the  National  Review  Online  (“Scowcroft  Strikes  Out”)  that,  “If  ever  there  was  a  region  that  richly  deserved  being  cauldronized,  it  is  the  Middle  East  today.  If  we  wage  the  war  effectively,  we  will  bring  down  the  terror  regimes  in  Iraq,  Iran,  and  Syria,  and  either  bring  down  the  Saudi  monarchy  or  force  it  to  abandon  its  global  assembly  line  to  indoctrinate  young  terrorists.”   On  August  19,  Joshua  Muravchik  argued  in  the  New  York  Times  (“Democracy’s  Quiet  Victory”)  that,  “Change  toward  democratic  regimes  in  Tehran  and  Baghdad  would  unleash  a  tsunami  across  the  Islamic  world.”  Also  see  Marina  Ottaway  et  al.,  “Democratic  Mirage  in  the  Middle  East,”  Policy  Brief  #20  (Washington,  D.C:  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  October  2002).   

187  Charles  Krauthammer,  “Peace  through  Democracy,”  Washington  Post,  June  28,  2002.  

188  Benn,  “Background.”   Also,  the  New  York  Times  reported  that  Halevy  gave  a  speech  in  Munich  in  February  2003  in  which  he  said,  “The  shock  waves  emerging  from  post‐Saddam  Baghdad  could  have  wide‐ranging  effects  in  Tehran,  Damascus,  and  in  Ramallah.”   The  Times  article  went  on  to  say  that  Israel  “is  hoping  that  once  Saddam  Hussein  is  dispensed  with,  the  dominoes  will  start  to  tumble.   According  to  this  hope  …  moderates  and  reformers  throughout  the  region  would  be  encouraged  to  put  new  pressure  on  their  own  governments,  not  excepting  the  Palestinian  Authority  of  Yasir  Arafat.”  Bennet,  “Israel  Says  War  on  Iraq  Would  Benefit  the  Region.”   This  same  theme  is  reflected  in  a  Forward  article  from  early  March  2003,  which  said  that  “Israel’s  top  political,  military  and  economic  echelons  have  come  to  regard  the  looming  war  as  a  virtual  deus  ex  machina  that  will  turn  the  political  ad  economic  tables  and  extricate  Israel  from  its  current  morass.”   Shalev,  “Jerusalem  Frets.”   Finally,  this  line  of  thinking  was  apparent  in  former  Prime  Minister  Ehud  Barak’s  previously‐discussed  September  4,  2002,  op‐ed  in  the  New  York  Times.   Barak  maintained  that  “putting  an  end  to  Saddam  Hussein’s  regime  will  change  the  geopolitical  landscape  of  the  Arab  world.”   He  claimed  

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that  “An  Arab  world  without  Saddam  Hussein  would  enable  many  from  this  generation  [leaders  about  to  come  into  power]  to  embrace  the  gradual  democratic  opening  that  some  of  the  Persian  Gulf  states  and  Jordan  have  begun  to  enjoy.”  Barak  also  maintained  that  toppling  Saddam  would  “create  an  opening  for  forward  movement  on  the  Israeli‐Palestinian  conflict.”  

189  See  Seymour  M.  Hersh,  “The  Syrian  Bet,”  New  Yorker,  Vol.  79,  issue  20  (July  28,  2003),  pp.  32‐36;  Molly  Moore,  “Sharon  Asks  U.S.  to  Pressure  Syria  on  Militants,”  Washington  Post,  April  17,  2003;  Ori  Nir,  “Jerusalem  Urges  Bush:  Next  Target  Hezbollah,”  Forward,  April  11,  2003;  Idem,  “Sharon  Aide  Makes  the  Case  for  U.S.  Action  against  Syria,  Forward,  April  18,  2003;  Marc  Perelman,  “Behind  Warnings  to  Damascus:  Reassessment  of  Younger  Assad,”  Forward,  April  18,  2004;  Daniel  Sobelman  and  Nathan  Guttman,  “PM  Urges  U.S.  to  Keep  Heat  on  Syria,  Calls  Assad  ‘Dangerous’,”  Ha’aretz,  April  15,  2003.   

190  Moore,  “Sharon  Asks  U.S.”  

191  Nir,  “Sharon  Aide.”  Also  see  Karen  DeYoung,  “U.S.  Toughens  Warnings  to  Syria  on  Iraq,  Other  Issues,”  Washington  Post,  April  15,  2003.   

192  Nir,  “Sharon  Aide.”  Also  see  Perelman,  “Behind  Warnings.”   In  their  efforts  to  demonize  Syria  and  bait  the  United  States  into  attacking  it,  Israelis  have  said  that  Damascus  was  harboring  high‐level  Iraqis  from  Saddam’s  regime,  and  even  worse,  hiding  Iraq’s  WMD.   Perelman,  “Behind  Warnings”;  Laurie  Copans,  “Israeli  Military  Boss  Claims  Iraq  Had  Chemical  Weapons,”  Associated  Press  news  release,  April  26,  2004;  Ira  Stoll,  “Saddam’s  WMD  Moved  to  Syria,  An  Israeli  Says,”  New  York  Sun,  December  15,  2005;  Idem,  “Iraq’s  WMD  Secreted  in  Syria,  Sada  Says,”  New  York  Sun,  January  26,  2006.  In  August  2003,  when  a  suicide  truck  bomber  blew  up  UN  headquarters  in  Baghdad,  Israel’s  ambassador  to  the  UN  caused  a  diplomatic  spat  by  suggesting  that  Syria  had  provided  the  truck,  thereby  implying  that  Syria  was  partly  responsible.   Michael  Casey,  “Israeli  Ambassador  Believes  Truck  Used  in  U.N.  Bombing  Came  from  Syria,”  Associated  Press  news  release,  August  21,  2003;  “Israeli  Envoy  Links  Syria  to  UN  Blast,  Stirs  Flap,”  Reuters  news  release,  August  21,  2003.   Itmar  Rabinowich,  the  former  Israeli  ambassador  to  the  United  States,  told  Seymour  Hersh  that  he  “wondered  …  whether,  given  the  quality  of  their  sources,  the  Syrians  had  had  advance  information  about  the  September  11th  plot  ‐‐ and  failed  to  warn  the  United  States.”   Hersh,  “The  Syrian  Bet.”   There  was  little  evidence  to  support  these  charges,  but  Israel’s  willingness  to  make  them  shows  how  eager  they  were  to  get  the  United  States  embroiled  with  yet  another  Arab  regim.   

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193   Syria  had  been  in  the  Lobby’s  gunsights  well  before  9/11.  In  fact,  Syria,  not  Iraq,  was  the  main  target  in  the  “Clean  Break”study  that  Feith,  Perle,  and  Wurmser  wrote  for  Netanyahu  in  1996.   And  Daniel  Pipes  and  Ziad  Abdelnour,  the  head  of  the  U.S.  Committee  for  a  Free  Lebanon  (USCFL),  had  co‐authored  a  2000  report  calling  for  the  United  States  to  use  military  threats  to  force  Syria  to  remove  its  troops  from  Lebanon,  get  rid  of  any  WMD  it  might  have,  and  stop  supporting  terrorism.  (“Ending  Syria’s  Occupation  of  Lebanon:  The  U.S.  Role,”  Report  of  the  Middle  East  Study  Group,  Middle  East  Forum,  May  2000.)   The  UCSFL  is  a  close  cousin  of  the  Lobby,  and  it  includes  numerous  neoconservatives  (Abrams,  Feith,  Ledeen,  Perle,  and  Wurmser)  among  its  “official  core  supporters.”  Jordan  Green,  “Neocons  Dream  of  Lebanon,”  ZNet,  July  23,  2003;  David  R.  Sands,  “Hawks  Recycle  Arguments  for  Iraq  War  against  Syria,”  Washington  Times,  April  16,  2003.   Except  for  Ledeen,  they  all  signed  the  2000  report,  as  did  pro‐Israel  Congressman  Eliot  Engel  (D‐NY),  another  core  supporter  of  UCSFL.   

194  Nathan  Guttman,  “Some  Senior  U.S.  Figures  Say  Syria  Has  Crossed  the  Red  Line,”  Ha’aretz,  Aril  14,  2004;  Michael  Flynn,  “The  War  Hawks:  The  Right  Flexes  Muscle  with  New  U.S.  Agenda,”  Chicago  Tribune,  April  13,  2003.   In  addition  to  Perle  and  Wolfowitz,  John  Bolton  pushed  hard  from  inside  the  Administration  for  regime  change  in  Syria.   He  had  told  Israeli  leaders  a  month  before  the  Iraq  war  that  the  Bush  Administration  would  deal  with  Syria,  as  well  as  Iran  and  North  Korea,  right  after  Saddam  fell  from  power.  Flynn,  “The  Right  Flexes  Muscle.”  In  pursuit  of  that  goal,  Bolton  reportedly  prepared  to  tell  Congress  in  mid‐July  that  Syria’s  WMD  programs  had  reached  the  point  where  they  were  a  serious  threat  to  stability  in  the  Middle  East  and  had  t  be  dealt  with  sooner  rather  than  later.  However,  the  CIA  and  other  government  agencies  objected,  claiming  that  Bolton’s  analysis  greatly  inflated  the  Syrian  threat.  Consequently,  the  Administration  did  not  allow  Bolton  to  give  his  testimony  on  Syria  at  that  time.   Douglas  Jehl,  “New  Warning  Was  Put  Off  on  Weapons  Syria  Plans,”  New  York  Times,  July  18,  2003;  Marc  Perelman,  “State  Department  Hawk  under  Fire  in  Intelligence  Flap  over  Syria,”  Forward,  July  25,  2003;  Warren  P.  Strobel  and  Jonathan  S.  Landay,  “Intelligence  Data  on  Syria  Now  Disputed,”  Philadelphia  Inquirer,  July  17,  2003.   Yet  Bolton  was  not  put  off  for  long.   He  appeared  before  Congress  in  September  2003  and  described  Syria  as  a  growing  threat  to  U.S.  interests  in  the  Middle  East.   Nathan  Guttman,  “US:  Syria  Supporting  Terror,  Developing  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction,”  Ha’aretz,  September  16  2003.  

195  Quoted  in  Robin  Wright,  “U.S.  Insists  Syria  Alter  Its  Course,”  Los  Angeles  Times,  April  14,  2003.   Also  see  Martin  Indyk’s  and  Dennis  Ross’s  tough‐minded  rhetoric  about  Syria  in  Hersh,  “The  Syrian  Bet.”  

196  Lawrence  F.  Kaplan,  “White  Lie,”  New  Republic,  April  21&  28,  2003.   Also  see  William  Kristol  and  Lawrence  F.  Kaplan,  The  War  over  Iraq:  Saddam’s  Tyranny  ad  America’s  Mission  (New  York:  Encounter  Books,  2003).   

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197  DeYoung,  “U.S.  Toughens  Stance.”  There  was  a  story  in  Ha’aretz  (“NY  Congressman  Says  Will  Push  Bill  to  Pressure  Syria”)  on  August  19,  2003,  which  reported  that  Engel  had  just  met  with  Sharon  in  his  Jerusalem  Office  for  90  minutes  and  the  Israeli  leader  had  endorsed  ngel’s  efforts  to  push  the  Syria  Accountability  Act.   Regarding  the  specifics  of  that  legislation,  see  Zvi  Bar’el,  “Deciphering  the  Syrians,  Ha’aretz,  July  9,  2003;  “The  Return  of  the  Syria  Accountability  Act,”  NewsMax.com,  April  19,  2003;  Claude  Salhani,  “The  Syria  Accountability  Act:  Taking  the  Wrong  Road  to  Damascus,”  Policy  Analysis,  No.  512,  CATO  Institute,  March  18,  2004.  Not  surprisingly,  Richard  Perle  called  on  Congress  to  pass  the  Syria  Accountability  Act  shortly  after  Engel  re‐introduced  the  legislation.  Sands,  “Hawks  Recycle  Arguments.”  

198   Ron  Kampeas,  “Bush,  Once  Reluctant  on  Sanctions,  Prepares  to  Take  a  Tough  Line  with  Syria,”  JTA,  March  16,  2004.  

199  Salhani,  “The  Syria  Accountability  Act,”  p.  5.  

200  Julian  Borger,  “Bush  Vetoes  Syria  War  Plan,”  Guardian,  April  15,  2003;  Kampeas,  “Bush,  Once  Reluctant.”  

201  See  Hersh,  “The  Syrian  Bet.”  Other  pieces  discussing  the  advantages  for  the  United  states  of  cooperating  with  Syria  include  Spencer  Ackerman,  “Rough  Trade,”  New  Repulic,  January  13,  2003;  Susan  Taylor  Martin,  “Experts  Disagree  on  Dangers  of  Syria,”  St.  Petersburg  Times,  November  3,  2002;  Salhani,  “The  Syria  Accountability  Act”;  Stephen  Zunes,  “Bush  Has  Clear  Run  at  Syria,”  Asia  Times  Online,  March  2,  2005.  

202  Two  articles  that  appeared  in  the  Forward  after  Baghdad  fell  describe  the  driving  forces  behind  the  new  U.S.  policy  toward  Syria.   In  a  piece  in  mid‐April,  the  author  noted:  “A  sudden  flurry  of  U.S.  warnings  to  Syria  in  recent  days  indicates  that  Washington  has  undertaken  what  Israel  and  its  supporters  here  have  been  urgingfor  months:  a  comprehensive  reassessment  of  Syrian  ruler  Bashar  Assad.”  Perelman,  “Behind  Warnings.”   A  few  months  later  in  mid‐July,  another  author  noted:  “During  the  past  several  months,  top  Israeli  officials  have  warned  their  American  counterparts  and  audiences  about  Assad’s  unreliability.  American  officials  have  echoed  the  stance  and  press  reports  have  speculated  about  possible  American  military  intervention  in  Sria.”  Marc  Perelman,  “Syria  Makes  Overture  over  Negotiations,”  Forward,  July  11,  2003.  

203  Quoted  in  Alan  Sipress,  “Israel  Emphasizes  Iranian  Threat,”  Washington  Post,  February  7,  2002.   This  article,  which  was  written  as  Sharon  was  arriving  in  Washington,  makes  clear  that  Tel  Aviv  was  “redoubling  its  efforts  to  warn  the  Bush  administration  that  Iran  poses  a  greater  threat  than  the  Iraqi  regime  of  Saddam  Hussein”   Also  see  Seymour  Hersh,  “The  Iran  Game,”  New  Yorker,  Vol.  77,  issue  38  (December  3,  2001),  pp.   

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42‐49;  Peter  Hirschberg,  “Background/Peres  Raises  Iranian  Threat,”  Ha’aretz,  February  5,  2002;  David  Hirst,  “Israel  Thrusts  Iran  in  Line  of  US  Fire,”  Guardian,  February  2,  2002;  “Israel  Once  Again  Sees  Iran  as  A  Cause  for  Concern,”  Ha’aretz,  May  7,  2001.  

204  Stephen  Farrell,  Robert  Thomson,  and  Danielle  Haas,  “Attack  Iran  the  Day  Iraq  War  Ends,  Demands  Israel,”  The  Times  (London),  September  5,  2002;  Stephen  Farrell  and  Robert  Thomson,  “The  Times  Interview  with  Ariel  Sharon,”  in  ibid.  

205  “Ambassador  to  U.S.  Calls  for  ‘Regime  Change’  in  Iran,  Syria,”  Ha’aretz,  April  28,  2003.    Ten  days  later  the  New  York  Times  reported  that  the  Washington  was  growing  increasingly  concerned  about  Iran’s  nuclear  ambitins,  and  that  there  is  “a  lot  of  hammering  from  the  Israelis  for  us  to  take  this  position  seriously.”   Steven  R.  Weisman,  “New  U.S.  Concerns  on  Iran’s  Pursuit  of  Nuclear  Arms,”  New  York  Times,  May  8,  2003.   Shimon  Peres  then  published  an  op‐ed  in  the  Wall  Street  Journal  on  June  25  entitled,  “We  Must  Unite  to  Prevent  an  Ayatollah  Nuke.”   His  description  of  the  Iranian  threat  sounded  just  like  his  earlier  description  of  the  threat  from  Saddam,  even  including  a  ritual  reference  to  the  lessons  of  appeasement  in  the  1930s.   Iran,  he  emphasized,  must  be  told  in  no  uncertain  terms  that  the  United  States  and  Israel  will  not  tolerate  it  going  nuclear.    

206  In  late  May  2003,  Inter  Press  Service  reported  that,  “The  neo‐cons’  efforts  to  now  focus  US  attention  on  ‘regime  change’  in  Iran  has  become  much  more  intense  since  early  May  and  already  has  borne  substantial  fruit.”  Jim  Lobe,  “U.S.  Neo‐Cons  Move  Quickly  on  Iran,”  Inter  Press  Service,  May  28,  2003.   In  early  June,  the  Forward  reported  that,  “Neoconservatives  inside  and  outside  the  administration  have  been  urging  an  active  effort  to  promote  regime  change  in  Tehran.  Reports  of  possible  covert  actions  have  surfaced  in  recent  weeks.”   Marc  Perelman,  “Pentagon  Team  on  Iran  Comes  under  Fire,”  Forward,  June  6,  2003.   Also  see  idem,  “White  House  Is  Aiming  to  Raise  Iranian  Nukes  at  U.N.  Security  Council,”  Forward,  May  9,  2003;  Idem,  “New  Front  Sets  Sights  on  Toppling  Iran  Regime,”  Forward,  May  16,  2003.   Finally,  the  Lobby  has  established  close  relations  with  Reza  Pahlavi,  the  son  of  the  late  Shah  of  Iran.   He  is  even  reported  to  have  had  meetings  with  Netanyahu  and  Sharon.   This  relationship  is  similar  to  the  Lobby’s  relationship  with  Ahmed  Chalabi.   Specifically,  pro‐Israel  forces  promote  Pahlavi,  and  in  return,  he  makes  clear  that  if  he  comes  to  power  in  Iran,  it  will  have  good  relations  with  Israel.  Connie  Bruck,  “Exiles:  How  Iran’s  Expatriates  Are  Gaming  the  Nuclear  Threat,”  New  Yorker,  Vol.  82,  issue  2  (March  6,  2006),  pp.  48‐ 63;  Perelman,  “New  Front.”  

207  The  flyer  advertising  the  conference,  which  was  entitled  “The  Future  of  Iran:  Mullahcracy,  Democracy  and  the  War  on  Terror,”  can  be  found  at  a  number  of  sites  on  the  web.  Also  see  Green,  “Neocons  Dream  of  Lebanon”;  Lobe,  “U.S.  Neo‐Cons  Move  Quickly.”    

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208  William  Kristol,  “The  End  of  the  Beginning,”  Weekly  Standard,  February  12,  2003.  Others  writing  articles  at  the  time  include  Daniel  Pipes  and  Patrick  Clawson,  who  wrote  a  piece  on  May  20  for  the  Jerusalem  Post  entitled  “Turn  up  the  Pressure  on  Iran.”   They  called  for  the  Bush  Administration  to  support  the  Mujahedeen‐e‐Khalq,  a  terrorist  organization  based  in  Iraq  that  was  bent  on  overthrowing  the  ayatollahs  running  Iran.   Lawrence  Kaplan  argued  in  the  New  Republic  (“Iranamok”)  on  June  9  that  the  US  needed  to  get  tougher  with  Iran  over  its  nuclear  programs,  which  he  feared  were  further  along  than  most  American  policymakers  recognized.  Michael  Ledeen,  one  of  the  leading  hawks  on  Iran,  wrote  in  the  National  Review  Online  (“The  Others”)  on  April  4:  “There  is  no  more  time  for  diplomatic  ‘solutions.’   We  will  have  to  deal  with  the  terror  masters,  here  and  now.   Iran,  at  least,  offers  us  the  possibility  of  a  memorable  victory,  because  the  Iranian  people  openly  loath  the  regime,  and  will  enthusiastically  combat  it,  if  only  the  United  States  supports  them  in  their  just  struggle.”  

209  For  evidence  of  the  Lobby’s  intensified  efforts  to  get  the  Bush  Administration  to  deal  with  the  Iranian  nuclear  problem,  see  Stewart  Ain,  “Israel  Urging  U.S.  to  Stop  Iran  Nukes,”  Jewish  Week,  October  7,  2005;  Efraim  Inbar,  “The  Imperatives  to  Use  Force  against  Iranian  Nuclearization,”  BESA  Center  [Bar‐Ilan  University,  Israel]  Perspectives,  Number  12,  December  1,  2005;  Martin  S.  Indyk,  “Iran’s  Bluster  Isn’t  A  Bluff,”  Los  Angeles  Times,  November  1,  2005;  Ron  Kampeas,  “With  Time  Short  on  Iran  Nukes,  AIPAC  Criticizes  Bush  Approach,”  JTA,  December  2,  2005;  Charles  Krauthammer,  “In  Iran,  Arming  for  Armageddon,”  Washington  Post,  December  16,  2005;  Dafna  Linzer,  “Pro‐Israel  Group  Criticizes  White  House  Policy  on  Iran,”  Washington  Post,  December  25,  2005;  Ori  Nir,  “New  Sanction  Bill  Loses  Momentum  as  Administration  Presses  Diplomacy,”  Forward,  June  10,  2005;  Idem,  “Jewish  Groups  Push  for  Iran  Sanctions,”  Forward,  September  23,  2005;  Idem,  “Israeli  Aides  Warn  U.S.  Not  to  Drop  Ball  on  Iran,”  Forward,  December  9,  2005;  Michael  Rubin  et  al.,  “War  Footing:  10  Steps  America  Must  Take  to  Prevail  in  the  War  for  the  Free  World,”  American  Enterprise  Institute,  November  30,  2005;  Rowan  Scarborough,  “Israel  Pushes  U.S.  on  Iran  Nuke  Solution,”  Washington  Times,  February  21,  2005.    

210  Some  neoconservatives  even  welcome  this  outcome.  For  example,  Robert  Kagan  and  William  Kristol  wrote  in  the  aftermath  of  9/11  that,  “Afghanistan  will  prove  but  an  opening  battle  ….  this  war  will  not  end  in  Afghanistan.   It  is  going  to  spread  and  engulf  a  number  of  countries  in  conflicts  of  varying  intensity.   It  could  well  require  the  use  of  American  military  power  in  multiple  places  simultaneously.   It  is  going  to  resemble  the  clash  of  civilizations  that  everyone  has  hoped  to  avoid.”   “The  Gathering  Storm,”  Weekly  Standard,  October  29,  2002.   Also  see  Eliot  A.  Cohen,  “World  War  IV,”  Wall  Street  Journal,  November  20,  2001;  Phil  McCombs,  “The  Fire  This  Time,”  Washington  Post,  April  13,  2003;  Norman  Podhoretz,  “How  to  Win  World  War  IV,”  Commentary,  February  2002;  Idem,  “World  War  IV:  How  It  Started,  What  It  Means,  and  Why  We  Have  to  Win,”   

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Commentary,  September  2004;  Brian  Whitaker,  “Playing  Skittles  with  Saddam,”  Guardian,  September  3,  2002.    

211  Ron  Kampeas,  “After  Restructuring,  AIPAC  Plans  to  Focus  on  Wider  Range  of  Issues,”  JTA,  September  26,  2005.   

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